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ABSTRACT 
  
EFFECTS OF TRANSITIONAL POLICIES ON LABOR MARKET OUTCOMES 
FIFTEEN YEARS AFTER TRANSITION: THE CASE OF UKRAINE AND 
LITHUANIA 
 
By 
 
OLGA PAVLOVA 
 
December 2006 
 
Committee Chair:     Dr. Julie L. Hotchkiss 
Major Department:     Economics 
 
 
This dissertation explores how different labor market policies implemented 
following the transition to market system in Eastern Europe affected labor market 
outcomes.  As the result of different policies implemented countries of Eastern Europe 
that were very similar at the beginning of the transition achieved different economic 
outcomes. We focus on Lithuania and Ukraine that represent two groups of countries 
with respect to the broad approach to economic transition.  Our analysis explores change 
in gender wage gap in the two countries as well as evolution in returns to human capital. 
We compare labor market institutions and composition of the labor force for these 
two countries.  Labor market of the Soviet Union serves as a reference point for this 
comparison. The data from Household Budget Surveys is utilized for this analysis. 
Returns to education levels are examined in both countries.  We find no evidence 
of increase in returns to higher education in Ukraine following the decentralization of the 
wage setting system.  However, higher educated workers in Lithuania were able to 
benefit from the transition. 
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The second part of this dissertation focuses on evolution of the gender wage gap.  
We decompose gender wage gap using Oaxaca decomposition as well as Juhn, Murphy, 
and Pierce decomposition.  We consistently find that it is the “unexplained” component 
that is single handedly responsible for the gender wage differential in both countries.
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CHAPTER I 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
As a result of the break up of the Soviet Union and transition to a market 
economy, Eastern European countries and former Soviet Republics experienced 
significant political, economic, and social changes.  15 years into transition, these 
countries are still a subject of extensive research.  Several broad paths of economic 
transition have been identified.  While the Eastern European and Baltic states constitute 
the more successful group of reforming countries, Southern European and former Soviet 
Republics have proven to be less successful.  A significant portion of research work is on 
countries of Eastern Europe and Russia, which in part is attributed to greater availability 
of data.  Much less is known about other transitional economies especially the former 
non-Russian republics of the Soviet Union.  Moreover, while much has been learned so 
far about the macroeconomic aspects of the transition, less is known about the social and 
labor market aspects. 
To fill the gap, this dissertation will concentrate on the two former Soviet 
Republics of Ukraine and Lithuania.  The purpose of this work is to study how different 
institutional, social, and policy factors, affect labor markets outcomes.  These factors also 
include wage-setting mechanisms in these two countries. Specifically, changes in returns 
to human capital and gender wage differentials will be examined and compared for the 
two countries.  As such, changes in the overall wage structures resulting from different 
institutional and economic arrangements and its effect on gender wage differentials will 
be investigated. 
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Motivation 
 
15 years ago, the labor markets of Ukraine and Lithuania were characterized by 
the same institutional arrangements since the two countries were a part of the Soviet 
Union. With independence and different transition paths, the labor market institutions of 
Ukraine and Lithuania have become very dissimilar.  Moreover, Lithuania as one the new 
European Union (EU) members adopted a set of reforms generally followed by Central 
European countries and Baltic States.  Ukraine, on the other hand, followed a different 
transition path more consistent with the general path of former Soviet Union (FSU) 
republics1. 
The market reforms, including labor market and social policies, in different FSU 
countries and Central and Eastern European countries varied substantially.  They were 
administered at different speeds, with different degrees of consistency, and focused on 
different issues.  As such, macroeconomic stabilization was achieved at different times.   
As a result of economic and political reforms, labor markets of transitional 
countries experienced major restructuring. The main changes that took place include the 
emergence and subsequent growth of the private sector, high unemployment previously 
unknown, and declining labor force participation rates, especially among women.  In the 
Central European Countries and Baltic States, growth of the private sector as well as 
small private business was relatively fast. However, private sector output accounts for 
only less than half of the GDP in most FSU countries.   
                                                 
1 Although Lithuania was a republic of the FSU, it was part of the Soviet Union only for about 40 years.  Its 
path of transition is also more consistent with that of Central and Eastern European countries.   
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In the more successful group of countries, unemployment is higher, especially 
among the young and less educated. On the other hand, in the less successful group of 
countries, unemployment is lower. In the later group of countries, the older and more 
educated are disproportionately represented among the unemployed. There is increasing 
demand for workers of “new” professions such as finance, accounting, and management 
while the need for specialists trained to work in the Soviet-type, now outdated 
establishments, decreased significantly.  Consequently, certain skills and experience 
obtained during the old times became obsolete.   
In addition, legal and institutional frameworks changed substantially. While 
Eastern European and Baltic countries implemented policies to ensure that wages in 
lower paid occupations do not decrease much below wages in higher paid occupations, 
FSU countries instituted policies to promote free and unregulated competition in the labor 
market.  At the same time, while most of the FSU countries kept extensive social benefits 
(often to be paid by the employer), other transitional economies adopted social benefit 
policies which cover smaller groups of recipients but provide higher levels of benefits.  
The experiences of the two countries–Ukraine and Lithuania–which represented two 
different approaches to economic and labor market transition, can be used to study how 
different courses of policies affect labor market outcomes of the populations in those 
countries. In other words, this could serve as a good natural experiment in the sense that 
the two countries started out at the same point as part of the FSU. As mentioned above, 
the labor market outcomes examined in this dissertation are returns to education and 
gender wage differentials. 
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Comparison of these labor market outcomes resulting from different institutional 
policies such as wage setting mechanisms, minimum wage policies, social benefits, and 
other labor market regulations will provide an opportunity to see how different 
approaches to the regulation of economic and labor market institutions affect the welfare 
of different population groups.  Since a number of these policies, such as the allowed 
length of and compensation during maternity leave are not gender neutral and are likely 
to affect males and females differently; gender aspects of labor market outcomes are 
given special attention.   
Accordingly, the first part of this dissertation focuses on studying how different 
economic policies relative to the common point of departure of artificially compressed 
wages affected the returns to different levels of education in the two countries.  In other 
words, we seek to explore the following questions: Do higher educated workers benefit 
disproportionately more from the transition since wages are no longer set according to 
specific wage grids that are uniform across the economy? Are the benefits relatively 
larger for Lithuania, which followed a more structured transitional approach?  With the 
emergence of the private sector, where wage setting is different from that in the public 
sector, are there differences in returns to education across sectors?  Since the private 
sector is more developed in Lithuania, do these results differ across the two countries?  
Further, is there a difference in returns to education for those who acquired their human 
capital under the socialist system and those who have “new” education that is more 
consistent with the demands of the market economy?  How do these results differ 
between the two countries given that the Lithuanian economy seems to be more 
consistent with Western developed economies?   
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While there is an extensive body of research that focuses on changes in returns to 
human capital in Central and Eastern European countries in transition, not much is known 
about Lithuania and specifically Ukraine.  It has been demonstrated numerous times in 
the existing research on the subject that when the wage structure is no longer compressed 
by state policy, more educated workers experience disproportionate increases in their 
relative wages.  This trend is expected in Lithuania where economic and labor market 
institutions are similar to Central European countries.  However, a different outcome is 
expected in Ukraine. As will be shown in detail later, the demand for and supply of 
human capital is different in Ukraine. Ukraine is also characterized by different economic 
and labor market institutions relative to Central European countries and Lithuania in 
particular.   
Our analysis indicates that the returns to education in Ukraine are well below that 
in developed market economies.  This is especially true for higher education. Further, 
contrary to what one would expect, returns to education declined over time.  According to 
the Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, about five million Ukrainian workers are 
employed abroad where the wages are higher.  Therefore, this wage setting system, 
coupled with other institutional arrangements, may result into further brain drain. 
Moreover, relatively low returns to education may result into decreased demand for 
education by younger Ukrainians leading to the deterioration of the human capital stock. 
On the other hand, returns to education are relatively higher for higher levels of education 
in Lithuania. This is consistent with most Central European and other Baltic states. 
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In addition, contrary to expectations, we find that in both countries wages in the 
public sector are higher relative to the private sector. Moreover, returns to education in 
the private sector are also relatively lower in both countries.  
The second part of the dissertation focuses on gender wage differentials.  Did the 
different labor market policies adopted in the two countries result in different economic 
outcomes for females relative to males?  In other words, are the labor market policies 
adopted by the two countries gender neutral or gender specific?   
The importance of understanding the dynamics of female/male wage differentials 
lies in the fact that it affects the position of females in society. Low gender wage ratios 
increase the economic dependence of women on men as well as help push single mothers 
into poverty, which has an adverse impact on children.  These effects are likely 
exacerbated in Ukraine and Lithuania where divorce rates are higher than even in other 
transitional economies.  The divorce rate in Ukraine is almost 3.4 per thousand people 
while the average for all Eastern European countries2 is 2.5.3 In Lithuania, 80 percent of 
divorced couples have children4 who, in Eastern Europe, traditionally stay with the 
mothers.  The number of children born to mothers who never marry and therefore do not 
receive alimony payments also increased tremendously. In Lithuania 4 to 6 percent of 
children were born out of wedlock during the Soviet times.  This number increased to 7 
percent in 1990 and to 22.6 percent in 2000.5  In Ukraine this number increased from 
11.2 in 1990 to 17.3 percent in 2000.6 
                                                 
2 Currently, all of the Eastern European countries are in transition to a market economy.  Any statistic for 
Eastern European countries is therefore equivalent to statistics for transitional economies. 
3 Since population in Eastern European countries is generally old, if divorce rates were computed using the 
percentage of marriages ending up in divorce then the rates would be much higher.  
4(UNDP 2000) 
5 (UNDP 2000) 
6 (State Statistics Committee of Ukraine 2003) 
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Female/male wage differentials also affect the economic well-being of female 
retirees.  Pensions consist of basic and supplementary parts where the latter is based on 
the person’s wages before retirement.  At the same time, females account for more than 
two-thirds of the population over age of 65 in both countries.7 As a result, a big segment 
of retirees is driven into poverty. 
This dissertation will contribute to the existing literature by helping to understand 
how different policy approaches to economic transition affect economic outcomes – 
returns to education and gender wage differentials-in Ukraine and Lithuania.  Our 
findings can also be generalized to compare the two common approaches to 
transformation to a market economy adopted by Central European and Baltic countries 
vis-à-vis FSU countries.   
Much less is known about social and labor market aspects of economic transition 
of FSU countries.  Our detailed investigation of returns to human capital and gender 
wage differentials in Ukraine attempts to expand this less developed part of transitional 
literature.  Moreover, while some findings in this dissertation for Ukraine are different 
from other studies that focus on similar research questions, they are not counterintuitive.  
On the contrary, once the composition of and policies regulating the labor market are 
well studied and understood, the results are not surprising and shed more light on the path 
of economic transition followed by the FSU countries. 
The remainder of this dissertation is structured as follows.  The remaining part of 
this Chapter describes institutional details of labor markets of the former Soviet Union, 
which describes the common starting point for economic transition in Ukraine and 
                                                 
7 (United Nations Economic Commission for Europe 2003) 
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Lithuania. This is followed by a brief overview of the two countries as case studies.  
Chapters II and III focus on the institutional and policy evolution of labor markets of the 
two countries in the post-Soviet era.  Chapter IV provides an overview of the micro level 
data used to answer the research questions posed in this dissertation.  Changes in returns 
to human capital resulting from the institutional arrangements and labor market polices 
described in Chapters II and III are investigated in detail in Chapter V.  Chapter VI 
studies the effect of these policies on gender wage differentials in Ukraine and Lithuania.  
Finally, Chapter VII provides a summary of results and concludes the dissertation. 
 
Labor Policies and Institutions of the Soviet Union 
 
Labor market institutions of the Former Soviet Union were quite different from 
those in the Western countries.  Under the Soviet economic system, priority was given to 
heavy industries and the defense sector. As such, other sectors of the economy were 
allocated what remained of the national resources after allocations to the above 
mentioned sectors.  The relative importance of different economic sectors was 
determined by central planners and not by the market.  Employment in terms of location 
and occupation were also determined by central planners.8  
Unemployment was at the minimum because being unemployed was a criminal 
offense during some periods of the Soviet history.  Even during times when being 
unemployed was not a criminal offense, it was considered socially unacceptable. Labor 
mobility was also very limited due to required housing registration and shortages. The 
                                                 
8 The exact number of employees in each enterprise and each grade and job cell within the enterprise was 
determined by the planners. See Brainerd (1998) for details on Soviet labor policies. 
  9 
 
 
one-enterprise town system also restricted labor mobility under the centrally planned 
economy.  
Female labor force participation (LFP) was very high.  Initially it was forced to 
support the growing industrialization of the Soviet Union and to promote female 
emancipation. To encourage female LFP, there were free kindergartens, day care centers, 
and summer resorts for children (Brainerd 2000).  Katz (2002), however, points out that 
the female working life was 5 years shorter than that of men, women worked shorter 
hours on average, and women on maternity leave, which was extended to 18 months in 
1982, were considered to be “at work.” 
Formally, the Soviet constitution ensured equal rights for men and women in all 
spheres of the labor market.  “The equal pay for equal work” provision was introduced in 
Soviet Labor Code in 1922 (Politbureau SSSR 1922).  This provision, together with 
specific wage grids, prevented open discrimination in the labor market.  However, 
discriminatory promotional practices were present and accounted for a part of the gender 
wage differential (Jurajda 2001; Newell and Reilly 1996).  Instead of ensuring real equal 
opportunities, the main emphasis was placed on women’s social protection through 
extensive benefits and assistance tied to child birth and child care, labor benefits and 
special measures to support women with children, and restricting usage of female labor 
for heavy and harmful work (Zhurzhenko 1998).  According to Katz (2002), Soviet 
women spent more time performing paid work than women in developed Western 
economies. Further, Katz  (2002) points out that they spent relatively more time on 
unpaid household work.  Among those employed in industry, women spent twenty-nine 
hours a week on average on housework while men spent only eleven hours.  This 
  10 
 
 
disproportionate amount of time spent on housework, together with extensive benefits, 
had an adverse affect on women’s careers (Katz 2002).   Consequently, employers 
viewed female workers as being less devoted to the enterprise.  That view led to lower 
earnings and much fewer promotions among females. 
There was a difference in male and female employment by economic sector. 
Women constituted 80 percent of the health sector, 75 percent of the education sector, 
and over 70 percent in light industry.  Men dominated heavy industry, mining, and 
energy sectors of the economy (Katz 2002).  Occupational segregation existed but 
predominantly female occupations were different from those in major industrialized 
countries.  A striking difference from Western industrialized countries is that women in 
the FSU region dominated the medical professions and were well represented in technical 
professions such as engineering.  Still, according to some researchers, occupational 
segregation was low compared to major industrialized capitalist nations (Brainerd 2000; 
Newell and Reilly 1996).  Nevertheless, a number of researchers find that occupational 
segregation accounted for a significant part of the gender wage differential (Ogloblin 
1999).   Vertical segmentation, implying that women occupy lower positions within the 
same economic sectors, was present.  Within organizations, relatively few women were 
promoted to positions of authority such as managers or foremen (Katz 2002). 
Wages were set by central planners as a multiple of the base wage (the wage of 
the lowest grade occupation with the lowest education and lowest tenure).  There was not 
much variation between different occupational groups.  Top managers usually earned two 
times as much as the average manual worker.  This ratio is 20:1 in the United States 
(Brainerd 1998).  Workers were also paid bonuses from plan fulfillment.  There were 
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very narrow wage differentials between occupations with wages being higher for manual 
workers who generally have a primary education.  Returns to education were generally 
low for both men and women, possibly because of the high overall level of education and 
oversupply of human capital (Newell and Reilly 1996).  At the same time, a significant 
part of work compensation was in the form of non-wage benefits which did not 
significantly vary with pay.  Enterprises provided workers with free vacations at resorts, 
day care and other child services, health care services, and at times even distributed free 
goods (Brainerd 1998). 
Although women were disproportionately represented in the lower paid 
occupations, there was a relatively high female/male wage ratio since there was not much 
variation in wages and the minimum wage was kept relatively high by international 
standards (Brainerd 1998).  The female/male wage ratio is believed to have been 0.7 on 
average (Newell and Reilly 1996).  As Katz (2002)  and Filler and Hanousek (2002) point 
out, we can only “believe” since official statistics on the gender wage gap were published 
only once in the history of the USSR, in 1989, and then only in the form of tables of 
distribution in wage brackets of men and women. 
The estimated gender wage ratio of 0.7 is likely to be an underestimate since 
wages were reported monthly in the Soviet Union, and possibly women worked fewer 
hours throughout the year due to their domestic responsibilities.  In addition, the Soviet 
Statistical Department included plan fulfillment bonuses in their reported monthly wages, 
and these bonuses most often went to men (Robinson 1998).  Finally, as was mentioned 
previously, non-pecuniary benefits accounted for a large part of the compensation for 
work.  As women were entitled to more extensive benefits than men, the female/male 
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wage ratio of monetary compensation should be expected to be smaller than the overall 
compensation ratio. 
 
Ukraine and Lithuania as Case Studies 
 
Lithuania and Ukraine are two former republics of the Soviet Union, and are the 
two countries that will be analyzed in this dissertation.  As mentioned earlier, the 
countries represent two different broad paths of economic transition.9  
Lithuania is a small country of about four million people located on the Baltic 
Sea.  It was annexed for the last time by the Soviet Union in 1945 following the end of 
World War II.  Ukraine, on the other hand, is a larger country of about fifty million 
people bordering Russia, Belarus, Poland, Romania, and Bulgaria.  The eastern part of 
Ukraine became a member of the USSR in 1918.  The western part of Ukraine was 
annexed from Poland in 1945.  Lithuania became independent in 1990 and Ukraine in 
1991 when their transformation to a free market economy began. 
Ukraine and Lithuania had very similar labor markets 15 years ago.  Both 
countries had strong industrial and agricultural sectors, homogenous populations with 
similar labor market characteristics, and the same labor market policies since both were 
Soviet republics at that time.  However, since the beginning of the transition, Ukraine and 
Lithuania have taken very different paths with respect to political and economic 
restructuring, including labor market reforms.  There are two general paths of transition 
identified in the literature.  Central European and Baltic countries constitute one group 
                                                 
9 See Pavlova and Rohozynsky (2005) for a discussion on labor markets of different transitional countries 
as well as different transition paths. 
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while countries of the FSU constitute another.  Lithuania belongs to the first group of 
countries, which are now members of the EU and are regarded as more successful 
reformers.  The initial decline in GDP levels in these countries was accompanied by large 
layoff of workers while those who remained employed were able to maintain relatively 
decent income.  At the same time, the unemployed were supported by a relatively 
generous social safety net.  In FSU countries, including Ukraine, despite massive drops in 
GDP, unemployment remained at relatively low levels.  The adjustment took the form of 
lower real wages (see Table 1).  Labor relations were governed by the old Soviet norms 
restricting the ability of enterprises to fire redundant employees.  Consequently, it was 
cheaper for employers to cut hours and/or wages leading to the phenomenon of 
artificially low unemployment.   
 
Table 1. Employment and GDP dynamics in Lithuania and Ukraine, Average 
Growth 
 Ukraine Lithuania 
 GDP Employment GDP Employment
1994 -23.0 -3.8 -9.8 -5.8 
1995 -12.2 3.0 3.3 -1.9 
1996 -10.0 -2.1 4.7 -0.7 
1997 -3.0 -2.7 7.0 -5.7 
1998 -1.9 -1.1 7.3 0.8 
1999 -0.2 -1.6 -1.8 1.0 
2000 5.9 -3.3 4.0 n/a 
2001 9.2 -0.9 6.5 -2.1 
2002 4.8 n/a 6.7 -0.3 
2003 5.5 n/a 6.0 n/a 
Source: (EBRD 2003) 
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In addition, high payroll and social security taxes, which employers had to pay in 
Ukraine and other FSU countries, made it unprofitable for the enterprises to pay higher 
wages.  High wages bills and the inability to fire excessive labor force from stagnating 
enterprises led to large wage arrears in those countries10 as well as low labor force 
mobility that slowed down enterprise restructuring.  This phenomenon was especially 
pronounced in such sectors of the economy as metallurgy, mining, and machine building 
(EBRD 2003). The concentration of such enterprises is especially high in Ukraine.  As a 
result, enterprise restructuring, creation of new workplaces, and re-education of the labor 
force was taking place at a very slow pace compare to central European and Baltic 
countries.  Without vibrant new enterprises, and with the closing of some enterprises, 
labor moved to low-productivity sectors of the economy. 
While Central European and Baltic countries have undergone social reforms 
restricting qualification for benefits while ensuring decent benefit amount, the Ukrainian 
labor code still closely resembles the old Soviet labor code.  Persons still qualify for 
unemployment and other welfare benefits on the basis of being part of a certain 
demographic group,11 and the size of the benefits is still unreasonably small.  In addition, 
the Ukrainian government is running arrears on payment of social benefits making them 
virtually non-existent.  Women are still entitled to generous maternity leaves of 3 years. 
Further, there are limitations on the types of work that can be performed by women, 
especially expectant mothers.   
                                                 
10 Ukraine along with Russia, Kazakhstan, and Croatia is among countries with the highest level of wage 
arrears while this phenomenon is virtually non-existent in Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Hungary, and Czech 
Republic.  It is discussed in Earle and Sabirianova (2002) that wage arrears run by firms are a signal to the 
government of the inability of these firms to pay high payroll taxes. 
11 For example under current law every unmarried mother of a child under six receives some help from the 
government regardless of her income. 
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Countries that are more successful with the reforms, and are further along the 
transition process, experienced a greater shift in labor demand towards more skill and 
education.  These more successful countries, including Lithuania, were able to attract 
more Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) leading to relatively higher demand for skill.  In 
contrast, labor markets of the FSU countries are characterized by relatively low demand 
for skilled labor.  Export revenues in Ukraine and other FSU countries rely almost 
exclusively on natural resources despite low labor costs.  In addition, the rate of technical 
and organizational enterprise restructuring is relatively low (EBRD 2003).  This may 
have limited the demand for skilled labor.   
As a result of different policies, labor markets in Ukraine and Lithuania are now 
diverse and, of course, both differ from the Soviet labor market.  The following two 
chapters of the dissertation describe labor markets of the two countries in more detail.  
The main aspects of the two labor markets and how they differ from the Soviet labor 
market are summarized in the Appendix A. 
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CHAPTER II 
THE LABOR MARKET IN UKRAINE IN THE POST-SOVIET ERA 
 
As mentioned in the introductory Chapter of the dissertation, our focus is to 
explore the effect of contrasting labor market policies on returns to human capital and 
gender wage differentials.  The analysis looks at two case studies–Ukraine and Lithuania.  
To that end, this Chapter will provide a brief overview of the Ukrainian labor market 
following the economic transition.  This Chapter will describe the key elements of the 
composition of the labor force as well as selected key labor market policies.   
 
Composition of the Labor Force 
 
The Ukrainian labor force is declining due to aging and to a general population 
decrease.12  Women comprise about half of the labor force.  According to the official 
statistics, LFP rates are relatively high (between 88 and 95 percent) with no apparent 
difference between genders (Table 2).  However, these figures can be misleading because 
some persons who are officially employed are working very few hours or on 
administrative leaves.  In addition, the aggregate Figure does not reveal the differences in 
LFP rates of females of different age groups.   
                                                 
12 Population decrease in Ukraine is caused by high levels of emigration, low birth rates, and high death 
rates. 
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Table 2. Ukraine: Labor Force, Employed, and Unemployed by Gender 
 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Labor Force  
Total (thousands of persons) 25,562 26,111 26,085 25,935 22,747 23,127 22,755 22701.7 22,614 
Females (thousands of persons) 12,763 12,921 13,237 13,179 11,013 11,230 11,076 11088.8 11,053 
Males (thousands of persons) 12,798 13,189 12,848 12,755 11,733 11,896 11,678 11612.9 11,562 
Females (% of the total labor force) 50% 49% 51% 51% 48% 49% 49% 49% 49% 
Males (% of the total labor force) 50% 51% 49% 49% 52% 51% 51% 51% 51% 
Employed 
Total (thousands of persons) 24,125 24,114 23,755 22,998 20,048 20,419 20,238 20,400 20,555 
Females (thousands of persons) 12,132 11,981 12,124 11,757 9,750 9,915 9,863 9,984 10,084 
Males (thousands of persons) 11,992 12,132 11,631 11,240 10,298 10,504 10,374 10,416 10,470 
Total (% of the total labor force) 94% 92% 91% 89% 88% 88% 89% 90% 91% 
Females (% of the female labor force) 95% 93% 92% 89% 89% 88% 89% 90% 91% 
Males (%of the male labor force) 94% 92% 91% 88% 88% 88% 89% 90% 91% 
Unemployed (based on the ILO definition) 
Total (thousands of persons) 1,437 1,998 2,330 2937.1 2698.8 2707.6 2516.9 2301 2059.5 
Females (thousands of persons) 631 940 1,113 1422 1263.3 1315.4 1213.1 1104.6 968.4 
Males (thousands of persons) 806 1,057 1,216 1515.1 1435.5 1392.2 1303.8 1196.4 1091.1 
Total (% of the total labor force) 6% 8% 9% 11% 12% 12% 11% 10% 9% 
Females (% of the female labor force) 5% 7% 8% 11% 11% 12% 11% 10% 9% 
Males (%of the male labor force) 6% 8% 9% 12% 12% 12% 11% 10% 9% 
Source: (State Statistics Committee of Ukraine 2003) 
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The Ukrainian labor force is highly educated.  The results of the national census 
conducted in 2001 indicate that 29 percent of the population has obtained post-secondary 
education.13  However, the post-Soviet era in Ukraine has seen changes in the demand for 
different types of post secondary-education. For example, there has been a relative 
increase in the demand for university education compared to vocational training.  The 
number of university students has doubled in the last decade, while it is not ascertained 
that all children go to primary school.  Most of the increase in university students has 
been absorbed by small private colleges that emerged after the collapse of the Soviet 
Union.  Anecdotal evidence suggests rampant corruption in these colleges.  The 
admission criteria or standards are unclear and questionable.  As such, it is reasonable to 
expect the quality of higher education to have gone down compared to the Soviet era. 
A disproportionately large number of people are employed in industry14 and 
agriculture reflecting the fact that Ukraine was the industrial and agricultural base of the 
Soviet Union.  This composition of the economy also reflects the fact that the economic 
structure of Ukraine still retains features of the FSU.   
The Ukrainian statistics ministry does not report the number of males and females 
in different occupations.  The closest statistic available is a number of males and females 
by industry (Table 3).  The Duncan Index calculated using these data is 0.31 but this 
number can be deceiving.15  There is gender segregation within industries which is not 
captured by the broad classification used in the Table.  For example, in the industrial 
                                                 
13 Ukrainian Ministry of Statistics does not report population by educational level rather by number of 
pupils enrolled in different educational institutions.   The Figure from the Census above includes also those 
who have incomplete postsecondary education. 
14 In this context industry is a term used by the Ukrainian Ministry of Statistics to refer to broad production 
of goods including heavy industrial production as well as manufacturing. 
15 See Table 3 for the computation of Duncan Index. 
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sector males dominate priority sectors such as fuel and ferrous metals.  Females dominate 
in light industries.  Also, in science and scientific services the majority of scientists are 
men while majority of workers who perform services are women (Zhurzhenko 1998). 
 
Table 3. Ukraine: Employed Population by Industry and Sex in 2001 (percent) 
 Males Females 
 100 100 
Industry 29.9 22.1 
Agriculture 22.4 11.8 
Forestry 1.4 0.3 
Fishing 0.4 0.1 
Transportation 8.6 4.0 
Communications 1.5 2.6 
Construction 6.9 2.3 
Trade 3.2 4.6 
Restaurant Services 0.3 0.8 
Technical Services 0.5 0.3 
Small Scale Food Processing 0.5 0.3 
Information and Computing Services 0.1 0.1 
Geology, Exploring of Minerals 0.3 0.2 
Not-Industrial kinds of household services of population 0.5 0.5 
Housing Services 1.2 1.6 
Utilities 3.9 2.4 
Domestic Services 0.2 0.5 
Health and Social Services 3.4 16.3 
Education 6.6 18.5 
Culture 1.0 2.3 
Art 0.3 0.3 
Science and Scientific Administration 1.6 1.4 
Finance, credit, and Insurance 0.8 1.6 
Government 4.7 5.4 
Duncan Index: 1/2sum|Fi/F-Mi/M| 0.31 
Source: (State Statistics Committee of Ukraine 2002) 
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The number of males and females by occupation is available from the 
International Labor Organization (ILO) statistics (Table 4).  Despite the fact that the nine 
broadest occupational definitions are used, the Duncan Indexes calculated are almost 40 
percent. 
 
Table 4. Ukraine: Employed Population by Occupation and Sex 
 1999 2000 2001 
 men women men women men women 
Legislators and Senior Officials 62% 38% 64% 36% 63% 37% 
Professionals 34% 66% 35% 65% 36% 64% 
Technicians, Associate Professionals 39% 61% 39% 61% 37% 63% 
Clerks 13% 87% 11% 89% 11% 89% 
Service, Shop, Market Sales Workers 29% 71% 29% 71% 30% 70% 
Skilled Agriculture, Fishery Workers 37% 63% 38% 62% 39% 61% 
Craft and Related Trade Workers 82% 18% 83% 17% 84% 16% 
Plant Operators, Assemblers 80% 20% 80% 20% 78% 22% 
Elementary Occupations 48% 52% 47% 53% 47% 53% 
Duncan Index-1/2*sum|Fi/F-Mi-M| 37% 38% 37% 
Source: ILO Statistics 
 
 
The private sector in Ukraine grew slower relative to other economies in 
transition.  By the middle of the 1990s the private sector accounted for about half of the 
GDP while this Figure was about 70 percent for more advanced transition economies 
including Lithuania.  Privatization began at a later stage of transformation and focused 
primarily on large industrial enterprises (EBRD 2003).  Moreover, as a result of the 
privatization process, monopolization of the economy by nomenclatura16 took place 
(Zhurzhenko 1998).  The literature distinguishes between de facto and de novo firms with 
the former being previously existing and privatized firms and the later are newly created 
                                                 
16 The term nomenclatura was used for the high level Communist Party members who were very powerful 
and well connected during the Soviet times.  Currently, economic power is disproportionately concentrated 
in the hands of the old party leaders and the individuals connected to them. 
  
 
21  
(Konings and Walsh 1999).  In Ukraine, the creation of de novo firms has been relatively 
slow.   
Ukraine has one of the largest informal sectors among transitional economies.  Its 
size is estimated to be equal to half of the size of the official economy by Schneider and 
Burger (2005) and equal to the full size of the official economy by Kaufman and 
Kaliberda (1996).  Moreover, according to Schneider and Burger (2005), 41 percent of 
the labor force was employed in the informal sector in 1999. 
The presence of a large informal sector implies that the official labor market 
statistics could be distorted.  The officially unemployed, underemployed or economically 
inactive could be actually employed in the informal sector constituting unofficial or 
informal employment.  In part, the unofficial employment is a reaction of enterprises to 
the restrictions imposed on them by government regarding firing redundant employees, 
employer contribution to social benefit taxes, etc. The unofficially employed have no 
legal protection.  They can be hired or fired at any time, without any contract, severance 
pay or social benefits. 
The official unemployment rates in Ukraine are about 10 percent with no 
significant differences between males and females (Table 2).  However, these statistics 
are only an approximation of the real unemployment rate.  Some of those who declare 
themselves unemployed are actually employed in the informal sector.  On the other hand, 
the economy is characterized by hidden unemployment.  Hidden unemployed include 
those individuals who work fewer weeks or hours than desired or work for no 
compensation.  In October 1997, an estimated 12 percent of workers in total national 
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employment worked part time.  The majority did so not because of the desire to work 
shorter hours but due to the initiative by enterprise management (ILO 1997). 
Another unemployment phenomenon specific for Ukraine is that workers with 
higher education are over represented among the unemployed.  Possible reasons for this 
unemployment composition include low demand for skills, oversupply of highly educated 
persons, and skill mismatches.  Schools prepare workers with the skills better suited for 
the old economy and which are obsolete in the new market.  The most vulnerable group 
of people are the older highly educated women, who cannot find new jobs because they 
are considered overqualified, and not easily trainable (ILO 1997). 
 
Labor Market Policies 
 
Wages as well as bonuses and indexations are set by collective bargaining 
agreements.  The government, in a negotiation with trade unions17 in which all unions are 
invited to participate, establishes wage coefficients18 in each industrial sector in the form 
of a General Collective Bargaining Agreement.  This agreement is followed by regional 
and enterprise level agreements (Bureau of Democracy 2002).  These agreements set 
wage coefficients for different categories of workers and branches of industry on the 
basis of the minimum wage, which therefore plays the major role in the entire wage 
structure of the economy.  This wage setting mechanism has two aims: to prevent wage 
inflation and to decrease wage differentials between different industries and sectors of the 
economy.   
                                                 
17 Trade Unions is the term used for labor unions 
18 Wage coefficients refer to the multiples of minimum wage used to determine the range of wages in 
different sectors of the economy. 
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In reality, sometimes an informal agreement takes place between an employer and 
an employee regarding wages, hours of work, and the part of wage to be paid “in 
envelopes”.  Wages in the informal sector are set by an informal agreement between an 
employer and employee and all wages are paid under the Table. 
The minimum wage is decided by the Cabinet of Ministers.  There is still no input 
from unions and employers in deciding how high the minimum wage should be.  
Therefore, the minimum wage has no relation to the subsistence minimum, no indexation 
mechanism, and no negotiated level (ILO 1999).  By the mid-nineties the minimum wage 
fell to a fraction of the average wage. The decline in the minimum wage influenced not 
only workers at the bottom of the wage tariff system but also all other categories of 
workers whose wages are determined on the basis of the minimum wage.  Because social 
benefits are also linked to the minimum wage, its decline in real terms heavily eroded the 
real value of unemployment benefits and other social benefits.  However, starting in 
1996, the minimum wage began to recover, reaching almost 50 percent of the average 
wage by 2000 and staying at about 40 percent of the average wage after that (Figure 1).  
Different unemployment policies were instituted during the transitional period.  
The majority of these policies are passive, including early retirement and unemployment 
benefits to the unemployed.  Being unemployed, and within eighteen months of the 
official retirement age, an individual is placed for an early retirement.  At the same time, 
a very small proportion of the population is covered by active policies such as labor 
market training and professional orientation (ILO 1999).   
In accordance with employment protection policy, an employer has to pay 
severance pay for half a year in case of employment termination.  Under these 
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circumstances, the majority of Ukrainian employers find it rational to keep an excessive 
workforce at their enterprise while greatly reducing hours and sending their employees on 
unpaid leaves (Verhovna Rada of Ukraine 2003).  Ironically, there are benefits for 
workers under this arrangement.  In order to be eligible for a larger pension, one has to 
have an uninterrupted work career. 
 
Figure 1. Ukraine: The Minimum Wage as a Percentage of the Average Wage 
 
Figure 1.  The Minimum Wage as a Percentage of the Average Wage, 1900 - 2003
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CHAPTER III 
THE LABOR MARKET IN LITHUANIA IN THE POST-SOVIET ERA 
 
Similar to the description of the Ukrainian labor market provided in the preceding 
Chapter, this Chapter provides a brief overview of the Lithuanian labor market.  The 
Chapter will describe key elements of the labor force composition as well as major 
policies implemented since the attainment of independence.  The policies described in 
this Chapter were part of the country’s transition to a market economy.  As mentioned 
earlier, we hypothesize that contrasting policies implemented in Ukraine and Lithuania 
account for the variation in labor market outcomes observed in the two countries.  
 
Composition of the Labor Force 
 
The size of the Lithuanian labor force is slowly declining due to the rapid aging of 
the population.  Women comprise almost half of the total labor force (Table 5).  
However, the female labor force participation rate is almost 10 percentage points lower 
than that of men for age groups between 20 and 24 years of age (Department of Statistics 
to the Government of the Republic of Lithuania 2003) which suggests withdrawal from 
the labor market during the child bearing period.  The reasons for this apparent 
withdrawal are not clear.  There are several plausible explanations; females might be 
voluntarily withdrawing from the labor market, they could be forced to go on maternity 
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leave by their employers, or could be financially forced to withdraw due to the high cost 
of child care which is no longer as subsidized by the state.   
 
Table 5. Lithuania: Labor Force, Employed and Unemployed by Gender 
 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
 Labor Force 
Total (thousands of persons) 1,716 1,705 1,671 1,635 1,630 1641 
Females (thousands of persons) 823 835 826 805 801 810 
Males (thousands of persons) 892 869 845 830 829 831 
Females (% of the total labor force) 48% 49% 49% 49% 49% 49% 
Males (% of the total labor force) 52% 51% 51% 51% 51% 51% 
 Employed 
Total (% of the total labor force) 87% 85% 84% 83% 86% 88% 
Females (% of female labor force) 88% 87% 86% 85% 87% 88% 
Males (% of male labor force) 85% 84% 81% 80% 85% 87% 
 Unemployed 
Total (% of the total labor force) 13% 15% 16% 17% 14% 12% 
Females (% of female labor force) 12% 13% 14% 15% 13% 12% 
Males (% of male labor force) 15% 16% 19% 20% 15% 13% 
Source: (Department of Statistics to the Government of the Republic of Lithuania 2003) 
 
 
Educational attainment of the Lithuanian labor force is relatively high.  About 20 
percent of the employed population has a university degree.  Only 3 percent of the 
population has a primary or less than primary education.  Women are more educated than 
men on average.  For example, 24 percent of employed women had university degrees in 
2001, compared to 16 percent of men  (Department of Statistics to the Government of the 
Republic of Lithuania 2003). 
Table 6 shows the occupational composition of the labor force.  Duncan indexes 
for different occupations calculated by gender are about 35 percent for the period 1998 
through 2001.  Men are over-represented among skilled and unskilled manual workers, 
such as craftsmen, assemblers, and plant and machine operators.  The share of men is also 
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relatively high among legislators, senior officers, and managers.  Women, on the other 
hand, are over-represented as service workers, skilled and semi skilled professionals, and 
shop workers.  However, they are underrepresented among entrepreneurs, accounting for 
only 40 percent in the newly created enterprises.  Vertical segmentation is evident in 
some occupations. For example, in the teaching occupation, 86 percent of teachers in 
general schools are women.  The number of women teachers declines as the level of 
educational institution increases.  The majority of university teachers are men 
(Department of Statistics to the Government of the Republic of Lithuania 2003). 
 
Table 6. Lithuania: Employed Population by Occupation and Sex 
  1999 2000 2001 
 MalesFemales Males Females Males Females
 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Legislators, senior officers, managers 11.6 7.5 9.5 6.8 7.9 6.9 
Professionals 8.2 19.9 8.2 20.4 9.1 21.7 
Technicians, associate professionals 4.6 10.3 5.2 10.2 6.1 11.9 
Clerks 1.7 7.4 1.8 7.7 1.4 7.2 
Service workers, shop, sales workers 6.9 16.4 8.1 16.8 7.8 18.1 
Skilled agricultural, fishery workers 17 14.4 18.1 14.1 17 11.2 
Craft and related trade workers 22.5 10.3 23.4 9.8 24.7 10.6 
Plant and machine assemblers 16.8 2.4 16.2 2.8 17.5 2.9 
Elementary Occupations 10.4 11.3 9.3 11.2 7.9 9.4 
Armed Forces 0.4 0.1 0.3 0 0.5 0 
Duncan Index: 1/2sum|Fi/F-Mi/M|   0.34   0.34   0.36 
 
 
Although the labor force participation rate in the new Lithuanian economy did not 
decrease significantly, there is evidence of a relatively high unemployment rate (Table 5).  
It is also important to note that the unemployment figures provided in Table 5 are 
probably understated.  Slavic ethnic minorities are not considered unemployed because 
they do not have the same residency status.   
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At the beginning of the transition, enterprises had an incentive to reduce 
employment to correct the overstaffing inherited from the Soviet era.  At the same time, 
as the economy restructures, there is a need for people with a different set of skills. In 
addition, work experience and job related skills acquired under the previous system 
become obsolete.   
Since the beginning of the transition, unemployment rates for women have been 
lower than that of men (Table 5).  Lithuania is unique in this respect among transitional 
countries.  As a result of the feminization of the public sector discussed earlier, men are 
over-represented in the private sector of the economy.  Further, the private sector is 
characterized by higher unemployment rates.  Also, due to the restructuring of the labor 
market, there is increased demand for higher education.  Those persons who did not 
acquire more than basic education now constitute the majority of the long-term 
unemployed (Department of Statistics to the Government of the Republic of Lithuania 
2001). 
Since the very beginning of the transition, there has been heavy restructuring and 
privatizing of the economy.  The Lithuanian private sector is growing rapidly and 
accounting for the major share of employment (Department of Statistics to the 
Government of the Republic of Lithuania 2003). At the same time, the average size of an 
enterprise decreased.  Almost all large industrial and building enterprises have been 
privatized and split into smaller units.  Small and medium business enterprises (up to 50 
employees) developed very intensively.  Among 128,000 registered enterprises in 
Lithuania, 80 percent were small and medium enterprises.  However, they employed only 
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23 percent of the employed population (Department of Statistics to the Government of 
the Republic of Lithuania 2003). 
However, while some sectors of the economy became completely privatized, such 
as manufacturing and construction, some sectors remain completely public, such as 
education and health.  This privatization pattern accounts for the fact that currently 
women are over-represented among public sector employees while men constitute the 
majority of workers in the private sector.  Men were traditionally employed in 
manufacturing while women usually took jobs in education and health. Surprisingly, 
according to the official data, public sector employees receive higher wages than private 
sector employees (Table 7).  This is likely due to the illegal employment activities taking 
place in the private sector where employees are paid “in envelopes” (Department of 
Statistics to the Government of the Republic of Lithuania 2001). 
 
Table 7. Lithuania: Average Monthly Earnings by Economic Sector (litas) 
 Whole Economy Public Sector Private Sector 
 Women Men Women Men Women Men 
1995 356 494 357 500 353 483 
1996 534 709 546 756 487 619 
1997 685 920 680 970 694 857 
1998 886 1152 909 1234 842 1058 
1999 968 1182 1020 1322 881 1066 
2000 956 1170 980 1272 918 1087 
2001 962 1181 989 1288 925 1109 
Source: (Department of Statistics to the Government of the Republic 
of Lithuania 2003) 
 
 
The shadow economy in Lithuania is smaller than in Ukraine, estimated at 30 
percent of GDP in 1990 and for 20 percent of GDP in 1998 (Kaufman and Kaliberda 
1996). 
  
 
30  
Labor Market Policies 
 
Wages in the public sector are calculated according to a formula that takes into 
account occupation, rank, educational level, and years of service.  In the private sector, 
however, wages are set by collective bargaining agreements at the enterprise level.  In the 
wage setting process, employers are constrained by the minimum wage provision.  
Employers are also required to pay overtime wage rates for hours of work in excess of 
forty hours a week. The Lithuanian government kept the minimum wage at a relatively 
high level, and also relative to the average wage  
The Lithuanian government has developed a comprehensive labor code that 
resembles labor codes of western countries and provides comprehensive coverage of 
different aspects of the labor market.  The new labor code sets rules and guidelines 
regarding different types of employment contracts, wages, responsibilities of employers 
and employees, social protection, and safety and health of employees at work.  The laws 
outlined in the labor code can be enforced in courts of law, which is different from the 
situation in less advanced transitional economies. 
Social protection laws and benefits outlined in the new labor code, though not as 
extensive as those in the Soviet Union, are more generous that in the USA and resemble 
those in Western Europe.  Every employee is guaranteed twenty eight days of annual 
leave for which he/she is paid by the employer.  Maternity leave is no longer 3 years 
during which a new mother’s job had to be saved by the employer and should be paid her 
salary.  Currently maternity leave is 70 calendar days before the child birth and 56 
calendar days after.  There is still a number of provisions, however, regulating labor of 
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pregnant women, such as preventing employers from assigning heavy manual labor or 
long and inconvenient hours to expectant mothers.  However, these provisions are more 
flexible than similar provisions in the old Soviet Code.  The labor policy that does not 
give women excessive benefits over men is beneficial to women’s position in the labor 
market since they are viewed as less costly employees. 
In the USSR, individuals were given their jobs by the state. Some kind of 
affirmative action was implemented for females and ethnic minorities.  Lithuanian 
legislation still in some respects gives priority to certain population groups and 
establishes employment quotas for them.  Additionally, new active employment policies 
that focus on job creation, training programs, and better enforcement of the labor 
legislation have been put in place. 
Lithuanian employers face a relatively high cost of dismissal.  Employers can 
terminate workers if there are valid reasons for dismissal, including business needs and 
poor performance on the part of the worker, with the burden of proof being on the 
employer.  An employer has to give two months advance notice prior to dismissal and 
offer one to three months of severance pay depending on tenure.  Employment protection 
regulations are better enforced in large unionized firms. This implies the law affects firms 
differently depending on their size. 
  
 
32  
 
 
CHAPTER IV 
THE DATA 
 
The empirical analysis in this dissertation employs data from a series of 
household budget surveys. For Ukraine, the available data are from the surveys 
conducted in 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, and 2003.  The data for 1995 and 1996 are also 
available.  However, about 30 percent of the respondents in those earlier years were 
affected by wage arrears.  Consequently, given the survey design it is impossible to 
establish the salaries for one third of the respondents. In addition, wage arrears are not 
gender neutral.  For these reasons, the earlier data for Ukraine is not used.  For Lithuania, 
the data is available only for 2000.  Consequently, we do a more detailed empirical 
analysis for Ukraine in the sense that we examine the effects of reforms over time.  
Data for Ukraine are obtained from the Committee of Statistics of Ukraine.  Data 
for Lithuania are obtained from the World Bank.  Each survey consists of household level 
and individual level questions.  Although the surveys in both countries were conducted 
following the common model provided by the World Bank, the scope of the surveys and 
specific questions are slightly different reflecting the initial lack of experience in 
conducting nationally representative surveys.  For Ukraine the specific questions differ 
slightly across years reflecting the rapid change in the state of the economy.19  
                                                 
19 For example, the legal form of business ownership changed over time following changes in the law.  At 
the beginning of the transition, the most common form of business ownership was state ownership or 
partial state ownership.  This changed following the privatization of state enterprises.  
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Our analysis is restricted to individuals of working age.  This includes males 
between 20 and 60 years and females between 20 and 55 years, reflecting the legal 
pension age which differs across gender.  Self-employed, students, entrepreneurs, and 
those working for no pay are excluded from the analysis.  Table 8 presents means of 
demographic variables of the respondents across years for Ukraine.  Table 9 presents the 
same information for Lithuania.  Married respondents include those legally married and 
in civil unions for Lithuania and only those legally married for Ukraine.  In Ukraine, the 
percentage of married individuals declines while the percentage of single and widowed or 
divorced individuals increases during the period of the analysis.  It is important to note 
that information on marital status in Ukraine is not as detailed as that in Lithuania.  For 
example, there is no information on couples in civil unions. Females constitute a 
disproportionately large share of the divorced or widowed, more so in Ukraine than in 
Lithuania. 
The average age of respondents is almost 40 years.  An average woman in the 
sample is slightly younger than the average man, reflecting the lower legal retirement age 
for women. Almost 40 percent of the respondents in Ukraine and fifty 6 percent in 
Lithuania are heads of their households.  This is expected given that the average 
household size in both countries is slightly above three.  The exact relationship between 
different household members is not defined in the Ukrainian survey. In some part of the 
analysis, the number of children younger than 7 years in the household is used as a proxy 
for the number of the individual’s children under 7 years of age.  On the other hand, the 
Lithuanian survey provides a pointer that links children and mothers in the same 
household.  This allows us to obtain the number of kids under seven for each individual 
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mother in Lithuania.  The number of individuals above pension age with no income other 
than the state pension is also imputed for each household since their presence can affect 
labor market decisions of the working members of the household.   
 
Table 8. Ukraine: Means from household surveys 1999-2003 (unweighted data, age 
20-60 (men) and 20-55 (women)) 
 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Marital Status      
Married 0.75 0.74 0.73 0.71 0.71 
     Men 0.79 0.77 0.76 0.74 0.74 
     Women 0.72 0.71 0.70 0.69 0.68 
Single 0.14 0.14 0.15 0.16 0.16 
     Men 0.16 0.17 0.18 0.19 0.19 
     Women 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 
Divorced/Widowed 0.11 0.12 0.12 0.13 0.14 
     Men 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.07 0.07 
     Women 0.16 0.17 0.18 0.19 0.20 
Average Age 38.76 39.10 39.18 39.21 38.96
     Men 39.81 39.91 39.99 39.81 39.49
     Women 37.80 38.37 38.48 38.67 38.50
Head of Household 0.41 0.42 0.41 0.41 0.42 
     Men 0.48 0.48 0.47 0.46 0.47 
     Women 0.35 0.36 0.36 0.37 0.37 
LFP = 1 0.68 0.68 0.69 0.69 0.66 
     Men 0.71 0.70 0.71 0.71 0.68 
     Women 0.66 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.63 
Highest Level of Education Completed      
Elementary 0.11 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.07 
     Men 0.13 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.07 
     Women 0.09 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 
Secondary 0.25 0.27 0.26 0.26 0.24 
     Men 0.26 0.27 0.27 0.26 0.24 
     Women 0.23 0.26 0.25 0.26 0.24 
Vocational Training 0.17 0.19 0.21 0.20 0.25 
     Men 0.20 0.23 0.25 0.24 0.30 
     Women 0.14 0.16 0.17 0.16 0.20 
Specialized Secondary 0.28 0.25 0.25 0.28 0.23 
     Men 0.23 0.21 0.21 0.22 0.19 
     Women 0.32 0.29 0.30 0.33 0.28 
Higher 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.18 
     Men 0.15 0.16 0.15 0.15 0.17 
     Women 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.19 
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Table 8. Ukraine: Means from household surveys 1999-2003 (unweighted data, age 
20-60 (men) and 20-55 (women)) continued 
 
 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Household Characteristics      
Number of People in the Household 3.60 3.52 3.44 3.40 3.39 
     Men 3.62 3.56 3.47 3.43 3.42 
     Women 3.59 3.48 3.42 3.38 3.35 
Number of Children less than 7  0.25 0.23 0.22 0.21 0.22 
     Men 0.24 0.22 0.21 0.19 0.20 
     Women 0.27 0.24 0.24 0.22 0.23 
Number of Pensioners 0.27 0.16 0.15 0.17 0.17 
     Men 0.30 0.16 0.16 0.17 0.18 
     Women 0.24 0.15 0.13 0.16 0.16 
Household Labor Income* 2079 2845 3880 4792 2703 
     Men 2089 2875 3990 4913 2776 
     Women 2070 2818 3784 4684 2639 
Household Non-Labor Income* 428 550 703 948 503 
     Men 454 596 773 1012 538 
     Women 404 508 642 892 473 
Total Household Income excluding respondent* 1482 1980 2680 3397 1911 
     Men 1318 1748 2396 3065 1708 
     Women 1631 2189 2928 3693 2091 
Type of Residence      
City 0.35 0.36 0.36 0.37 0.38 
     Men 0.34 0.35 0.34 0.36 0.36 
     Women 0.37 0.38 0.37 0.39 0.40 
Town 0.31 0.30 0.30 0.29 0.30 
     Men 0.31 0.30 0.30 0.29 0.30 
     Women 0.31 0.30 0.31 0.29 0.30 
Rural 0.33 0.34 0.34 0.34 0.32 
     Men 0.35 0.35 0.36 0.36 0.33 
     Women 0.32 0.32 0.33 0.33 0.31 
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Table 8. Ukraine: Means from household surveys 1999-2003 (unweighted data, age 
20-60 (men) and 20-55 (women)) continued 
 
 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Geographic Region of Residence      
Kiev 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.05 
     Men 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.05 
     Women 0.03 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 
South 0.14 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.14 
     Men 0.14 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.14 
     Women 0.14 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.14 
West 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.23 0.23 
     Men 0.24 0.25 0.24 0.23 0.23 
     Women 0.23 0.23 0.23 0.23 0.23 
East 0.25 0.26 0.26 0.25 0.25 
     Men 0.25 0.26 0.25 0.24 0.25 
     Women 0.26 0.27 0.27 0.25 0.25 
North 0.13 0.13 0.12 0.13 0.13 
     Men 0.13 0.16 0.13 0.13 0.13 
     Women 0.13 0.13 0.12 0.13 0.12 
Central 0.16 0.15 0.16 0.16 0.15 
     Men 0.16 0.13 0.16 0.16 0.15 
     Women 0.15 0.14 0.16 0.16 0.15 
Crimea 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 
     Men 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 
     Women 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 
Sample Size 11512 11162 10912 10919 11640
     Men 5488 5298 5080 5152 5458 
     Women 6024 5864 5832 5767 6182 
 
 
About 70 percent of the respondents of the working age are employed in Ukraine 
and about 80 percent in Lithuania.  Labor force participation is not equal by gender and 
age group in the two countries.  Figures 2 and 3 plot LFP rates by age group for 
Ukrainian males and females.  These figures show more even patterns for males across 
the analysis period.  For females, being in childbearing years greatly reduces probability 
of LFP.  Only by the age of 40 to 45 male and female LFP rates converge.  In Lithuania, 
LFP rates are higher for every age group compared to Ukraine over the period of analysis 
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(Figure 4).  Employment of Lithuanian females exhibits a more similar pattern to that of 
males.  About 90 percent of females between 25 and 30 are employed, which is much 
higher proportion than in any given year for Ukrainian females of the same age group.  
The female employment rate drops to 85 percent for the age group of 30 to 35, reflecting 
the older age of child bearing.  For subsequent age groups the female employment rate is 
not much different from that of men.  The differences in female employment patterns 
between the two countries are not surprising.  The withdrawal of Ukrainian females from 
the labor market in their childbearing years might reflect more generous maternity leave 
policies with employers having to bear the costs.  Consequently, employers regard 
younger females as too expensive/problematic to hire.   
 
Table 9.  Lithuania: Means of Household Survey 2000 (unweighted data, age 20-60 
(men) and 20-55 (women)) 
Variable 
All 
persons Males Females 
Demographic Variables    
Married 0.74 0.8 0.67 
Single 0.15 0.16 0.14 
Divorced/Widowed 0.11 0.04 0.19 
Average Age 39.78 40.36 39.19 
Head of Household 0.56 0.65 0.46 
LFP=1 0.84 0.84 0.83 
Highest Level of Education Completed    
Elementary 0.13 0.17 0.08 
Secondary 0.38 0.4 0.36 
Secondary Special 0.31 0.28 0.35 
University 0.18 0.15 0.21 
Household Characteristics    
Number of People in the Household 3.53 3.59 3.46 
Number of Children less than 7 0.24 0.27 0.22 
Number of Pensioners 0.13 0.12 0.14 
Household Labor Income 1096.86 1094.75 1098.98 
Household Non-Labor Income 152.58 155.89 149.26 
Sample Size 5176 2592 2584 
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Figure 2.  Ukraine: Labor Force Participation by Age Group. Females 1999-2003 
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Figure 3. Ukraine: Labor Force Participation by Age Group. Males 1999-2003 
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Figure 4.  Lithuania: Labor Force Participation by Age Group. Males and Females 
2000 
Figure 4. Lithuania: Labor Force Participation by Age Group. 2000. Males and Females
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The dataset used in the analysis also includes non-labor income sources.  Total 
non-labor income of an individual includes alimony payments, stipends, pensions, grants, 
etc.  Non-labor income of each household is calculated by summing non-labor incomes of 
the individual household members.  Non-labor household income is on average about 
one-fifth and one-tenth of total household labor income in Ukraine and Lithuania 
respectively.  Prior to the collapse of the Soviet Union about 15 years ago, transitional 
countries had socialist regimes.  Consequently, residents of these countries did not have 
an opportunity to accumulate private assets that would provide them with sizable and 
stable non-labor income sources.  Household labor income is a sum of wages of all 
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working household members.  It is measured in Litas and Hryvnas in Lithuania and 
Ukraine respectively. 
Education is coded by the highest level of education completed.  In Ukraine, 
educational levels consist of elementary, general secondary; vocational; specialized 
secondary; incomplete higher; and completed higher education.  Those who are defined 
to have elementary education consist of those with primary education or less.  There are 
extremely few individuals with less than elementary education since until recently 
education through this level (8 years of schooling) was compulsory.  Since labor market 
outcomes are equally bleak for those with elementary education or less, and since the 
latter group is very small, the two groups are combined.  After the elementary level of 
education (first 8 years), one can continue and complete the general secondary level of 
education or get a vocational degree or specialized secondary degree.  Specialized 
secondary degree requires 3 or 4 more years of education.  General secondary school 
graduates can also obtain vocational or specialized degrees requiring 1 or 2 additional 
education years.  General secondary degree graduates as well as secondary specialized 
degree graduates can also join a university to pursue a high education degree, which 
requires 5 to 6 years.   
The educational system in Ukraine was reformed in 1999.  Prior to 1999, general 
secondary education consisted of eleven grades and currently it consists of twelve grades 
after the reform.  Also, bachelor degrees were introduced in 1999.  A bachelor degree is 
awarded after 4 years of studying at a university. Starting in 2002, vocational and 
specialized secondary degrees are no longer among the educational categories.  Instead, 
there is a separate question in the survey asking whether an individual has vocational 
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training or not.  Educational institutions that used to provide specialized secondary 
education are currently referred to as colleges starting 2002 and their graduates hold 
bachelor degrees.  For the sake of consistency, vocational training and bachelor degrees 
of the respondents after 2002 are referred to as vocational and specialized secondary 
degrees. 
The educational system in Lithuania is slightly different from that in Ukraine.  
There is no distinction between vocational and secondary special degrees.  Instead there 
is just one type of vocational training.  The Lithuanian survey also does not included 
incomplete higher education as a category.  It is assumed that those who have some 
higher education are included in secondary education and vocational groups. 
In both countries, the majority of the population has general secondary or 
specialized secondary degrees.  The percentage of the population who hold a university 
degree is about 20 percent throughout the period of the analysis.  In both countries 
females are more educated than males.  More females hold university and secondary 
special degrees while more males hold secondary or elementary education degrees. 
The data on years of schooling is available.  It is not used in the analysis however 
since individuals with the same years of education can hold different degrees, which 
results in differences in pay.  Although the data on tenure is available, it is not used since 
it reflects total number of years worked rather than years worked in the most recent job.  
When tenure is recorded this way, it is highly correlated with age, making it hard to use 
both variables in the analysis.  We use respondents’ age to make inferences about tenure. 
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In Ukraine, the respondents are divided about equally between rural, urban, and 
town areas with a slightly bigger share residing in the cities.20  Residents of eighteen 
administrative arrears are grouped into seven bigger regions: South, North, East, West, 
Central, Kiev, and Crimea.  The arrears that became part of the same region are similar to 
each other in terms of geographic location, economic development, and ethnic and 
religious composition of the inhabitants.  Appendix B describes how these regions were 
constructed.  About 5 percent of the respondents live in Kiev, the capital city.  Another 5 
percent reside in the autonomous republic of Crimea, and the rest are divided evenly 
between the remaining regions.  Not much change in the relative size of the regions is 
observed over the analysis period.  For Lithuania, information on the respondent’s region 
of residence is available but does not indicate the name of the region.  The regions are 
coded numerically.  Therefore, constructing broader regional categories was not possible.   
Table 10 summarizes employment by industry and gender of Ukrainian 
respondents who work for wages because such information is only available for 
employed individuals.  In Ukraine, classification of industries changed more than once 
during the analyzed period.  Industry definitions are constructed across different years.  
The classification of industries is described in Appendix C.  Surprisingly, the 
composition of employment by industry did not change significantly over the analyzed 
period.  About 25 percent of the labor force is employed in industrial production and 
about 20 percent in agriculture.  This lack of change in the proportion employed in 
industrial production and agriculture may be reflecting the slow pace of economic 
reforms in Ukraine.   
                                                 
20 In this survey classification, “urban” is used to refer to cities or large urban centers. 
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Table 10.  Ukraine: Summary of Industry at the Place of Employment (working 
population only, unweighted data, age 20-60 (men) and 20-55 women. 
 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Industry 0.24 0.24 0.23 0.26 0.25 
     Men 0.28 0.29 0.29 0.32 0.32 
     Women 0.20 0.19 0.19 0.20 0.19 
Agriculture, Forestry 0.16 0.15 0.15 0.14 0.12 
     Men 0.21 0.20 0.19 0.19 0.16 
     Women 0.12 0.11 0.11 0.10 0.09 
Construction 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 
     Men 0.08 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.08 
     Women 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 
Transportation and Communications 0.10 0.10 0.09 0.09 0.09 
     Men 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.12 0.12 
     Women 0.06 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.06 
Education, Culture 0.12 0.12 0.11 0.11 0.11 
     Men 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.05 
     Women 0.17 0.18 0.17 0.16 0.17 
Health Care, Physical Culture, Social Security 0.09 0.09 0.10 0.09 0.09 
     Men 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.03 
     Women 0.15 0.15 0.16 0.15 0.15 
Finance, Insurance, Credit, Pension Security 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 
     Men 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 
     Women 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 
State 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.06 0.08 
     Men 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.07 0.09 
     Women 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.06 0.08 
Municipal Utilities, Service Sphere 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.04 0.04 
     Men 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.03 0.04 
     Women 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.04 0.04 
Trade, Public Catering, Input Supply 0.11 0.12 0.12 0.13 0.13 
     Men 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.09 
     Women 0.14 0.15 0.16 0.17 0.17 
Other 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.01 0.01 
     Men 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.01 0.01 
     Women 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 
Sample Size 7,852 7,611 7,522 7,516 7,650
     Men 3,904 3,699 3,604 3,662 3,725
     Women 3,948 3,912 3,918 3,854 3,925
 
 
Employment by industry calculated using the survey data (Table 10) is similar to 
that provided in Table 3.  The figures in Table 3 are obtained from the Ukrainian 
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Ministry of Statistics and cover the entire country.   This consistency between the two 
data sources gives us confidence that our survey sample is representative of the labor 
market situation in Ukraine.  Besides, the survey data also indicates the presence of 
gender segregation as shown in the national statistics.  Relatively more men are employed 
in industry and agriculture, while more women are employed in education, culture, and 
healthcare industries.  
The Lithuanian survey uses different occupational classifications, which are 
consistent with the commonly used ILO definition (Table 11).  A notable difference 
between the two countries is that a much larger share of Ukrainian workers is employed 
in agriculture.  Table 11 indicates the presence of gender segregation.  Females are 
relatively more in Scientific and Intellectual Professionals.  Males are relatively more 
represented in blue color industrial jobs and among legislators and senior officials.  More 
females in intellectual professions might be a result of the fact that females are relatively 
more educated than males in Lithuania.   
 
Table 11.  Lithuania: Summary of Current Occupation at the Place of Employment 
(working population only, unweighted data, age 20-60 (men) and 20-55 (women) 
Occupation All Persons Males Females
Legislators and Senior Officials 0.07 0.08 0.05 
Scientific and Intellectual professionals 0.15 0.09 0.22 
Medium Level Technicians and Professionals 0.10 0.07 0.13 
Office Workers 0.06 0.03 0.09 
Service Workers and Shop and Market Sales Workers 0.12 0.06 0.18 
Agricultural Workers, Farmers, and Fishermen 0.01 0.02 0.01 
Operators and craftsmen of mechanic arts and other trades 0.20 0.27 0.12 
Operators of Installations and machinery and assemblers 0.11 0.20 0.03 
Non-Qualified Workers 0.17 0.17 0.17 
Armed Forces 0.00 0.01 0.00 
Public Sector 0.45 0.37 0.53 
Private Sector 0.55 0.63 0.47 
Sample Size 4319 2164 2155 
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The Ukrainian legal forms of business ownership changed intermittently during 
the analyzed period. Different forms of business ownership relevant to the time of the 
analysis are described in Appendix D.  Table 12 summarizes type of business ownership 
at the place of employment.  The size of the public sector decreased from 56 percent in 
1995 to 50 percent in 2003.  The proportion of persons working in cooperatives fell from 
19 to 8 percent.  At the same time the proportion of people employed in companies 
owned by private individuals increased from 8 to 20 percent. These numbers reflect the 
undergoing privatization process in Ukraine.  Comparatively, the size of public sector in 
Ukraine is larger than that in Lithuania.  The size of the public sector in Lithuania and 
Ukraine in year 2000 was 45 percent and 53 percent respectively. 
 
Table 12.  Ukraine: Summary of Type of Ownership at the Place of Employment 
(working population only, unweighted data, age 20-60 (men) and 20-55 women 
Ownership of the place of employment 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
State 0.56 0.53 0.51 0.48 0.50 
     Men 0.50 0.44 0.44 0.41 0.42 
     Women 0.62 0.61 0.58 0.54 0.58 
Working Collective or Cooperative 0.19 0.15 0.12 0.10 0.08 
     Men 0.23 0.19 0.15 0.11 0.09 
     Women 0.15 0.12 0.10 0.09 0.06 
Stock Company 0.16 0.18 0.19 0.21 0.20 
     Men 0.17 0.22 0.23 0.24 0.24 
     Women 0.14 0.15 0.16 0.17 0.16 
Rented Company 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
     Men 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 
     Women 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
Foreign Ownership 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
     Men 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
     Women 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 
Private Ownership 0.08 0.12 0.15 0.19 0.20 
     Men 0.09 0.12 0.15 0.21 0.22 
     Women 0.08 0.11 0.15 0.18 0.19 
Sample Size 7852 7611 7522 7516 7650
     Men 3904 3699 3604 3662 3725
     Women 3948 3912 3918 3854 3925
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CHAPTER V 
RETURNS TO HUMAN CAPITAL 
 
The purpose of this Chapter is to address the first research question and 
investigate how, as a result of institutional policies and social factors, returns to different 
levels of education in Ukraine changed over the period of 1999 through 2003.  
Additionally, we compare returns to education in Ukraine and Lithuania for the year 
2000. Following the emergence and growth of the private sector, where the wage setting 
mechanism is different from that in public sector, returns to different levels of education 
across sectors are compared. Returns to various levels of education for those with “old 
education,” i.e., education obtained under the Soviet system are compared to returns for 
those with “new education.”  The “new education” is believed to be more consistent with 
the demands of the market economy.  Returns to levels of education for Lithuania and 
Ukraine in 2000 are compared to investigate the effect of different labor market policies 
implemented in the two economies.   
This Chapter is structured in as follows: the first subsection presents the 
background and a brief literature review on returns to education in transitional countries.  
In the second subsection, we discuss the empirical methodology.  We present and discuss 
empirical results on returns to education in Ukraine in subsection three.  This is followed 
by a comparison of returns to education in Ukraine and Lithuania in 2000.  Subsection 
five investigates differences in returns to education across sectors.  In subsection six, 
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returns to the “new” and “old” education are examined.  Finally, the Chapter concludes 
by looking at how policy and social factors led to the observed changes in the returns to 
education and how these results differ between the two countries. 
 
Background 
 
One of the central themes of transitional economic research focuses on changes in 
returns to human capital.  Compared to other countries, returns to education were low21 
prior to the transition for several reasons.  Wage differentials were kept artificially low in 
accordance with the equalization policies of the Communist Party.  As mentioned 
previously, wages were set using specific wage grids.  In order to meet high demand for 
manual labor, caused in part by the low degree of automation, government and 
enterprises used wages as an incentive mechanism to attract workers to these jobs.  
Generally, wage grids were set higher for manual blue-collar jobs than for white-collar 
jobs requiring higher levels of education.  At the same time, workers regarded higher 
education and white-collar jobs as more prestigious and would accept lower wages for 
these jobs (Benitez-Silva and Cheidvasser 2000).  There are very few studies on the 
Soviet labor market due to the lack of available micro-level data and the results of these 
studies may be distorted by the sample selection problem.22   
                                                 
21 Returns to education were low in comparison to Western economies 
22 Two existing studies use surveys conducted on samples of immigrants from the Soviet Union.  Offer and 
Vinokur (1992) use a sample of immigrants who traveled from the USSR to Israel in the early 1970.  
Gregory and Kohlhase  (1988) use an emigrants’ survey based on the Soviet Interview Project.  Katz 
(1999) uses a survey conducted in 1989 in a single Soviet city of Taganrog which is dominated by heavy 
industry and whose population is not representative of the whole country in terms of earnings, educational 
attainment, and occupation. 
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A number of studies demonstrate that since the beginning of the transition, wage 
rewards to skill/higher education have increased.  Orazem and Vodopivec (1995) and 
Stanovnik (1997) find increase in returns to higher education in Slovenia; Flanagan 
(Wage structures in the transition of the czech economy 1995) and Svejnar (1998) in 
Czech Republic; Brainerd (1998) and Sabirianova (2002) and Gorodnichenko and 
Sabirianova (2005) in Russia and Ukraine; Rutkowski (1996) and Rutkowski (1997 ) in 
Poland; Jones and Ilayperuma (2005) in Bulgaria; Halpern and Korosi (1997) in 
Hungary; Anderson and Pomfret (2000) in Kyrgyz Republic; Noorkiv, Orazem, Puur and 
Vodopivec (1998) for Estonia and  Hazans (2003) for Latvia.  Pastore and Veraschagina 
(2006) find a moderate increase in Belarus.  Some of the earlier studies are summarized 
in Svejnar (1998).   
Freeman and Oostendorp (2005) used an ILO survey on wages in 161 occupations 
in over 150 countries and found a sizeable increase in skill differentials favoring skilled 
workers in countries moving from planned to market economies.23 In fact, to the best of 
my knowledge there are only two studies that do not find an increase in returns to higher 
education/skill in transition economies: Benitez-Silva and Cheidvasser (2000) for 
Russia,24 and Krstic and Reilly (2003) for Serbia. 
There is no uniform opinion on the reasons for this observed increase.  Moreover, 
the explanation across different transitional economies need not be the same as it can be 
caused by different factors.  Some research has focused on legal, regulatory, and 
institutional factors that lead to adjustment of wages to market levels.  For instance, it is 
generally agreed that when institutional mechanisms of wage determination change and 
                                                 
23 See Fleisher et al. (2005) for a detailed review. 
24 However, interestingly, Gorodnichenko and Sabirianova (2005) use exactly the same data and find an 
increase in returns to years of education. 
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wages are no longer artificially suppressed by government, returns to higher education 
and skill are expected to increase.  Another explanation was proposed by Schultz (1975) 
who suggested that highly educated individuals are better able to adjust to changing 
opportunities and obtain higher rewards.   
Other causes of higher returns to higher education discussed in the existing 
literature on the subject include technological change, openness to trade, and shift in 
demand for final goods resulting from the restructuring of the economy. 
Moreover, the transition process has been taking place for about 15 years now, 
and two general phases in the movement of relative wages are identified in the literature.  
The first stage reflects the initial adjustment from controlled wage setting to the system 
where wages depend on market processes and worker productivity.  In the second stage, 
once that adjustment has taken place, the growth of relative wages for educated/skilled 
workers slows down and the overall wage structure resembles that in a developed 
economy.  The lengths of the two phases are determined, in part, by the speed, 
consistency, and quality of the economic, institutional, and legal reforms  (Munich, 
Svejnar, and Terrell 2005; Sabirianova-Peter 2003).  
Economic indicators suggest that Lithuania, relative to Ukraine, is a faster 
reformer. Additionally, the quality of reforms in terms of consistency and essence of the 
policies is superior in Lithuania relative to Ukraine. Consequently, Lithuania is expected 
to be in the second phase of the wage adjustment process mentioned above.  On the other 
hand, it is more likely that Ukraine is in the first phase of the adjustment. This would 
suggest that returns to higher education are relatively higher in Lithuania.  In the next 
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subsection of the Chapter, we present the empirical methodology, including the choice of 
variables used in the analysis, given the limitations of the data available. 
 
Empirical Methodology 
 
To investigate the returns to education in Ukraine and Lithuania, the common 
approach is followed, and four different specifications of a Mincerian earning equation 
are estimated for each year and for each country, as follows: 
iiiii uAGEAGEEDUCXw ++++= 2ln γλδβ  (1) 
This first basic human capital specification (HCS) regresses log of monthly wages 
on educational categorical variable EDUC,25 experience measured by AGE, and a vector 
X of other control variables expected to affect earnings including demographic variables, 
regional, and type of residence dummies. 
There are two different approaches to measuring education-by highest degree 
completed and by total years of education.  The latter approach advocated by Layard and 
Psacharopoulos (1974) assumes a constant rate of return to an additional year of 
education.  The former approach advocated by Heckman, Layne-Farrar, and Todd (1995) 
allows the rate of return to differ by level of education completed reflecting the 
“sheepskin” hypothesis.  In light of the fact that number of total years of education is 
self-reported and therefore prone to recall error, different degrees can be represented by 
                                                 
25 Categorical educational variables are slightly different in Ukraine and Lithuania since in Lithuania the 
educational system was reformed to correspond to the EU system.  While in Ukraine where the educational 
system still resembles the Soviet system there are vocational and secondary special educational categories, 
in Lithuania there is only category called vocational training.  Also, incomplete higher educational category 
(those who start tertiary education but do not complete it) is not present.  See Data section for the complete 
description of the data and educational systems. 
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the same years of education; and there is a strong presence of “sheepskin” effect in 
transitional economies.  Therefore, we measure education using the highest degree 
completed.26 
Even though the data on tenure are available, it is missing for a large number of 
respondents and is self reported, which makes it prone to error.  Some researchers used 
imputed years of tenure which are usually computed as “AGE minus 7 minus total years 
of education.”   Total years of education are imputed from the highest degree completed.  
However, this measure is not at all precise because the same level of education can 
require a different number of years of education.  For example, a university degree in 
medicine or law requires 1 or 2 more years to complete than other university degrees.  
Moreover, the number seven in this imputation refers to the fact that generally children 
start their school at seven.  However, a number of children end up starting school at 6 
depending on the month of their birth date.   
In addition, women in the USSR were allowed up to 3 years of maternity leave 
per child. Further, in a lot of surveys including the Ukrainian survey used in this 
dissertation, only information on the number of children in the household is available.  
Information on the exact family relations within the household is not available and, 
therefore, it is impossible to adjust female years of tenure for maternity leave.  For these 
reasons, age of respondents is used as a proxy for years worked.  It is important to note 
however that age is a proxy for the total number of years worked and not the number of 
years worked at the last job. 
In this simple specification we do not control for industry, occupation, and 
sectoral effects.  Therefore, we expect our estimate for returns to education to capture the 
                                                 
26 These approaches are also discussed in Munich et al. (2005). 
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effect of these omitted variables since they are likely correlated with the level of 
education.   
The second specification is augmented specification (AS) and it includes a vector, 
OIS, consisting of occupational, industry, and sector dummies.27  Equation (2) provides 
the general specification of this augmented regression model. 
iiiiiii uOISAGEAGEEDUCXw +++++= φγλδβ 2ln  (2) 
Going one step further than most of the researchers in the transitional human 
capital literature, the possibility that participation in the labor market is not random or 
that E( iu \in sample) ≠ 0 is accounted for.  To correct for the potential sample selection 
bias, we use the Heckman (1979) two step estimation procedure. The first step estimates 
an equation that determines the labor market status of an individual.  Estimates of this 
first step equation are used to construct a selection correction term that is included in the 
earnings regression to obtain consistent estimates.  The labor force participation equation 
is as follows: 
iii exY += β*  (3) 
where: 
*
iY  = 1 if individual i is in the labor force and to 0 otherwise 
ix is a vector of characteristics that affect participation in the labor force 
β– vector of coefficients 
),0(~ 2σie  
                                                 
27 Ukrainian data contains information on industry of employment while no information on occupation.  On 
the contrary, Lithuanian data contains information on occupation but not on industry.  Data from both 
countries contains information on firm ownership even though ownership categories are different reflecting 
different state of the economy in the two countries.  See Data section for the detailed description of these 
variables. 
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Based on the assumption that the error term is normally distributed, the probability that a 
person is in the labor force is 
⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡Φ=−> σ
ββε iii xxP )(  (4) 
and the likelihood function is 
[ ] [ ] )1((1)()( ii yiyi xPxPL −−= βββ  (5) 
Once the selection correction is included in log earnings equations, (1) and (2) become 
iiii ucAGEAGEEDUCXw +++++= λγλδβ 2ln  (6) 
iiii ucOISAGEAGEEDUCXw ++++++= λφγλδβ 2ln  (7) 
Where 
λ  is the selection correction term. 
 
c is the covariance between the error term in the wage and labor force selection 
equations.28 
 
One of the criticisms of Heckman’s two step procedure is that the second stage 
earning equation estimates are often subject to multicollinearity, which has an adverse 
impact on the robustness of the two-step estimator.  In particular, multicollinearity 
becomes a problem if the explanatory variables are highly correlated with the inverse 
Mills ratio.  This is common in applications where the set of variables in the selection and 
earnings equations overlap significantly and the excluded set of variables are not a strong 
predictor of participation (Munich, Svejnar, and Terrell 2005).  To correct for selection 
bias while avoiding the multicollinearity problem, the variables in the participation 
equation are carefully selected and are not the same as variables in the earning equation.  
                                                 
28 For details on this methodology, see Reimers (1984). 
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The variables used to explain the probability of working include the number of 
children in the household under the age of 7, number of retirees in the household over the 
age of 65, geographic region of residence, non-labor income as well as a variable 
indicating whether the respondent is the head of the household.  
With the transition to capitalism, state subsidized day care facilities are no longer 
available while private facilities are very costly.  Due to the costly private day care 
facilities together with policies encouraging child bearing29 and extensive social benefits 
inherited by Ukraine from the Soviet Union (see previous chapters), the transition had a 
negative impact on female participation in the labor market (Bettio and Platenga 2004).  
It has also been argued that, politically and socially, the transition period is marked by 
increasing advocacy of family values on the part of society.  According to (Heinen and 
Wator 2006), women’s roles are now seen as child and home care takers. In her work on 
post-soviet identities of women in Ukraine, Zhurzhenko (2001) identifies house wife as 
one of the two main polar identities. For these reasons, the presence of very young 
children in the household is expected to have a strong negative effect on female labor 
force participation.  The effect is expected to be less pronounced in Lithuania since the 
instituted maternity leaves are shorter and are not paid by the employer.  
As was mentioned previously, transitional countries including Ukraine and 
Lithuania are characterized by rapidly aging populations.  In the majority of families, 
several generations share the same dwelling.  Since the beginning of the transition, the 
real value of state pensions for retirees decreased dramatically.  By 2002, the minimum 
pension in Ukraine was less than $10 (50 Hryvna) per month.  At the same time, an 
                                                 
29 During the Soviet Union and currently, Ukraine and Lithuania are faced with very low birth rates.  The 
policies instituted range from prohibiting abortions and the use of contraceptives during the 1950s and 
1960s to monetary benefits and longer vacations for those who have children. 
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absolute majority of the retired population do not have private savings since under the 
design of the old system, individuals were supposed to rely exclusively on their 
pensions.30  In addition, the medical care is no longer free and its cost is rising rapidly.  
For these reasons the presence of retirees in the household creates financial and 
caretaking responsibilities for other household members.  Usually, caretaking 
responsibilities are shared disproportionately more by females.  Thus, presence of retirees 
in the household is expected to have a negative effect on female labor force participation 
similar to that of young children.  Again, the magnitude of the effect is expected to be 
smaller for Lithuanian females due more generous real valued payments.  
Another very important determinant of labor market participation is 
unemployment. Geographical regions are included to control for differences in regional 
unemployment rates.  Some authors use industry unemployment rates in the selection 
equation.  The data we have does not contain information on the industry of last job for 
the unemployed.  However, in Ukraine specific industries tend to be concentrated in 
particular regions.  For that reason, regional unemployment rates are used as a proxy for 
industry unemployment rates. 
Another commonly used determinant of the decision to work is a person’s non-
labor income.  In transitional economies, however, an absolute majority of the population 
does not have the amount or sources of non-labor income.  This is contrary to developed 
countries where a substantial portion of the population receives non-labor income from 
                                                 
30 In the absence of market economy, working population relied exclusively on wages and fringe benefits 
determined by the state that were enough for basic consumption.  There were no private capital 
accumulation or investment possibilities.  Once retired, individuals relied on state pensions and fringe 
benefits.  The value of state pensions even though lower than wages, was enough to provide for 
consumption possibilities similar to that of working population.  In addition, fringe benefits included free 
and accessible medical care as well as heavily subsidized prices for medications. 
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trust funds, rental income, etc.  Among the most common sources of non-labor income of 
people in transitional economies are government payments such as stipends, grants, and 
alimonies.  These payments alone are usually too little to really sustain the recipients and 
to seriously affect their decision to work.  However, the decision of an individual to 
engage in labor market activities is likely to depend on the total income within the 
household, which constitutes non-labor income to that individual.  Consequently, the 
non-labor income of an individual is defined as a total income of other household 
members. 
 
Returns to Education in Ukraine, 1999-2003 
 
Tables 13 through 18 summarize returns to education obtained using the four 
specifications outlined above for Ukraine 1999-2003.  The reference group is secondary 
education level.  Although it is common elementary education level to be the reference 
group, secondary education level is used since there are too few persons with elementary 
education in our sample.  Hence, selecting elementary education level as a reference 
group can present of excluding a zero vector.  In Ukraine, returns to all levels of 
education relative to secondary education decreased between 1999 and 2003.   Most 
notable, and contrary to what is observed in most of the transitional countries, is the 
decrease in returns to higher education.  Using the HCS and AS estimation methods, the 
results indicate that a university graduate received 66 percent more on average than a 
secondary school graduate in 1999 and only 42 percent more on average in 2003 (Tables 
13 and 16). 
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Table 13.  Ukraine: Returns to Education. Human Capital Specification 1999-2003. 
Males and Females 
 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
VARIABLE 
Coefficient 
(Standard 
Error) 
Coefficient 
(Standard 
Error) 
Coefficient 
(Standard 
Error) 
Coefficient 
(Standard 
Error) 
Coefficient 
(Standard 
Error) 
OLS Human Capital Specification 
ELEMENTARY EDUCATION 
-0.26*  
(0.058) 
-0.142*  
(0.052) 
-0.221*  
(0.046) 
-0.104**  
(0.045) 
-0.239*  
(0.045) 
VOCATIONAL TRAINING 
0.090*  
(0.044) 
0.126*  
(0.033) 
0.113*  
(0.029) 
0.115* 
(0.026) 
-0.001   
(0.024) 
SECONDARY SPECIAL 
0.262**  
(0.038) 
0.324*  
(0.031) 
0.253*  
(0.027) 
0.245*  
(0.024) 
0.154*  
(0.024) 
INCOMPLETE HIGHER 
0.269**  
(0.082) 
0.308*  
(0.055) 
0.215*  
(0.053) 
0.349*  
(0.091) 
0.235*  
(0.063) 
HIGHER EDUCATION 
0.656**  
(0.043) 
0.635*  
(0.033) 
0.505*  
(0.029) 
0.468*  
(0.027) 
0.422*  
(0.025) 
Human Capital Specification.  Two Stage Heckman Estimation 
ELEMENTARY EDUCATION 
-0.122*  
(0.043) 
-0.132*  
(0.044) 
-0.204*  
(0.041) 
-0.096** 
(0.039) 
-0.170*  
(0.040) 
VOCATIONAL TRAINING 
0.095*  
(0.032) 
0.097*  
(0.028) 
0.091*  
(0.025) 
0.094*  
(0.023) 
0.020  
(0.021) 
SECONDARY SPECIAL 
0.185*  
(0.029) 
0.230*  
(0.026) 
0.196*  
(0.024) 
0.186*  
(0.021) 
0.144*  
(0.022) 
INCOMPLETE HIGHER 
0.237*  
(0.062) 
0.230*  
(0.046) 
0.186*  
(0.047) 
0.246*  
(0.081) 
0.243*  
(0.057) 
HIGHER EDUCATION 
0.466*  
(0.034) 
0.479*  
(0.028) 
0.449*  
(0.026) 
0.412*  
(0.024) 
0.404*  
(0.022) 
Note: * means significant at 99% level, ** at 95% level, *** at 90% level 
Note: Other regressors for the OLS estimation also include – type of residence, geographic 
region, marital status, gender, age, age squared.  The complete results of the OLS estimation are 
presented in the Appendix Table E1. 
Note: Other regressors for the Two Stage Heckman estimation also include-type of residence, 
geographic region, marital status, gender, age, age squared.  The regressors in the selection 
equation include – number of children in the household under 7, head of household, non-labor 
income, number of pensioners in the household, geographical region.  The complete results of the 
OLS estimation are presented in the Appendix Table E5. 
 
 
The decrease is much less pronounced when selection into the labor market is 
accounted for.  The corresponding numbers are 47 and 40 percent, respectively.  Using 
AS, the trend remains unchanged.  Returns to higher education drop from 54 to 39 
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percent and from 44 to 43 percent when selection into the labor market is accounted for.  
The effects of selection into the labor market are much more pronounced in the beginning 
of the analysis period.  In1999 the difference in returns to higher education using HCS 
was almost 20 percentage points. This difference reduced to only 2 percentage points by 
2003.  A similar trend is observed when the augmented specification is used.  This trend 
suggests that in 2003 higher education was no longer an important factor affecting 
probability of a person being employed.    While the probability of working was about 10 
percent higher for persons with higher education in 1999, it was actually 4 percent lower 
in 2003 compared to those with only secondary education.  
Returns to vocational and secondary special levels of education decreased also 
although the decrease is less pronounced relative to university degrees.  This trend is not 
completely unexpected. Munich, Svejnar, and Terrell (2005) for Czech Republic and 
Anderson, Pomfred, and Usseinova (2004) for Kyrgyzstan demonstrate similar results.  
However, not consistent with findings of other authors, the relative decline in returns to 
vocational education is less pronounced compared to higher education. 
Over time, changes in returns to levels of education differ between males and 
females.  For females, returns to all levels of education regardless of model specification 
used, decreased over the analyzed period.  On the contrary, males experienced a mild 
increase in returns to vocational training and secondary special education while the 
decrease in returns to higher education is less pronounced.  Relative earnings of a female 
with a university diploma dropped by 31 percent over the analyzed period without when 
selection into the labor market is controlled for and 13 percent when selection into the 
labor market is controlled for.  
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Table 14.  Ukraine: Returns to Education. Human Capital Specification 1999-2003. 
Males Only 
 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Variable 
Coefficient 
(Standard 
Error) 
Coefficient 
(Standard 
Error) 
Coefficient 
(Standard 
Error) 
Coefficient 
(Standard 
Error) 
Coefficient 
(Standard 
Error) 
OLS Human Capital Specification 
ELEMENTARY 
EDUCATION 
-0.334*  
(0.081) 
-0.042  
(0.075) 
-0.208*  
(0.067) 
-0.112***  
(0.061) 
-0.237*  
(0.067) 
VOCATIONAL 
TRAINING 
0.030  
(0.062) 
0.109**  
(0.048) 
0.111*  
(0.042) 
0.189*  
(0.037) 
0.020*  
(0.035) 
SECONDARY SPECIAL 
0.189*  
(0.059) 
0.343*  
(0.048) 
0.260*  
(0.043) 
0.287*  
(0.038) 
0.218*  
(0.039) 
INCOMPLETE HIGHER 
0.105  
(0.130) 
0.394*  
(0.084) 
0.205**  
(0.091) 
0.416**  
(0.170) 
0.208**  
(0.105) 
HIGHER EDUCATION 
0.608*  
(0.066) 
0.605*  
(0.051) 
0.483*  
(0.047) 
0.443*  
(0.041) 
0.433*  
(0.039) 
Human Capital Specification.  Two Stage Heckman Estimation 
ELEMENTARY 
EDUCATION 
-0.225*  
(0.061) 
-0.088  
(0.064) 
-0.209*  
(0.059) 
-0.118**  
(0.054) 
-0.213*  
(0.059) 
VOCATIONAL 
TRAINING 
0.024  
(0.047) 
0.103**  
(0.041) 
0.090**  
(0.038) 
0.145*  
(0.033) 
0.053***  
(0.031) 
SECONDARY SPECIAL 
0.104*  
(0.046) 
0.282*  
(0.042) 
0.232*  
(0.039) 
0.227*  
(0.034) 
0.223*  
(0.035) 
INCOMPLETE HIGHER 
0.114  
(0.101) 
0.334*  
(0.073) 
0.184**  
(0.083) 
0.266***  
(0.154) 
0.238* *  
(0.093) 
HIGHER EDUCATION 
0.429*  
(0.053) 
0.488*  
(0.045) 
0.447*  
(0.043) 
0.398*  
(0.037) 
0.431*  
(0.035) 
Note: * means significant at 99% level, ** at 95% level, *** at 90% level 
Note: Other regressors for the OLS estimation also include – type of residence, geographic 
region, marital status, age, age squared.  The complete results of the OLS estimation are 
presented in the Appendix Table A2. 
Note: Other regressors for the Two Stage Heckman estimation also include-type of residence, 
geographic region, marital status, gender, age, age squared.  The regressors in the selection 
equation include – number of children in the household under 7, head of household, non-labor 
income, number of pensioners in the household, geographical region.  The complete results of the 
OLS estimation are presented in the Appendix Table A6 
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Table 15.  Ukraine: Returns to Education. Human Capital Specification 1999-2003. 
Females Only 
 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Variable 
Coefficient 
(Standard 
Error) 
Coefficient 
(Standard 
Error) 
Coefficient 
(Standard 
Error) 
Coefficient 
(Standard 
Error) 
Coefficient 
(Standard 
Error) 
OLS Human Capital Specification 
ELEMENTARY 
EDUCATION 
-0.127 
(0.082) 
-0.234*  
(0.071) 
-0.214*  
(0.064) 
0.015  
(0.066) 
-0.234*  
(0.058) 
VOCATIONAL 
TRAINING 
0.163*  
(0.062) 
0.120*  
(0.043) 
0.107*  
(0.038) 
0.013*  
(0.036) 
-0.014  
(0.032) 
SECONDARY 
SPECIAL 
0.332*  
(0.049) 
0.232*  
(0.037) 
0.233*  
(0.033) 
0.209*  
(0.030) 
0.097*  
(0.029) 
INCOMPLETE 
HIGHER 
0.426*  
(103) 
0.182*  
(0.065) 
0.185*  
(0.061) 
0.328*  
(0.101) 
0.249*  
(0.074) 
HIGHER 
EDUCATION 
0.712*  
(0.055) 
0.568*  
(0.040) 
0.501*  
(0.036) 
0.485*  
(0.034) 
0.400*  
(0.031) 
Human Capital Specification.  Two Stage Heckman Estimation 
ELEMENTARY 
EDUCATION 
0.019   
(0.060) 
-0.141**  
(0.059) 
-0.173*  
(0.055) 
0.020  
(0.057) 
-0.149*  
(0.052) 
VOCATIONAL 
TRAINING 
0.154*  
(0.046) 
0.115*  
(0.037) 
0.101*  
(0.034) 
0.009*  
(0.032) 
-0.003  
(0.029) 
SECONDARY 
SPECIAL 
0.250*  
(0.0337) 
0.193*  
(0.032) 
0.151*  
(0.029) 
0.158*  
(0.026) 
0.080*  
(0.026) 
INCOMPLETE 
HIGHER 
0.368*  
(0.076) 
0.118**  
(0.056) 
0.161*  
(0.053) 
0.252*  
(0.090) 
0.238*  
(0.068) 
HIGHER 
EDUCATION 
0.500*  
(0.042) 
0.471*  
(0.035) 
0.426*  
(0.032) 
0.422*  
(0.030) 
0.371*  
(0.028) 
Note: * means significant at 99% level, ** at 95% level, *** at 90% level 
Note: Other regressors for the OLS estimation also include – type of residence, geographic region, marital 
status, age, age squared.  The complete results of the OLS estimation are presented in the Appendix Table 
E3. 
Note: Other regressors for the Two Stage Heckman estimation also include-type of residence, geographic 
region, marital status, gender, age, age squared.  The regressors in the selection equation include – number 
of children in the household under 7, head of household, non-labor income, number of pensioners in the 
household, geographical region.  The complete results of the OLS estimation are presented in the Appendix 
Table E7 
 
 
When industry and ownership controls are included, the corresponding decreases 
are 22 and 11 percent.  On the other hand, for a university educated male, the relative 
drop in earnings was 18 percent without controlling for selection into the labor market 
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and 0 percent when controlling for selection into the labor market.  Adding industry and 
ownership controls the corresponding decreases are 10 and 1 percent.  These results also 
demonstrate that higher education has a smaller effect on selection into the labor market 
in 2003 compared to 1999 and the difference is more pronounced for females.   
Looking at Tables E6 and E7 that present the full estimation results, it can be 
observed that that presence of young children and pensioners in the household has 
increasingly negative effect on the probability of females being employed.  Over 
protective policies for female employees in conjunction with luck of state subsidized 
childcare facilities are likely responsible for this observed effect.   
At the same time, the effect of presence of small children in the household is the 
opposite for males-positive and increasing over time. On the other hand, the presence of 
pensioners has the same effect on the selection into the labor market for males and 
females.  Being head of the household has positive effect on the probability of being 
employed for both males and females.  The magnitude of the effect is increasing over the 
analysis period.  However, the magnitude of the effect and its increase is stronger for 
males than for females.   
It is interesting to note that in 1999 the return to a university degree was higher 
for females than males using either specification.  Moreover, the magnitude of the returns 
was comparable to more successful transitional countries.  For example, the return to a 
university degree relative to having only basic education for females was 44 percent in 
Poland in 1997 (Adamchik and Bedi 2003) and 56 percent in Serbia in 1999 (Krstic and 
Reilly 2003) while in Ukraine the corresponding number for 1999 was 59 percent.  In 
Czech Republic, return to a university degree relative to basic education for females in 
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1996 was 65 percent while the corresponding number for Ukrainian females in 1999 was 
71 percent.  However, by 2003 Ukrainian women with university degrees received 
relatively less than Ukrainian males as well as their CEE female counterparts 
 
Table 16.  Ukraine: Returns to Education.  Augmented Specification 1999-2003. 
Males and Females 
 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
VARIABLE 
Coefficient  
(Standard 
Error) 
Coefficient  
(Standard 
Error) 
Coefficient  
(Standard 
Error) 
Coefficient  
(Standard 
Error) 
Coefficient  
(Standard 
Error) 
Augmented Specification. OLS 
ELEMENTARY 
EDUCATION 
-0.001*  
(0.000) 
-0.001*  
(0.000) 
-0.000* 
(0.000) 
-0.000*  
(0.000) 
-0.000*  
(0.000) 
VOCATIONAL 
TRAINING 
-0.152*  
(0.053) 
-0.028  
(0.048) 
-0.098**  
(0.043) 
-0.023  
(0.041) 
-0.136*  
(0.041) 
SECONDARY 
SPECIAL 
0.055  
(0.041) 
0.106*  
(0.030) 
0.097*  
(0.027) 
0.093*  
(0.024) 
-0.017  
(0.022) 
INCOMPLETE 
HIGHER 
0.199*  
(0.036) 
0.230*  
(0.028) 
0.214*  
(0.025) 
0.213*  
(0.022) 
0.131*  
(0.022) 
HIGHER 
EDUCATION 
0.156**  
(0.076) 
0.244*  
(0.049) 
0.173*  
(0.049) 
0.320*  
(0.084) 
0.199*  
(0.058) 
Augmented Specification.  Two Stage Heckman Estimation 
ELEMENTARY 
EDUCATION 
-0.099**  
(0.041) 
-0.041**  
(0.042) 
-0.111*  
(0.038) 
-0.021  
(0.036) 
-0.084** 
(0.037) 
VOCATIONAL 
TRAINING 
0.071**  
(0.032) 
0.111*  
(0.026) 
0.081*  
(0.024) 
0.072*  
(0.022) 
0.010 
(0.020) 
SECONDARY 
SPECIAL 
0.153*  
(0.028) 
0.211*  
(0.024) 
0.182*  
(0.022) 
0.172*  
(0.020) 
0.140* 
(0.020) 
INCOMPLETE 
HIGHER 
0.173*  
(0.059) 
0.234*  
(0.043) 
0.170*  
(0.044) 
0.221*  
(0.077) 
0.216* 
(0.053) 
HIGHER 
EDUCATION 
0.465*  
(0.034) 
0.519*  
(0.028) 
0.470*  
(0.026) 
0.437*  
(0.023) 
0.411* 
(0.022) 
Note: * means significant at 99% level, ** at 95% level, *** at 90% level 
Note: Other regressors for the OLS estimation also include – type of residence, geographic region, marital 
status, gender, age, age squared, industry and sector controls.  The complete results of the OLS estimation 
are presented in the Appendix Table E9. 
Note: Other regressors for the Two Stage Heckman estimation also include-type of residence, geographic 
region, marital status, gender, age, age squared.  The regressors in the selection equation include – number 
of children in the household under 7, head of household, non-labor income, number of pensioners in the 
household, geographical region.  The complete results of the OLS estimation are presented in the Appendix 
Table E13. 
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Table 17.  Ukraine: Returns to Education.  Augmented Specification 1999-2003. 
Males Only 
 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
VARIABLE 
Coefficient  
(Standard 
Error) 
Coefficient  
(Standard 
Error) 
Coefficient  
(Standard 
Error) 
Coefficient  
(Standard 
Error) 
Coefficient  
(Standard 
Error) 
OLS Augmented Specification 
ELEMENTARY 
EDUCATION 
-0.217*  
(0.074) 
0.076  
(0.069) 
-0.086  
(0.061) 
-0.044  
(0.055) 
-0.119***  
(0.061) 
VOCATIONAL 
TRAINING 
0.001  
(0.057) 
0.117*  
(0.043) 
0.085**  
(0.038) 
0.157*  
(0.033) 
-0.002  
(0.032) 
SECONDARY SPECIAL 
0.136  
(0.054) 
0.281*  
(0.044) 
0.198*  
(0.040) 
0.239*  
(0.034) 
0.177*  
(0.035) 
INCOMPLETE HIGHER 
0.024  
(0.119) 
0.316*  
(0.077) 
0.121  
(0.084) 
0.401*  
(0.154) 
0.175***  
(0.096) 
HIGHER EDUCATION 
0.509*  
(0.063) 
0.600*  
(0.048) 
0.454*  
(0.045) 
0.446*  
(0.038) 
0.409*  
(0.037) 
Augmented Specification.  Two Stage Heckman Estimation 
ELEMENTARY 
EDUCATION 
-0.186* 
(0.058) 
0.004 
(0.060) 
-0.100*** 
(0.054) 
-0.037 
(0.049) 
-0.105** 
(0.054) 
VOCATIONAL 
TRAINING 
-0.008 
(0.045) 
0.117** 
(0.038) 
0.072** 
(0.035) 
0.121* 
(0.030) 
0.027 
(0.028) 
SECONDARY SPECIAL 
0.065 
(0.044) 
0.250* 
(0.039) 
0.183* 
(0.036) 
0.187* 
(0.031) 
0.187* 
(0.032) 
INCOMPLETE HIGHER 
0.082 
(0.094) 
0.276* 
(0.068) 
0.119 
(0.076) 
0.265*** 
(0.138) 
0.193** 
(0.086) 
HIGHER EDUCATION 
0.441* 
(0.052) 
0.543* 
(0.044) 
0.461* 
(0.041) 
0.419* 
(0.036) 
0.427* 
(0.033) 
Note: * means significant at 99% level, ** at 95% level, *** at 90% level 
Note: Other regressors for the OLS estimation also include – type of residence, geographic region, marital 
status, age, age squared, industry and sector controls.  The complete results of the OLS estimation are 
presented in the Appendix Table E10. 
Note: Other regressors for the Two Stage Heckman estimation also include-type of residence, geographic 
region, marital status, gender, age, age squared.  The regressors in the selection equation include – number 
of children in the household under 7, head of household, non-labor income, number of pensioners in the 
household, geographical region.  The complete results of the OLS estimation are presented in the Appendix 
Table E14. 
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Table 18. Ukraine: Returns to Education.  Augmented Specification 1999-2003. 
Females Only 
 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
VARIABLE 
Coefficient  
(Standard 
Error) 
Coefficient  
(Standard 
Error) 
Coefficient  
(Standard 
Error) 
Coefficient  
(Standard 
Error) 
Coefficient  
(Standard 
Error) 
Augmented Specification. OLS 
ELEMENTARY 
EDUCATION 
-0.045  
(0.076) 
-0.138*  
(0.067) 
-0.118**  
(0.060) 
0.084  
(0.063) 
-0.155*  
(0.055) 
VOCATIONAL 
TRAINING 
0.109***  
(0.058) 
0.108*  
(0.041) 
0.100*  
(0.036) 
0.008  
(0.034) 
-0.027  
(0.030) 
SECONDARY 
SPECIAL 
0.249*  
(0,047) 
0.185*  
(0.035) 
0.205*  
(0.031) 
0.190*  
(0.028) 
0.084*  
(0.028) 
INCOMPLETE 
HIGHER 
0.299*  
(0.097) 
0.169*  
(0.062) 
0.162*  
(0.057) 
0.287*  
(0.096) 
0.212*  
(0.071) 
HIGHER 
EDUCATION 
0.587*  
(0.054) 
0.544*  
(0.039) 
0.474*  
(0.035) 
0.483*  
(0.034) 
0.371*  
(0.031) 
Augmented Specification.  Two Stage Heckman Estimation 
ELEMENTARY 
EDUCATION 
0.032 
(0.058) 
-0.076 
(0.057) 
-0.111** 
(0.052) 
0.068 
(0.055) 
-0.086*** 
(0.05) 
VOCATIONAL 
TRAINING 
0.149* 
(0.045) 
0.120* 
(0.036) 
0.096* 
(0.032) 
-0.004 
(0.03) 
-0.005 
(0.028) 
SECONDARY 
SPECIAL 
0.223* 
(0.036) 
0.185* 
(0.030) 
0.163* 
(0.027) 
0.159* 
(0.025) 
0.095* 
(0.025) 
INCOMPLETE 
HIGHER 
0.305* 
(0.075) 
0.171* 
(0.053) 
0.171* 
(0.050) 
0.207** 
(0.086) 
0.224* 
(0.065) 
HIGHER 
EDUCATION 
0.497* 
(0.043) 
0.508* 
(0.034) 
0.450* 
(0.031) 
0.450* 
(0.03) 
0.385* 
(0.028) 
Note: * means significant at 99% level, ** at 95% level, *** at 90% level 
Note: Other regressors for the OLS estimation also include – type of residence, geographic region, marital 
status, age, age squared, industry and sector controls.  The complete results of the OLS estimation are 
presented in the Appendix Table E11. 
Note: Other regressors for the Two Stage Heckman estimation also include-type of residence, geographic 
region, marital status, gender, age, age squared.  The regressors in the selection equation include – number 
of children in the household under 7, head of household, non-labor income, number of pensioners in the 
household, geographical region.  The complete results of the OLS estimation are presented in the Appendix 
Table E15 
 
 
While returns to higher education in 1999 are consistent with results from other 
transitional economies, the subsequent decrease is not consistent with other authors’ 
findings.  The first year of the analysis period refers to the middle of the transitional 
  
 
65  
period.31  However, the Ukrainian transition to the market system began only in 1992 and 
initial macroeconomic stabilization was achieved only in 1996.32  Therefore, in 1999, 
Ukraine was at a stage in the transition similar to1995-1996 in Central Europe and Baltic 
states.  As such, returns to education in 1999 were comparable to returns to education in 
other transitional economies a couple of years earlier. This reflects that Ukraine was 
undergoing  initial stages of wage adjustment as discussed by Munich, Svejnar, and 
Terrell (2005) and Fleisher, Sabirianova, and Wang (2005).  To the best of our 
knowledge, there are no studies that estimate returns to levels of education in Ukraine in 
the pre-transition period.  
 
Returns to Education:  Ukraine vs. Lithuania 2000. 
 
Tables 19 and 20 present results from specifications (1) through (4) with and 
without controlling for selection into the labor market for Lithuania.  The results are 
similar to that obtained by Hazans (2003) using a different Lithuanian survey dataset.33  
In our analysis returns to higher education relative to secondary education are between 61 
and 63 percent for different gender groups. Hazans (2003) study reports 59 percent for 
the pooled sample. 
 
                                                 
31 Transitional period here refers to the overall transition of Eastern European and FSU countries and not 
specifically Ukrainian transition 
32In Central Europe and Baltic states transition to a market economy began in 1989 and macroeconomic 
stabilization was achieved much faster. 
33 Hazans (2003) uses Lithuanian Labor Force Survey data.  Specification of the wage equation used is 
similar to HCS specification without accounting for selection into the labor market.  In addition to the same 
explanatory variables used in this work, Hazanas (2003) also includes controls for ethnicity, type of 
economic activity, and type of contracts.  These variables are not available in the Household Budget Survey 
that we are using. 
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Table 19.  Lithuania: Returns to Education.  Human Capital Specification 2000 
Variable 
Males and 
Females 
Males 
Only 
Females 
Only 
OLS Human Capital Specification 
ELEMENTARY 
-0.184*  
(0.032) 
-0.195*  
(0.042) 
-0.116**  
(0.050) 
SECONDARY SPECIAL 
0.178*  
(0.020) 
0.154*  
(0.031) 
0.182*  
(0.026) 
HIGHER EDUCATION 
0.632*  
(0.024) 
0.606*  
(0.038) 
0.628*  
(0.029) 
Human Capital Specification.  Two Stage Heckman Estimation 
ELEMENTARY 
-0.161*  
(0.030) 
-0.171*  
(0.039) 
-0.098**  
(0.047) 
SECONDARY SPECIAL 
0.176*  
(0.020) 
0.158*  
(0.029) 
0.173*  
(0.024) 
HIGHER EDUCATION 
0.620*  
(0.023) 
0.587*  
(0.037) 
0.629*  
(0.028) 
Note: * means significant at 99% level, ** means significant at 95% level, *** 
means significant at 90% level 
Note: Other regressors for the OLS estimation also include –  marital status, age, age squared.  The 
complete results of the OLS estimation are presented in the Appendix Table E4. 
Note: Other regressors for the Two Stage Heckman estimation also include-marital status, gender, age, age 
squared.  The regressors in the selection equation include – number of children in the household under 7, 
head of household, non-labor income, number of pensioners in the household.  The complete results of the 
OLS estimation are presented in the Appendix Table E8 
 
 
Returns to education levels are generally similar in Lithuania to that in Ukraine in 
2000.  For all four specifications of the earnings equation, the relative returns to 
elementary and secondary special education are slightly lower in Lithuania in 2000.  
Relative returns to higher education are identical to that in Ukraine using the simple 
Human Capital specification.  However, unlike in the Ukrainian case, this number does 
not change when selection into the labor market is accounted for using either 
specification.  (See Table 13 for the Ukrainian results and Table 19 for the Lithuanian 
results)  These results imply different composition of the unemployed and dynamics of 
LFP decisions in the two countries.  For Lithuania, the sample of workers whose wages 
are observed appears to be representative of the overall sample, while it is not the case in 
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Ukraine.  Compared to Ukraine, the Lithuanian economy is characterized by a relatively 
high pace of enterprise restructuring, high wages, and high unemployment.  In his 
detailed analysis of unemployment in the Lithuanian labor market, Rutkowski (2003) 
suggests that majority of the unemployed workers gain this status because of fast 
restructuring of the enterprises.  Consistent with results of Rutkowski (2003) it is shown 
in the next Chapter that overall wages are high in Lithuania by transitional standards. The 
overall wage dispersion is low and positively skewed, which is in part attributed to the 
high minimum wage. Moreover, Rutkowski (2003) shows that growth in wages is higher 
than growth in productivity achieved by laying off the excessive labor force in the 
process of enterprise restructuring.  Since the probability of being laid off is much higher 
in Lithuania, the observed characteristics of workers who became unemployed are 
expected to be more similar.   Thus, especially given the compact and positively skewed 
wage distribution, large changes in wage outcomes will not be expected in the case where 
the currently unemployed became employed.  In Ukraine, where enterprise restructuring 
is taking place at a much slower pace and the labor market overall is much less dynamic, 
the probability of being laid off is much less.  It is expected that the unemployed have 
different characteristics than the employed. 
The results of the Heckman two stage wage estimation are presented in the Tables 
E5 through E8.  The “head of the household” variable is the only significant predictor of 
participation in the labor market in a full sample. Given the extremely small size of 
Lithuanian households, more than half of the respondents identified themselves as the 
head of the household (see Table 9).  Moreover, given the small household size, being the 
head of the household is extremely correlated with age and the Lithuanian labor market is 
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characterized by high youth unemployment (see Chapter 3), thus explaining the result.  
On the contrary, in Ukraine, factors such as number of small children in the household, 
number of pensioners in the household, and geographic location, are also important 
determinants of being employed.  At the same time, for Lithuanian females the 
coefficient for the number of children under seven in the household is significant only at 
95 percent level and is much smaller in magnitude than the same coefficient in Ukraine.   
 
Table 20.  Lithuania: Returns to Education.  Augmented Specification 2000 
Variable 
Males 
and 
Females 
Males 
Only 
Females 
Only 
OLS Human Capital Specification 
ELEMENTARY 
-0.108*   
(0.030) 
-0.109*  
(0.040) 
-0.054  
(0.050) 
SECONDARY 
SPECIAL 
0.073*  
(0.020) 
0.082*  
(0.030) 
0.052**  
(0.026) 
HIGHER 
EDUCATION 
0.346*  
(0.029) 
0.344*  
(0.046) 
0.322*  
(0.036) 
Augmented Specification.  Two Stage Heckman 
Estimation 
ELEMENTARY 
-0.094*  
(0.029) 
-0.100*  
(0.038) 
-0.039  
(0.044) 
SECONDARY 
SPECIAL 
0.075*  
(0.019) 
0.086*  
(0.029) 
0.051**  
(0.025) 
HIGHER 
EDUCATION 
0.349*  
(0.028) 
0.345*  
(0.044) 
0.343*  
(0.034) 
Note: * means significant at 99% level, ** means significant at 95% 
level, *** means significant at 90% level 
Note: Other regressors for the OLS estimation also include –  marital status, age, age squared, and 
occupational controls.  The complete results of the OLS estimation are presented in the Appendix Table 
E12. 
Note: Other regressors for the Two Stage Heckman estimation also include-marital status, gender, age, age 
squared, and occupational controls.  The regressors in the selection equation include – number of children 
in the household under 7, head of household, non-labor income, number of pensioners in the household.  
The complete results of the OLS estimation are presented in the Appendix Table E16 
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At the same time, the observed decline in relative returns to higher education 
when the effect of education in allocating workers into low or high-paying occupations is 
excluded is much higher than the corresponding decline resulting from the similar effect 
for industries in Ukraine.  This implies that the premiums associated with different 
occupations in Lithuania are higher than premiums associated with different industries in 
Ukraine. 
Lithuanian females received slightly higher returns to their educational levels than 
Lithuanian males in 2000.34  However, when occupation is controlled for, returns equate 
across genders and males receive even slightly higher premiums for holding university 
degrees.35  These results indicate that one of the positive effects of higher education for 
Lithuanian women is employment in higher paying occupations rather than higher pay 
within an occupation.  Similar to the pooled specification estimation, there is no change 
in relative educational earning profiles by gender when selection into the labor market is 
controlled for. 
 
Returns to Education across Sectors 
 
  In the previous section it was established that as transition in Ukraine 
progressed, returns to education and especially to higher education diminished and more 
so for women than for men.  It was also established that returns to schooling in Lithuania 
are similar to that in Ukraine in 2000 when HCS is used. However, when selection into 
the labor market is controlled for, the results change in Ukraine. On the other hand, in 
                                                 
34 This result is also consistent with Hazans (2003) 
35 This result is also consistent with Hazans (2003) 
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Lithuania controlling for selection does not change the results.  The purpose of this 
section is to investigate whether returns to education are different between public and 
private sectors.36  
While wages in the state sector are still set according to specific grids, these 
restrictions no longer apply to the wage setting process in the private sector.  For that 
reason, returns to human capital in the private sector are expected to be higher. 
In order to test this hypothesis, each country’s sample is divided into two groups-
those who work for the public sector and those employed in the private sector.   As 
discussed in the data section, there are different types of business ownership in Ukraine.  
Any form of ownership other than public is considered to be private. 
Tables 21 and 22 present the results of estimating the HCS equation for sub-
samples consisting of males, females, and both genders combined for Ukraine.  As 
evident from the results, in Ukraine initially returns to education are higher in the private 
sector but convergence is observed by the end of the period.  Returns to education in both 
sectors decreased over the period of analysis.  These results are somewhat counter 
intuitive since we would expect relatively higher and increasing returns to education in 
the private sector as transition progresses. Indeed, previous studies have indicated higher 
returns to education in the private sector relative to the public sector (see Munich, 
Svenjnar, and Terrell [2005a] for Czech Republic).  
 
 
                                                 
36 Some researchers explore this issue one step further and subdivide non-public firms into privatized firms 
that existed under the old system as state firms and newly created de-novo firms (Boeri and Terrell 2002; 
Flanagan Wage structure in the transition of the Czech economy 1995; Konings and Walsh 1999; Munich, 
Svejnar, and Terrell 2005).  Unfortunately, this information is not available in my dataset 
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Table 21.  Ukraine: Returns to Education. Public Sector. 1999- 2003 
 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
 Males and Females 
ELEMENTARY 
EDUCATION 
-0.179*  
(0.067) 
0.135*8  
(0.067) 
-
0.134**   
(0.064) 
-0.032   
(0.063) 
-0.211*   
(0.059) 
VOCATIONAL 
TRAINING 
0.040  
(0.050) 
0.155*  
(0.040) 
0.034  
(0.035) 
0.123*  
(0.033) 
0.044   
(0.029) 
SECONDARY SPECIAL 
0.197*  
(0.042) 
0.243*  
(0.035) 
0.167*  
(0.059) 
0.204*  
(0.029) 
0.126*   
(0.027) 
INCOMOPLETE 
HIGHER 
0.211**  
(0.087) 
0.221*  
(0.057) 
0.170*  
(0.059) 
0.270*  
(0.098) 
0.182*  
(0.068) 
HIGHER EDUCATION 
0.526*  
(0.044) 
0.527*  
(0.036) 
0.377*  
(0.032) 
0.453*  
(0.031) 
0.388*  
(0.027) 
 Males 
ELEMENTARY 
EDUCATION 
-0.264*  
(0.097) 
-0.048   
(0.108) 
-0.072   
(0.106) 
0.033   
(0.100) 
-
0.255**  
(0.101) 
VOCATIONAL 
TRAINING 
0.026   
(0.071) 
0.250*  
(0.066) 
0.030   
(0.057) 
0.167*  
(0.053) 
0.046   
(0.045) 
SECONDARY SPECIAL 
0.166*  
(0.066) 
0.323*  
(0.063) 
0.171*  
(0.056) 
0.242*  
(0.052) 
0.162*  
(0.048) 
INCOMOPLETE 
HIGHER 
-
0.045**  
(0.147) 
0.435*  
(0.103) 
0.153  
(0.112) 
0.254  
(0.205) 
0.173  
(0.124) 
HIGHER EDUCATION 
0.458*  
(0.068) 
0.578*  
(0.063) 
0.352*  
(0.057) 
0.430*  
(0.053) 
0.327*  
(0.046) 
 Females 
ELEMENTARY 
EDUCATION 
-0.056  
(0.094) 
-0.176*   
(0.082) 
-0.201*  
(0.076) 
-0.029   
(0.082) 
-
0.166**  
(0.071) 
VOCATIONAL 
TRAINING 
0.044  
(0.070) 
0.092  
(0.049) 
0.047   
(0.043) 
0.073***  
(0.043) 
0.055  
(0.037) 
SECONDARY SPECIAL 
0.225*  
(0.054) 
0.195*  
(0.040) 
0.165*  
(0.035) 
0.188*  
(0.034) 
0.115*  
(0.032) 
INCOMOPLETE 
HIGHER 
0.384*  
(0.106) 
0.102  
(0.066) 
0.181*  
(0.065) 
0.265**  
(0.102) 
0.187**  
(0.078) 
HIGHER EDUCATION 
0.584*  
(0.057) 
0.499*  
(0.042) 
0.395*  
(0.037) 
0.475*  
(0.035) 
0.436*  
(0.033) 
Note: * means significant at 99% level, ** means significant at 95% level, *** means significant at 
90% level 
Note: Other regressors also include – type of residence, geographic region, marital status, 
gender, age, age squared.   
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Earnings experience in public and private sectors differed for males and females.  
Females experienced higher returns to university degrees than males in the public sector.  
This is not surprising since law enforcement is stricter in public sector.  The general 
decrease in returns to higher education in the public sector over the analysis period is 
from 58 to 44 percent for females and from 46 to 33 percent for males.  In the private 
sector the earnings of educated females were lower at the start of the analysis period and 
deteriorated faster than that for males.  In 2003, a university educated female employed in 
the private sector received only 28 percent more on average than her secondary school 
educated counterpart. On the other hand, the corresponding number for males was 47 
percent.  The higher returns to education for females in the public sector relative to those 
in the private sector could be attributed, in part, to more discriminatory practices in the 
private sector. Further, public sector wages are still determined by wage grids, which 
makes it harder to discriminate.37 
Comparing relative returns to levels of education in Lithuania in 2000, those with 
university degrees or elementary education faired slightly better in the public sector.  
Relative returns for males are slightly higher except for those with elementary education 
employed in the private sector.   Lithuanian university graduates received higher relative 
premiums compared to Ukrainian university graduates in either sector while the situation 
is reversed for those with secondary special degrees. 
 
 
                                                 
37 It is much harder to openly discriminate against females in the public sector since as mentioned 
previously wages are set according to specific wage grids that take into account occupation, grade within 
occupation, educational level, and tenure.  At the same time, labor law enforcement is harder in the private 
sector.  It is much easier for example to pay “in envelopes”. 
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Table 22.  Ukraine: Returns to Education. Private Sector. 1999- 2003 
 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
 Males and Females 
ELEMENTARY 
EDUCATION 
-
0.217**  
(0.089) 
-0.110  
(0.076) 
-
0.156**   
(0.064) 
-0.087   
(0.061) 
-0.213*  
(0.063) 
VOCATIONAL 
TRAINING 
0.140**  
(0.070) 
0.062  
(0.049) 
0.163*  
(0.043) 
0.090**  
(0.037) 
-0.023*  
(0.036) 
SECONDARY SPECIAL 
0.269*  
(0.064) 
0.274*  
(0.0474) 
0.270*  
(0.042) 
0.233*  
(0.036) 
0.141*  
(0.038) 
INCOMOPLETE 
HIGHER 
0.201  
(0.142) 
0.292*  
(0.094) 
0.187**  
(0.085) 
0.421*  
(0.153) 
0.255*  
(0.105) 
HIGHER EDUCATION 
0.618*  
(0.082) 
0.558*  
(0.056) 
0.540*  
(0.051) 
0.377*  
(0.044) 
0.388*  
(0.042) 
 Males 
ELEMENTARY 
EDUCATION 
-
0.259**   
(0.118) 
-0.020*  
(0.099) 
0.175**  
(0.084) 
-0.122*  
(0.076) 
-
0.192**  
(0.085) 
VOCATIONAL 
TRAINING 
0.057*   
(0.093) 
0.023   
(0.065) 
0.156*  
(0.057) 
0.191*  
(0.048) 
0.015*  
(0.048) 
SECONDARY SPECIAL 
0.175**  
(0.092) 
0.301*  
(0.068) 
0.283*  
(0.061) 
0.286*  
(0.051) 
0.234*  
(0.054) 
INCOMOPLETE 
HIGHER 
0.211  
(0.198) 
0.306**  
(0.127) 
0.188   
(0.134) 
0.573**  
(0.258) 
0.190  
(0.156) 
HIGHER EDUCATION 
-0.619*  
(0.116) 
0.568*  
(0.077) 
0.531*  
(0.073) 
0.362*  
(0.059) 
0.465*  
(0.059) 
 Females 
ELEMENTARY 
EDUCATION 
-0.126  
(0.136) 
-0.240**  
(0.118) 
-0.126   
(0.100) 
0.083   
(0.100) 
-
0.236**  
(0.092) 
VOCATIONAL 
TRAINING 
0.286*  
(0.108)*
0.143***  
(0.074) 
0.156**  
(0.063) 
-0.068   
(0.057) 
-0.064  
(0.053) 
SECONDARY SPECIAL 
0.383*  
(0.089) 
0.233*  
(0.065) 
0.254*  
(0.057) 
0.178*  
(0.050) 
0.035  
(0.051) 
INCOMOPLETE 
HIGHER 
0.231**  
(0.204) 
0.250*  
(0.138) 
0.126*  
(0.107) 
0.368**  
(0.186) 
0.318**  
(0.022) 
HIGHER EDUCATION 
0.640*  
(0.114) 
0.562*  
(0.080) 
0.534*  
(0.070) 
0.390*  
(0.065) 
0.280*  
(0.059) 
Note: * means significant at 99% level, ** means significant at 95% level, *** means significant 
at 90% level 
Note: Other regressors also include – type of residence, geographic region, marital status, gender, 
age, age squared.   
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Table 23.  Lithuania: Returns to Education. Public vs. Private Sector. 2000 
 
Males 
and 
Females Males Females
 Public Sector 
ELEMENTARY EDUCATION 
-0.150*  
(0.046) 
-
0.134**  
(0.064) 
-0.160*  
(0.070) 
SECONDARY SPECIAL 
0.166*  
(0.027) 
0.159*  
(0.044) 
0.167*  
(0.035) 
HIGHER EDUCATION 
0.667*  
(0.029) 
0.709*  
(0.049) 
0.641*  
(0.036) 
 Private Sector 
ELEMENTARY EDUCATION 
-0.344*  
(0.045) 
-0.385*  
(0.057) 
-0.233*  
(0.071) 
SECONDARY SPECIAL 
0.203*  
(0.030) 
0.197*  
(0.043) 
0.184*  
(0.040) 
HIGHER EDUCATION 
0.664*  
(0.040) 
0.676*  
(0.058) 
0.615*  
(0.053) 
Note: * means significant at 99% level, ** means significant at 95% level, 
*** means significant at 90% level 
Note: Other regressors also include –  marital status, gender, age, age 
squared.   
 
 
Comparison in Returns to Soviet vs. Market System Education 
 
One hypothesis about returns to education in transitional economies is based on 
the belief that wage structures were compressed by the planners to achieve an equalized 
distribution of income.  Consequently, education was undervalued in the communist 
system.  Therefore, once wage determination is left to the market forces, returns to 
education should increase following the adjustment of wages to marginal products.  
Another hypothesis is that education and training acquired under communist rule are 
inadequate in a new market economy.  Skills/education acquired under communism were 
too specialized and usually trained workers for specific production processes and were 
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not easily transferable across jobs, industries, and occupations (Boeri and Terrell 2002).  
Following this hypothesis, returns to education should decline in transition.  However, 
following the transformation of the economy, there are changes in educational systems of 
transitional countries including introduction of new fields of the study such as finance, 
marketing as well as different academic curricula.  Assuming that educational systems 
adjusted well to fit labor demands of the new market economies, the second hypothesis 
implies that individuals educated and trained under different systems would receive 
different returns to their education.  Older workers educated and trained under the 
communist system are expected to receive lower returns to their education than their 
younger counterparts. 
To test these hypotheses, the sample is subdivided into three different cohorts.  
The first cohort consists of those born before 1965, and represents those with “old” 
education.  The youngest members of this cohort are 34 years old in the beginning and 38 
years old in the end of the analysis period and were 27 years old when the economic 
transition began. Consequently, even those who pursued university education completed 
before the collapse of the former Soviet Union.  Members of the second cohort include 
those born between 1965 and 1975.  This group is mixed.  Some members studied under 
the old curriculum, some had studied under programs where some “new” courses were 
already introduced.  The third cohort consists of those born after 1975 representing those 
with the “new” education.  This cohort includes those trained in “new” fields such as 
accounting, management, and marketing.   A HCS equation is estimated for all three 
cohorts. 
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Returns to education across all cohorts have decreased in Ukraine (Tables 24-26).  
Females in all groups experienced greater decline than males in the same cohorts.  While 
the youngest cohort regardless of gender continues to remain the least paid despite their 
“new” education, this group also experienced the smallest relative decline in returns to 
their education over the analysis period.  The greatest decline to all types of education is 
experienced by females, regardless of the cohort.  Among the levels of education, it is 
university degree that lost the most value.  The difference between relative returns to 
different types of education decreases over the analysis period for all age groups.  The 
results are consistent with the results of earlier sections of this dissertation.  The most 
striking result is the decrease in relative returns to higher education especially for females 
in the first cohort.  There is no strong evidence that younger workers benefited 
disproportionately from being educated under a new market system.  This result is 
consistent with results of previous similar studies. Munich, Svejnar, and Terrel (2005) 
find that there is no difference in returns to “new” and “old” education in Czech 
Republic;  Noorkiv, et al.   (1998)  for Estonia; Filler, et al. Filer, Jurajda, and Planovsky 
(1999) for Czech Republic and Slovakia; and Campos and Jolliffe (2002)  for Hungary.  
However, the above mentioned research finds that younger workers do not benefit 
disproportionately from changes in returns to their “new” education because members of 
all age groups experienced increases in return to their education.  On the contrary, our 
results indicate that in Ukraine members of all cohorts lost in terms of relative returns to 
education over analysis period including the youngest group. 
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Table 24.  Ukraine: Returns to Education by Cohort. Males and Females. 1999-2003 
 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
  Cohort 1 
ELEMENTARY 
EDUCATION 
-0.213*   
(0.002) 
-0.164*  
(0.005) 
-0.197* 
(0.000) 
-0.113**   
(0.038) 
-0.219*  
(0.000) 
VOCATIONAL 
TRAINING 
0.121**   
(0.026) 
0.122*  
(0.001) 
0.113*  
(0.001) 
0.111* 
(0.000) 
0.023 
(0.415) 
SECONDARY 
SPECIAL 
0.307*  
(0.000) 
0.297*  
(0.000) 
0.249*  
(0.000) 
0.257* 
(0.000) 
0.159*  
(0.000) 
INCOMPLETE 
HIGHER 
0.234***  
(0.057) 
0.302* 
(0.000) 
0.223* 
(0.001) 
0.405* 
(0.001) 
0.196** 
(0.035) 
HIGHER 
EDUCATION 
0.718*  
(0.000) 
0.588*  
(0.000) 
0.517* 
(0.000) 
0.510* 
(0.000) 
0.427*  
(0.000) 
  Cohort 2 
ELEMENTARY 
EDUCATION -0.367** (0.012) 
-0.149  
(0.282) 
-0.326* 
(0.005) 
-0.091  
(0.386) 
-
0.200***  
(0.064) 
VOCATIONAL 
TRAINING 
-0.004  
(0.972) 
-0.022  
(0.789) 
0.075  
(0.293) 
0.026  
(0.671) 
-0.078  
(0.194) 
SECONDARY 
SPECIAL 
0.233**  
(0.027) 
0.215* 
(0.008) 
0.232* 
(0.001) 
0.202* 
(0.001) 
0.158** 
(0.010) 
INCOMPLETE 
HIGHER 
0.181  
(0.247) 
0.196***  
(0.085) 
0.307*  
(0.007) 
0.343***  
(0.046) 
0.434*  
(0.005) 
HIGHER 
EDUCATION 
0.423*  
(0.001) 
0.515*  
(0.000) 
0.455*  
(0.000) 
0.282* 
(0.000) 
0.403*  
(0.000) 
  Cohort 3 
ELEMENTARY 
EDUCATION 
-0.309**  
(0.034) 
0.157  
(0.514) 
-0.305** 
(0.049) 
-0.112  
(0.325) 
-0.405* 
(0.000) 
VOCATIONAL 
TRAINING 
0.026  
(0.796) 
0.123 
(0.406) 
0.146 
(0.183) 
0.275*  
(0.000) 
-0.031  
(0.633) 
SECONDARY 
SPECIAL 
0.086  
(0.35) 
0.251** 
(0.090) 
0.288** 
(0.014) 
0.190**  
(0.013) 
0.102  
(0.116) 
INCOMPLETE 
HIGHER 
0.414**  
(0.015) 
0.373 
(0.058) 
0.061 
(0.663) 
0.131  
(0.549) 
0.176** 
(0.095) 
HIGHER 
EDUCATION 
0.531*  
(0.000) 
0.737 
(0.072) 
0.348***  
(0.081) 
0.297** 
(0.016) 
0.349*  
(0.000) 
Note: * means significant at 99% level, ** means significant at 95% level, *** means 
significant at 90% level                                                                           
Other regressors include type of residence, geographic region, marital status, gender, 
age, age squared 
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Table 25.  Ukraine: Returns to Education by Cohort. Males Only. 1999-2003 
  1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
  Cohort 1 
ELEMENTARY 
EDUCATION -0.243**  (0.016) 
-0.052  
(0.533) 
-
0.155**  
(0.048) 
-0.072  
(0.340) 
-
0.215**  
(0.013) 
VOCATIONAL TRAINING 0.086  (0.276) 
0.117**  
(0.030) 
0.120**  
(0.013) 
0.189* 
(0.000) 
0.058  
(0.167) 
SECONDARY SPECIAL 0.232*  (0.002) 
0.342*  
(0.000) 
0.243*  
(0.000) 
0.314*  
(0.000) 
0.237*  
(0.000) 
INCOMPLETE HIGHER 0.149 (0.426) 
0.434* 
(0.000) 
0.262** 
(0.028) 
0.319 
(0.117) 
0.168 
(0.298) 
HIGHER EDUCATION 0.654*  (0.000) 
0.583* 
(0.000) 
0.483* 
(0.000) 
0.472* 
(0.000) 
0.449* 
(0.000) 
  Cohort 1 
ELEMENTARY 
EDUCATION -0.603*  (0.002) 
-0.015  
(0.939) 
-
0.373**  
(0.015) 
-0.058  
(0.689) 
-0.188  
(0.235) 
VOCATIONAL TRAINING -0.190 (0.189) 
0.067 
(0.583) 
-0.015  
(0.880) 
0.089  
(0.298) 
-0.072  
(0.427) 
SECONDARY SPECIAL 0.120  (0.403) 
0.388*  
(0.003) 
0.148  
(0.160) 
0.176***  
(0.063) 
0.236**  
(0.016) 
INCOMPLETE HIGHER -0.113  (0.650) 
0.340***  
(0.068) 
0.193  
(0.287) 
0.559  
(0.103) 
0.404  
(0.126) 
HIGHER EDUCATION 0.344***  (0.065) 
0.655* 
(0.000) 
0.415*  
(0.000) 
0.288*  
(0.005) 
0.407*  
(0.000) 
  Cohort 1 
ELEMENTARY 
EDUCATION 
-0.443**  
(0.024) 
0.013  
(0.970) 
-0.361  
(0.116) 
-0.362**  
(0.011) 
-0.450*  
(0.001) 
VOCATIONAL TRAINING 0.005  (0.970) 
0.076 
(0.718) 
0.147 
(0.357) 
0.347* 
(0.000) 
-0.031  
(0.699) 
SECONDARY SPECIAL 0.090 (0.521) 
0.369**  
(0.096) 
0.598* 
(0.002) 
0.244**  
(0.026) 
0.073  
(0.425) 
INCOMPLETE HIGHER 0.289  (0.267) 
0.611**  
(0.043) 
0.012  
(0.960) 
0.307 
(0.690) 
0.116  
(0.457) 
HIGHER EDUCATION 0.612* (0.000) 
1.480**  
(0.023) 
0.340 
(0.298) 
0.298*** 
(0.095) 
0.308* 
(0.004) 
Note: * means significant at 99% level, ** means significant at 95% level, *** means significant at 
90% level                                                                                              
Other regressors include type of residence, geographic region, marital status, gender, age, age squared 
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Table 26.  Ukraine: Returns to Education by Cohort. Females Only. 1999-2003 
  1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
  Cohort 1 
ELEMENTARY 
EDUCATION 
-0.148 
(0.121) 
-0.257*   
(0.001) 
-0.243*  
(0.001) 
-0.049  
(0.544) 
-0.235*  
(0.001) 
VOCATIONAL 
TRAINING 
0.153**  
(0.041) 
0.144*  
(0.003) 
0.086**  
(0.046) 
0.019  
(0.644) 
-0.01  
(0.788) 
SECONDARY SPECIAL 0.373*  (0.000) 
0.263* 
(0.000) 
0.231*  
(0.000) 
0.218*  
(0.000) 
0.098*  
(0.003) 
INCOMPLETE HIGHER 0.334  (0.035) 
0.216*  
(0.006) 
0.154** 
(0.048) 
0.489* 
(0.001) 
0.239**  
(0.024) 
HIGHER EDUCATION 0.781* (0.000) 
0.599* 
(0.000) 
0.515*  
(0.000) 
0.533*  
(0.000) 
0.397* 
(0.000) 
  Cohort 2 
ELEMENTARY 
EDUCATION 
0.033 
(0.887) 
-0.293  
(0.130) 
-0.165  
(0.356) 
-0.170  
(0.264) 
-0.224   
(0.116) 
VOCATIONAL 
TRAINING 
0.304  
(0.105) 
-0.043  
(0.685) 
0.166 
(0.104) 
-0.053  
(0.553) 
-0.048  
(0.522) 
SECONDARY SPECIAL 0.403**  (0.012) 
0.029  
(0.765) 
0.286* 
(0.003) 
0.180** 
(0.017) 
0.073  
(0.323) 
INCOMPLETE HIGHER 0.438**  (0.036) 
0.020  
(0.882) 
0.343** 
(0.016) 
0.200  
(0.270) 
0.435**  
(0.012) 
HIGHER EDUCATION 0.528*  (0.005) 
0.342*  
(0.001) 
0.462*  
(0.000) 
0.261*  
(0.002) 
0.382*  
(0.000) 
  Cohort 3 
ELEMENTARY 
EDUCATION 
-0.058  
(0.794) 
0.573***  
(0.083) 
-0.068   
(0.746) 
0.495***  
(0.010) 
-0.185  
(0.263) 
VOCATIONAL 
TRAINING 
0.024  
(0.869) 
0.205  
(0.331) 
0.170  
(0.250) 
0.103  
(0.412) 
0.023  
(0.821) 
SECONDARY SPECIAL 0.075  (0.546) 
0.212  
(0.305) 
0.113  
(0.417) 
0.158  
(0.125) 
0.136  
(0.136) 
INCOMPLETE HIGHER 0.470**  (0.037) 
0.135  
(0.603) 
0.047  
(0.768) 
0.160  
(0.471) 
0.242***  
(0.089) 
HIGHER EDUCATION 0.470* (0.001) 
-0.100  
(0.848) 
0.411*** 
(0.085) 
0.349**  
(0.035) 
0.428*  
(0.000) 
Note: * means significant at 99% level, ** means significant at 95% level, *** means significant at 
90% level                                                                                 
         Other regressors include type of residence, geographic region, marital status, gender, age, age 
squared 
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Table 27.  Lithuania: Returns to Education by Age Group. Males and Females.  
2000 
 
Males 
and 
Females Males Females 
 
Cohort 1 
 
ELEMENTARY EDUCATION -0.326*  
(0.055) 
-0.382*  
(0.07) 
-0.189*  
(0.089) 
SECONDARY SPECIAL 0.152*  
(0.046) 
0.133*  
(0.067) 
0.163*  
(0.061) 
HIGHER EDUCATION 0.616*  
(0.061) 
0.670*  
(0.094) 
0.572*  
(0.078) 
 
Cohort 2 
 
ELEMENTARY EDUCATION -0.418*  
(0.095) 
-0.464*  
(0.124) 
-0.191  
(0.153) 
SECONDARY SPECIAL 0.201*  
(0.040) 
0.225*  
(0.061) 
0.158*  
(0.051) 
HIGHER EDUCATION 0.732*  
(0.049) 
0.746*  
(0.079) 
0.709*  
(0.059) 
 Cohort 3 
ELEMENTARY EDUCATION -0.171*  
(0.058) 
-0.199*  
(0.075) 
-
0.195*** 
(0.089) 
SECONDARY SPECIAL 0.166*  
(0.051) 
0.097*  
(0.074) 
0.214*   
(0.068) 
HIGHER EDUCATION 0.598*  
(0.057) 
0.603*  
(0.080) 
0.533*  
(0.077) 
Note: * means significant at 99% level, ** means significant at 95% level, 
*** means significant at 90% level 
 
 
How do returns to education compare in Lithuania and Ukraine in 2000?  
Estimation results for Lithuania are presented in Table 27.  Unlike in Ukraine, the 
members of the first cohort (oldest workers) in Lithuania have the lowest return to their 
university education while members of the third cohort (youngest workers with “new” 
education) have the highest.  Hence, there is evidence that “new” higher education in 
Lithuania pays more than “old” education. Consistent with Ukrainian results, males of all 
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cohorts have higher return to university education.  However, the gender difference 
between returns to higher education is larger in Ukraine.  
 
Chapter Conclusion 
 
Among the findings of the previous sections, an overall decrease in return to 
human capital is counterintuitive.  The returns to human capital uniformly decrease for all 
age groups and across all sectors.  The most striking result is the decrease in returns to 
university education in Ukraine over the analysis period.  It is contrary to the belief that 
returns to education should increase once wages are no longer determined by planners.  
This also is not consistent with what is observed in a number of transitional economies 
(see the beginning of this Chapter for the list of literature).  Why do returns to higher 
education decline over the period of 1999 to 2003 in Ukraine?   
According to economic theory, returns to education are determined by the forces 
of supply and demand.  On the supply side of human capital, the Ukrainian population is 
well educated.  In my sample, about 20 percent of respondents have higher education.  
The national Ukrainian Census of 2001 indicates that 29 percent of the population had at 
least some post-secondary education.  These figures compare favorably to the OECD 
average of university graduates of 23 percent (OECD 2003).  Moreover, as mentioned 
previously, the pursuit of higher education is increasing disproportionately.  The number 
of university students has doubled in the last decade.38  In comparison, the proportion of 
the population with tertiary education is smaller in a number of more successful 
transitional economies where there is documented increase in returns to higher education.  
                                                 
38 (State Statistics Committee of Ukraine 2003) 
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For example, in Czech Republic, a country that exhibited large and rapid increase in 
returns to higher education (Munich, Svejnar, and Terrell 2005 b), the proportion of the 
population with tertiary education is only 12 percent. 
While the quality of education in countries of the former Communist block was 
questioned, the results of the Third International Math and Science Study (TIMSS) 
demonstrate favorable performance by students from nine former socialist countries 
including Ukraine (Micklewright 1999).39  Children in Ukraine achieved mean scores in 
both math and science that were above the international average and ahead of children in 
such countries as England, Germany, and the United States.   
On the demand side, several factors affect demand for human capital.  First, 
technological change has been associated with increased demand for skilled labor.  Given 
Ukraine’s earlier isolation, abundance of educated labor, and increase of technological 
innovation around the world, increase in demand for skilled labor could be expected as 
the country opened up to foreign competition and investment.  However, Foreign Direct 
Investment (FDI) rates have been low in Ukraine throughout the transition period even 
compared to other transitional economies.  This negatively affects technological change 
and the associated shift in demand for skills.  Statistics provide little evidence of the shift 
towards skill-intensive exports.  On the contrary, Ukrainian export revenues consist 
almost exclusively of natural resources and raw materials despite the low wage cost 
(EBRD 2003) 
Second, there is international evidence that upward shift in demand for skills 
occurs as a result of technological progress not necessarily related to trade (Berman, 
Bound, and Machin 1998; Richardson 1995).   In comparison to other transitional 
                                                 
39 TIMSS is based at Boston College, http://timss.bc.edu, accessed May 2004 
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countries, there was a disproportionately high concentration of heavy industrial 
enterprises and agricultural production in Ukraine.  Consequently, at the beginning of the 
transition, the Ukrainian economy was dominated by huge and frequently inefficient 
socialist industrial enterprises more so than other transitional countries.  The privatization 
process not only started later but also was proceeding at the lower speed.  For example, 
65 percent of the Lithuanian economy was privatized by 1995 relative to 45 percent of 
the Ukrainian economy.  Moreover, as numerous accounts indicate, the privatization 
process in Ukraine was extremely corrupt allowing the few to acquire the country’s 
wealth. At the very beginning of transition, these large industrial enterprises faced soft 
budget constraints where unprofitable enterprises were given government subsidies not to 
close.  Thus, enterprises did not have incentives to compete and implement new 
technological and structural changes but rather stay unprofitable to keep receiving state 
funds.   
Third, there is an argument put forth by Sabirianova-Peter (2003)  that “in a 
transforming economy, organizational changes are not necessarily related to 
technological development and could have an independent effect on skill prices.”   She 
states that in a process of economic transition with old socialist firms transforming into 
new market entities there is suddenly an increasing need for “market-needed” 
professionals such as accountants, marketers, tax advisors, financial planners, etc.  As a 
result of the increased demand for these “new” skilled occupations, skilled workers are 
expected to earn higher wages.   However, in Ukraine there is little evidence of old 
socialist firms transforming into market organizations with “different incentives, 
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management practices, ownership control, and organizational innovations.” 40  Share of 
industry and agriculture in GDP still remains high, resembling the Soviet economy.  
There is also no evidence of much labor reallocation from “old” to “new” economic 
sectors (Table 12).  As Konings and Walsh (1999) conclude, Ukraine is still only in the 
beginning of the restructuring process.   
Other than forces of demand and supply, institutional factors such as various labor 
market policies play an important role in wage determination.   As was discussed in 
earlier chapters of the dissertation, Ukrainian employers face high payroll taxes, high 
benefit payments, and high costs associated with laying of workers.  Consequently, 
Ukrainian firms do not have incentives to lay off excess labor and pay higher salaries to 
the remaining workers.   Instead, there are financial incentives encouraging labor 
hoarding and low wage payment, which further impedes technological and organizational 
change and demand for higher education and skills.   
Earlier work by Brainerd (1998) suggested that the degree of overall wage 
dispersion in Ukraine is high relative to other transitional economies where the overall 
wage dispersion was measured as a ratio of minimum to average wage.   However, this 
ratio increased substantially after 1996 (See Figure 1) and is now comparable to other 
transitional economies.  Most importantly, in the Ukrainian economy minimum wage acts 
not only as a lower boundary on wages but also a base wage in the overall wage system.  
Wages as well as social benefits in the overall economy are tied to the minimum wage.  
Therefore, the minimum wage plays a role of an equalizing wage policy, which further 
prevents increase in returns to higher education.  In summary, abundance of highly 
educated workers in conjunction with lack of apparent technological and organizational 
                                                 
40 This terminology is borrowed from Sabirianova Peter (2003) 
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change, institutional factors that take away firms’ incentives to compete by advancing 
production process, and absence of appropriate labor market policies resulted in relatively 
low and declining returns to human capital. 
Another seemingly counterintuitive finding is the higher returns to education in 
the Lithuanian public sector. Public sector wages are set according to specific grids, 
while in the private sector the only restriction is the minimum wage legislation.  
However, in my sample, about one-third of those employed in the private sector report 
wages below the official minimum wage line.  This is likely due to illegal activities in the 
private sector where employees are paid “in envelopes.”  This result, although seemingly 
counterintuitive, is in line with Lithuanian official wage statistics which also indicate 
higher salaries in the public sector. 
Our results also indicate that Ukrainian females experienced a disproportionate 
decrease in returns to human capital compared to Ukrainian males and that relative 
position of Ukrainian females is worse than that of Lithuanian females.  There are 
different factors that account for this difference.  As discussed earlier, Ukrainian females 
are still entitled to maternity leave of 3 years while Lithuanian females are entitled only 
to 70 days before child birth and 56 fifty-six days after.  There are still a number of 
limitations on the type of work females can perform in Ukraine.  In Lithuania, even 
though still in existence, these limitations are fewer and more flexible.  Definitely, 
although aimed at encouraging child birth and protecting females from hard work, this 
legislation makes females less attractive and costly employees.  The effects of this 
legislation are exacerbated further by higher costs of dismissal faced by employers in 
both countries.  Consistent with this hypothesis is the observed disproportionately large 
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drop in returns education for females between 30 and 50 years old.  In addition, as 
discussed in the previous Chapter, Lithuania experienced a more uneven privatization 
pattern, where traditionally male sectors such as manufacturing and construction, were 
privatized while traditionally female sectors such as education and health were not.  
However, Lithuanian females actually benefited from this arrangement since wages in 
general and returns to education are higher in the public sector. 
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CHAPTER VI 
GENDER WAGE DIFFERENTIALS IN UKRAINE AND LITHUANIA 
 
Introduction 
 
As was discussed in the first Chapter, the Soviet government was committed to 
gender equality in the labor market.  Government policies such as generous maternity 
leave, extensive benefits, free child care and other facilities, and equal rights in the work 
place facilitated high rates of female labor force participation.41  Even though there was 
some documented discrimination against females in the work place and females were 
over represented in industries such as education and health, Soviet females (including 
females in Ukraine and Lithuania) fared relatively well in terms of relative wages by 
international standards.42 
Since the breakup of the Soviet Union and the beginning of the transition to a 
market economy, Lithuania and Ukraine have adopted different economic policies as 
discussed in detail in Chapters II and III.  These policies likely affected men and women 
differently and the outcomes may differ across countries.  The purpose of this Chapter is 
to investigate whether, as a result of different policies, women shared a 
disproportionately heavier burden of the transition and how gender specific labor market 
outcomes differ between the two countries.  Given the similar economic structure and 
                                                 
 
42 See Brainerd (1998) Chapter III “Women in Transition: Changes in Gender Wage Differentials in 
Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union” Figure 1. 
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labor market institutions of the two countries before the transition and different reforms 
implemented by the two countries after the collapse of the former Soviet Union, it should 
be expected that gender-specific labor market outcomes differed in Lithuania and 
Ukraine. 
This Chapter focuses on relative wages and the overall wage structures and does 
not consider other labor market outcomes such as employment and occupational 
segregation.  However, it is important to point out that issues of unemployment and 
occupational segregation do impact women in transition but they are beyond the scope of 
this dissertation. 
 
Relative Female Wages in Ukraine and Lithuania 
 
The changes in the mean and median female/male wage ratios over time are 
illustrated in Table 28.  Women’s relative wage decreased in Ukraine and increased in 
Lithuania.  In fact, the relative female/male wage ratio of 0.84 in Lithuania appears to be 
comparable to those observed in Scandinavian countries. However, this ratio fell from 
0.78 in 1999 to 0.70 in 2003 in Ukraine.43 
A similar picture is observed in Figure 5 which depicts changes in a female 
dummy variable in the estimated log wage equations 1, 2, 3, and 4 that pool male and 
female observations together.  The absolute value of the gender penalty using this 
                                                 
43 Reilly and Newell (2000) investigate gender pay gap in a number of transitional Eastern European 
countries and FSU republics.  Lithuanian females rank favorably compared to other transitional countries in 
the sample using female/male wage ratio. The only two countries who have higher female/male wage ratio 
are former Yugoslavia and Slovenia.  In the end of the analysis period, Ukrainian gender wage ratio is 
among the lowest in the sample.  The only countries with lower ratios are Bulgaria in 1997 and Russia in 
1996. 
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measure increases for Ukraine, reaching about 0.3 by the end of the analyzed period 
regardless of which specification is used. 
 
Table 28.  Female/Male Wage Ratios and Position of Women in the Male Wage 
Distribution 
            Ukraine Lithuania 
 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2000 
Mean wage, local currency/month 1194 1680 2259 2804 1674 658 
Men 1342 1948 2659 3253 1973 716 
Women 1048 1426 1891 2377 1390 600 
Female/Male 0.78 0.73 0.71 0.73 0.7 0.84 
        
Median wage, local currency/month 957 1320 1775 2263 1350 530 
Men 1038 1511 2109 2737 1650 600 
Women 899 1200 1608 2034 1190 500 
Female/Male 0.87 0.79 0.76 0.74 0.72 0.83 
        
Position of mean female in male wage 
distribution* 44.42 43.32 40.74 40.05 38.19 47.98 
Position of median female in male wage 
distribution* 43.10 40.28 37.10 36.90 34.00 48 
        
Sample size 7852 7611 7520 7516 7650 4324 
Men 3904 3699 3602 3662 3725 2168 
Women 3948 3912 3918 3854 3925 2156 
* Calculated by assigning each woman a percentile ranking in the male wage distribution, and 
finding the mean of median of those rankings  
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Figure 5. Coefficient on Female Dummy Variable. Ukraine 1999-2003 
Figure 5. Coefficient on Female Dummy Variable. Ukraine 1999-2003
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In Lithuania, in the year 2000, the absolute value of the female dummy was 0.18 
for the basic HCS and 0.2 for the AS comparing favorably to the corresponding absolute 
values of 0.236 and 0.24 in Ukraine (See Figure 6).   
 
Figure 6.  Coefficient on Female Dummy Variable. Ukraine vs. Lithuania 2000 
Figure 6. Coefficient on a female Dummy Variable. Ukraine and Lithuania 2000
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Table 28 also reports positions of mean/median female wages in the male wage 
distribution.  The position of the mean/median female in the male wage distribution is 
calculated by assigning each woman a percentile ranking in the male wage distribution 
and calculating the ranking of the mean/median female.  Blau and Kahn (1996)  used this 
approach to compare international differences in gender wage differentials between the 
United States and several Western European countries.  Brainerd (1998)  also used this 
approach to compare differences in gender wage differentials for a sample of Central and 
Eastern European countries.  This statistic reflects both labor market skills and 
discrimination.  A female with a salary that falls in a certain percentile of a male wage 
distribution is perceived by employers to be comparable to a male with a salary in that 
percentile.  In other words, if a median female falls in the 20th percentile of the male 
wage distribution then a median female is perceived to be equivalent to the male in the 
20th percentile of the male wage distribution.  This could be because the median female 
has observed labor market skills and characteristics comparable to that of a male in the 
20th percentile of the male wage distribution or for other reasons such as discrimination.  
A decline in the position of a median female in the male wage distribution over time 
would indicate that either observed skills have declined or that discrimination has 
increased (i.e., the median female is valued by employers as a male in a lower percentile 
of the male wage distribution).  At the same time, a change in the overall wage structure 
would have an impact on the position of females in the overall male wage distribution.  
Since wages of females usually fall in the lower parts of the overall wage distribution, an 
increase in the overall wage dispersion would have an adverse effect on female wages.   
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The position of the mean and median Ukrainian female in the male wage 
distribution deteriorated from the 44th and 43rd percentile in 1999 to 38th and 34th 
percentile in 2003, respectively.  However, despite this decrease, the position of a mean 
and median female in the male wage distribution is relatively high compared to other 
countries.44  Nevertheless, as Brainerd (1998) notes, a relatively high ranking of the mean 
female in the male wage distribution can correspond to a relatively low female/male 
wage ratios if the overall wage dispersion is relatively high.   In fact, in her analysis of 
gender wage differentials in a number of Eastern European countries, Brainerd (1998) 
finds that the dispersion of the overall wage structure is the single most important factor 
responsible for the decrease of relative wages in Russian and Ukraine for the period of 
1991-1994.  However, she demonstrates no change in ranking of mean/median female in 
the overall wage distribution.  Since, on the contrary, a decrease in the relative female 
wages and the simultaneous deterioration of the ranking of the mean/median female is 
observed, it is unlikely that the overall dispersion of wages is responsible for the 
worsening of female relative wages.  Moreover, the downward movement of female 
wages in the wage distribution suggests that valuation of females by employers has 
decreased.  There are several reasons as to why females can be perceived by employers as 
“less desirable” employees.  The labor market characteristics of females could have 
                                                 
44 For example, for a sample of Western European countries and the United States in 1980s, Blau 
and Khan (1996) report the mean female percentile in male wage distribution to be between 33.6 
in Italy and 19.6 in Norway.  Brainerd (1998) performed a similar analysis for a sample of 
Eastern and Central European countries as well as for Russia and Ukraine.  She reports 
mean/median female percentiles in male wage distribution to be between 54.6 and 54.3 for 
Kyrgyz Republic and 19.0 and 27.1 for Czech Republic respectively.  Using data from December 
of 1994, Brainerd (1998) reports that a median Ukrainian female is ranked the same as a male in 
28.7th percentile of a male wage distribution while mean female is ranked the same as a male in 
35.3th percentile of a male wage distribution.    
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decreased over the analysis period.  At the same time, the tastes for discrimination by 
employers could have increased or employers can exercise such tastes more freely due to 
the weakened law enforcement.  Finally, the institutional policies involving gender 
specific social protection (such as described in Chapters II and III) can lead to lower 
valuation of female workers. 
However, relatively lower or decreasing labor market qualifications of women are 
unlikely to explain the decreasing female/male average wage ratio in Ukraine.  As 
summary statistics presented earlier indicate, women compare favorably to men with 
respect to their labor market characteristics.  Moreover, a higher proportion of women in 
both countries have higher education than men (Tables 8 and 9). 
The position of the mean/median female is even slightly higher in Lithuania 
where mean female wage is ranked by employers in the 48th percentile of the male wage 
distribution while the median female wage is ranked in the 47th percentile.  However, a 
relatively high mean/median female percentile ranking, in conjunction with relatively 
high gender wage ratio, suggests a more compressed overall wage structure in Lithuania 
compared to Ukraine.  
The purpose of the analysis in this Chapter is to determine what accounts for the 
deterioration relative female wages in Ukraine during the period of the “late transition”. 
We also examine why relative wages of Lithuanian females are higher than that of 
Ukrainian females in 2000.  To understand the mechanisms through which the 
institutional arrangements and labor market policies lead to the observed wage outcomes, 
two different methods are used.   First, the Oaxaca decomposition technique is employed.  
This method decomposes the average gender wage gap into two components-differences 
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in labor market characteristics and differences in treatment, which may in part be 
attributed to discrimination.   
Labor market policies can also affect relative wages indirectly by changing the 
overall wage structure.  Consequently, the change in wage structures and the policies 
leading to such change are examined.  Next, the Juhn, Murhpy, and Pierce (1993) 
decomposition technique is used to decompose the gender wage gap over time.  
 
Oaxaca Decomposition: Empirical Methodology 
 
Becker (1971) defined a competitive market discrimination coefficient for labor 
as the difference between the observed wage ratio and the wage ratio that would prevail 
in the absence of discrimination.  Oaxaca (1973) expressed it in percentage terms as 
f
m
f
m
f
m
MP
MP
MP
MPW
W
D
−
=  (8) 
Where: the two groups are males and females, 
f
m
W
W is the observed male-female 
average wage ratio, and  
f
m
MP
MP  is the ratio of the average male-female marginal 
products, which is equivalent to the average wage ratio in the absence of discrimination.  
The observed wage differential can be expressed using the logarithmic form of equation 
(5) as given in equation (6) below: 
)1ln(lnlnlnln ++−=− DMPMPWW fmfm . (9) 
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Equation (6) breaks down the difference between the mean female and the mean male 
wage in two parts. The first two terms on the left-hand side indicate the part of the gender 
wage gap that is due to differences in male and female productivity. The third term 
represents the unexplained part of the gender wage gap, which is often attributed to 
discrimination.  .   
      In general, lnW can be estimated as: 
  iii eXW += βln  (10) 
Where: 
W- earnings 
X – vector of observable characteristics 
β-coefficients 
ε-Error term      iε ~ ),0( εσN  
 
Wage equations for women and men separately are presented in equations (11) and (12) 
respectively. 
ffff eXW += βln  (11) 
mmmm eXW += βln  (12) 
The difference between mean log wages of males and females can be decomposed in 
the following way. 
ffmfmfmmffmmfm XXXXXXnWlnWl ββββββ ˆˆˆˆˆˆ −+−=−=−  
ffmmfm XXX )ˆˆ(ˆ)( βββ −+−=  (13) 
or 
mfmffmfm XXXnWlnWl )ˆˆ(ˆ)( βββ −+−=−  (14) 
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The first term on the right-hand sides of equations (13) and (14) represents estimates of 
fm MPMP lnln − , the second term represents the unequal treatment coefficient. 
For the purposes of this analysis, the general wage equation (10) is estimated differently 
using four specifications described in detail in the previous Chapter.  These are human 
capital and augmented specifications with and without correction for the selection into 
the labor market.  When wage equations are estimated with correction for the labor force 
participation, the general wage equation becomes 
iii ecXW ++= λβln  (15) 
Where: 
λ – selection correction term 
c – covariance between the error terms in the earnings and labor market status equations. 
Consequently, female and male wage equations corrected for labor market participation 
become: 
ffffff ecXW ++= λβln  (16) 
mmmmmm ecXW ++= λβln  (17) 
Hence, the difference between mean log wages of males and females can be decomposed 
in the following way: 
+−+−=−+−=− ffmfmfmmffmmffmmfm XXXXccXXnWlnWl ββββλλββ ˆˆˆˆˆˆˆˆ
 
ffmmffmmfmffmm ccXXXcc λλβββλλ ˆˆ)ˆˆ(ˆ)(ˆˆ −+−+−=−  (18) 
or 
ffmmmfmffmfm ccXXXnWlnWl λλβββ ˆˆˆ)ˆˆ(ˆ)( −+−+−=−  (19) 
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The third term represents the difference in selectivity bias which is used to obtain the 
percentage difference in wage offers faced by persons with the characteristics of the 
average wage earner among males and females (Reimers 1984). 
 Equations (16) and (17) assume that the male wage structure prevails in the 
absence of discrimination, while equations (18) and (19) assume that the female wage 
structure prevails in the absence of discrimination. 
 However, none of the two assumptions above with respect to the wage structure is 
realistic.  While the discriminated group (presumably females in this case) is 
undervalued, the preferred group is overvalued.  Moreover, it is the undervaluation of the 
discriminated group that pays for overvaluation of the preferred group (Cotton 1988). 
As described in Becker (1971), in the absence of discrimination the two groups would be 
perfect substitutes in production and the only reason for a difference in wages would be 
different productivity characteristics.  Therefore, in the absence of discrimination the two 
wage structures would be equal i.e *βββ == fm .  Where *β  represents a vector of 
coefficients in a nondiscriminatory wage structure.  The average wage differential using 
the non-discriminatory wage structure, overvaluation of one group and undervaluation of 
the other group, can be expressed as: 
)()()(*lnln ** ffmmfmfm XXXXWW βββββ −+−+−=−  (20) 
or 
ffmm
ffmmfmfm ccXXXXWW λλβββββ ˆˆˆ)()()(*lnln ** −+−+−+−=−  (21) 
when selection into the labor market is accounted for. 
 This decomposition consists of four components.  The first component represents 
the difference in wages resulting from productive characteristics of the two groups, the 
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second component represents the advantage of preferred group (males), the third 
component represents the disadvantage of the discriminated group (Cotton 1988), and the 
fourth component represents the difference in the selectivity bias.  Unfortunately, *β  is 
unobserved and must be estimated.  The estimation of *β  is based on assumptions about 
the nature of the nondiscriminatory wage structure.   Different research studies assume 
different wage structures to be non-discriminatory.  The “true” wage structure was 
approximated by equally weighting the parameters obtained from the male and female 
regressions (Bedi and Garg 2000; Reimers 1984). Neumark (1988) suggests obtaining the 
non-discriminatory wage structure by estimation of a wage regression over the pooled 
sample. Cotton (1988) weighs white and black wage structures by the proportion of white 
and black males in the civilian male labor force.  Following (Bedi and Garg 2000; 
Neumark 1988; Reimers 1984) the non-discriminatory wage structure is obtained by 
estimating a regression over a pooled sample. 
 
Oaxaca Decomposition:  Results–Ukraine 1999-2003 
 
 Estimations of 1 through 4 are used to decompose gender wage differentials.  The 
results of Oaxaca decomposition using Human Capital Specification (HCS) and 
Augmented Specification (AS) with and without accounting for the selection into the 
labor market for Ukraine are presented in Table 29.  Consistent with the previous results, 
the gender wage gap increased in Ukraine over the analysis period from 0.067 to 0.243.45  
Regardless of which specification is used, the difference in characteristics component is 
                                                 
45 Reilly and Newell (2000) report comparable gender log wage ratio of 0.186 for Ukraine in 1996.  
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actually negative for all years, implying that females on average have better labor market 
qualifications than males.  When selection into the labor market is not accounted for, the 
male advantage component is zero while the female disadvantage component is large and 
increasing from year to year, single-handedly contributing to the gender wage 
differential. This implies that the difference in average male/female wages is primarily 
caused by the unexplained portion of the gender wage differential.  This result still holds 
when selection into the labor market is accounted for. The female disadvantage 
component becomes larger in magnitude and still is the main component contributing to 
the gender wage differential. Our results are also robust to the different specification of 
the earnings equation i.e. HCS versus AS.  
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Table 29.  Ukraine: Results of Oaxaca Decomposition.  1999-2003 
 
LnWm-
LnWf 
Difference in 
characteristics 
Male 
Advantage
Female 
Disadvantage  
LnWm-
LnWf  
Difference in 
characteristics
Male 
Advantage
Female 
Disadvantage
Selection 
Component 
 Human Capital Specification  Human Capital  Specification with Selection into the Labor Market 
1999 0.067 -0.108 0.000 0.175 1999 0.067 -0.074 -0.098 0.218 0.021 
2000 0.151 -0.080 0.000 0.231 2000 0.151 -0.059 -0.625 0.325 0.509 
2001 0.194 -0.073 0.000 0.267 2001 0.194 -0.074 0.486 -0.175 -0.043 
2002 0.202 -0.085 0.000 0.288 2002 0.151 -0.065 -0.048 0.758 -0.493 
2003 0.243 -0.052 0.000 0.295 2003 0.243 -0.052 0.443 -0.106 -0.042 
 Augmented Specification  Augmented Specification with Selection into the Labor Market 
1999 0.067 -0.192 0.000 0.259 1999 0.067 -0.094 -0.088 0.204 0.045 
2000 0.151 0.090 0.000 0.241 2000 0.151 -0.023 -0.023 0.258 -0.061 
2001 0.194 -0.006 0.000 0.255 2001 0.194 -0.005 -0.034 0.264 -0.031 
2002 0.202 -0.063 0.000 0.265 2002 0.202 -0.016 -0.042 0.248 0.013 
2003 0.243 -0.036 0.000 0.279 2003 0.243 0.003 -0.033 0.287 -0.015 
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 Regardless of which wage equation specification is used to compute the Oaxaca 
decomposition, female disadvantage component is the single most important component 
of the gender wage differential, as well as its growth over time.  The female disadvantage 
component represents the unexplained part of the gender wage differential and hence can 
not be labeled simply as discrimination against women.  While part of this component 
could be attributed to discrimination, the other part could be attributed to unobserved 
factors which affect productivity. 
 
Oaxaca Decomposition: Results – Lithuania 2000 
 
 As demonstrated in Table 30, when the selection in the labor market is not 
accounted for, the results of the Oaxaca decomposition in Lithuania are similar to that in 
Ukraine.  No matter which specification is used, the difference in characteristics is 
negative implying that women have “better” labor market characteristics on average than 
men.  The male advantage component is negligible regardless of the specification used.  
The largest component explaining the average female/male wage differential is the 
female disadvantage, implying that the unexplained portion of the gender wage 
differential is the major cause of the difference in gender wage outcomes.    However, 
unlike in Ukraine, when selection into the labor market is accounted for, the actual 
gender wage gap changes very little: it decreases by 0.003 using HCS and by 0.011 using 
AS (Table 32).  At the same time, the female disadvantage component becomes slightly 
smaller, implying there is a positive selection of Lithuanian females into the labor 
market.  When HCS is used, the female disadvantage component is smaller relative to the 
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AS regardless of selection into the labor market (0.186 vs. 0.203 and 0.177 and 0.192, 
Table 32), implying that there is gender segregation in allocating workers into low or 
high-paying occupations.  This finding is consistent with the results presented in the 
previous Chapter, where it was shown that there are significant wage premiums being 
associated with higher paying occupations in Lithuania. 
 
Table 30.  Results of Oaxaca Decomposition. Lithuania 2000 
 
LnWm-
LnWf  
Difference in 
characteristics 
Male 
Advantage 
Female 
Disadvantage 
Selection 
Component 
HCS  0.102 -0.083 0.000 0.186  
HCS with Selection 
into the Labor Market 0.102 -0.077 -0.002 0.177 0.003 
AS 0.102 -0.100 0.000 0.203  
AS with Selection into 
the Labor Market 0.102 -0.092 -0.009 0.192 0.011 
 
 
 The results of Oaxaca decomposition in Ukraine and Lithuania in 2000 
demonstrate small differences.  The log wage differential is slightly higher in Ukraine 
than in Lithuania in 2000 (0.151 vs. 0.102).  The differences in average characteristics 
between genders in the two countries are both a small in magnitude and have negative 
signs. This implies that in both countries females on average are more endowed in terms 
of their observable labor market characteristics than males and that these differences can 
therefore not explain gender wage differentials. The male advantage component is zero or 
almost zero in both countries. On the other hand, the female disadvantage component is 
the single most important component account for gender wage gap in both countries.  
However, the female disadvantage component is larger in Ukraine, accounting for a 
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larger (compared to Lithuania) average gender wage gap. The selectivity bias is very 
small and positive in Lithuania while there is no clear pattern of the sign or magnitude of 
the bias in Ukraine.  Why is the Ukrainian female disadvantage component greater in 
Ukraine than that in Lithuania?  While females in both countries are well endowed with 
respect to their education and skill, Ukrainian females are underpaid more relative to 
males than Lithuanian females.  At least part of the answer can be attributed to the fact 
that Ukraine still maintains more generous gender non-neutral policies, i.e generous 
maternity benefits, etc., as was discussed in the previous chapters.   These policies cause 
females to be more expensive employees than males in the eyes of employers.  It is likely 
that by paying females less, employers are compensating for the additional cost 
associated with hiring female workers. 
 As was mentioned previously, Lithuanian females are disproportionately 
employed in the public sector where wages are more regulated by wage grids, making it 
harder to discriminate.  Moreover, Lithuanian women also benefit from the fact that the 
labor laws are better enforced in the public sector, making it harder to pay below legally 
set limits and discriminate on the basis of gender. 
 
Changes in the Overall Wage Structure 
 
By decomposing the gender wage gap into characteristics and treatment related 
components, it was established that relative labor market characteristics play little role in 
explaining the gender wage gap.  Moreover, it is the treatment or the unexplained part of 
the gender wage differential that is solely responsible for the difference in male and 
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female average wages.  The next part of this Chapter attempts to uncover how differences 
in the overall wage structures affect the gender wage differentials and whether changes in 
the wage structure in Ukraine over the analysis period have contributed to the worsening 
of the relative female wages in that country.  Since women are disproportionately 
represented among the low-wage workers, they are expected to be penalized more by the 
overall wage dispersion.   
Table 31 presents different measures of the overall log wage distribution.  
Regardless of which measure is used, the results indicate that the wage structure in 
Ukraine narrowed significantly over the analysis period.  Interestingly, the comparison of 
Table 31 to the similar results of Brainerd (1998) indicates that in 1999 wage dispersion 
was far lower than what was reported for 1994 (which represented the post-reform period 
with relatively high wage dispersion in Brainerd’s work).  At the same time, in 2003 the 
ratio of log wages in the 90th/10th percentile in the male distribution was the same as in 
1991 (which represented the pre-reform period with relatively low wage distribution).  As 
was explained in detail earlier in this Chapter, since women in Ukraine occupy the lower 
part of the wage distribution, compression of the wage structure should have a positive 
effect on relative female wages. The relative female wages in Ukraine, however, have 
decreased over the analysis period.  As will be shown later, even though narrowing of the 
overall wage distribution contributed to a smaller average gender wage gap, this effect 
was more than offset by movement of women down the male wage distribution.  The 
same measures presented in the Table 32 demonstrate that the log wage distribution in 
Lithuania is more compressed compared to Ukraine not only in 2000 but also 1999 and 
2001-2003.  
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Table 31. Summary Measures of the Log Wage Distribution. Ukraine 1999-2003 
 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Males  
90-10 log wage differential 1.53 1.37 1.29 1.26 1.25 
variance of log wages 2.19 1.34 1.08 0.91 0.81 
skewness -1.78 -1.12 -1.13 -1.18 -1.27 
kurtosis 7.46 4.58 5.34 5.44 5.98 
Females 
90-10 log wage differential 1.71 1.51 1.40 1.36 1.34 
variance of log wages 1.48 0.85 0.64 0.60 0.49 
skewness -1.97 -1.32 -1.43 -1.46 -1.28 
kurtosis 8.96 5.88 7.40 7.70 7.33 
Males and Females 
90-10 log wage differential 1.62 1.44 1.35 1.31 1.30 
variance of log wages 1.83 1.09 0.86 0.76 0.66 
skewness -1.86 -1.15 -1.16 -1.20 -1.15 
kurtosis 8.18 5.11 6.09 6.20 6.32 
 
 
Table 32.  Summary Measures of the Log Wage Distribution. Lithuania 2000 
 Males Females
Males 
and 
Females
90-10 log wage 
differential 1.31 1.23 1.27 
variance of log wages 0.49 0.34 0.42 
skewness -0.50 -0.58 -0.49 
kurtosis 5.09 6.17 5.55 
 
 
Figures 7 through 11 take a closer look at the overall wage distribution in 
Ukraine.  In every single year of the analysis period except for 2002, 90 percent of all 
wages are in the first four quintiles of the overall wage distribution.  This implies that 
wages of a large majority of the Ukrainian labor force are within a relatively narrow 
range, while there is less than 10 percent of the labor force that receives relatively high 
wages.  The average wage in the first three quintiles is between $40 and $60 per month, 
while the average wage in the twentieth quintile is between $2,500 and $3,500 per month 
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across the time period.  Therefore, with the exception of the small group of individuals 
who are earning relatively high wages even by the Western standards, the majority of 
males and females earn relatively low wages with a small variance within the group, 
contributing to the relatively high ranking of mean/median female in the male wage 
distribution. 
 
Figure 7.  Percent Distribution of Wages. Ukraine 1999 
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Even though the relative position of a mean/median female in the male wage 
distribution is high by international standards, it was shown previously that it has 
declined between 1999 and 2003. Interestingly, while the female frequency percent 
distribution of wages (Figure 7) show only a tiny peak at a relatively low wage in 1999, 
there are sizeable and apparent peaks in frequency of a certain low wage value after that 
year.  Moreover, in 1999 male and female frequency percent distribution of wages were 
almost identical, after that year the female distribution shows higher than male 
frequencies at the lower wage values while this trend reverses at the higher wage values. 
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Figure 8.  Percent Distribution of Wages. Ukraine 2000 
Percent Distribution of Wages, Ukraine 2000
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 Figure 9.  Percent Distribution of Wages.  Ukraine 2001 
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Figure 10.  Percent Distribution of Wages. Ukraine 2002 
Frequency Percent Distribution of Wages, Ukraine 2002
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Figure 11. Percent Distribution of Wages. Ukraine 2003 
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 Distribution of wages in Lithuania actually exhibits some similarities to the wage 
distribution in Ukraine after 2000.  90 percent of all wages also fall within the first four 
quintiles of the wage distribution.   Relative to Ukraine, there is even less variation within 
the narrow range where the wages of the majority of Lithuanian individuals fall.  This 
explains the relatively high position of mean/median females in the male wage 
distribution.  In general, the frequency percent distribution of Lithuanian wages is similar 
to that of Ukraine. The Lithuanian frequency percent distribution has a large peak of 
twenty five percent of all wages at 650 litas (about $216) per month. However, there are 
no significant differences between male and female distributions in Lithuania.  In fact, 
the two distributions (male and female) are almost identical.   
 
Figure 12. Percent Distribution of Wages. Lithuania 2000 
Percent Distribution of Wages, Lithuania 2000
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Table 33 presents the summary for the top 5 percent of wage earners. The 
summary statistics allow us to examine whether there are any differences in 
characteristics between the top 5 percent and the rest of the population. Two-thirds of the 
highest wage earners live in urban areas.  Very few persons among the top 5 percent of 
wage earners live in rural areas.  About one-fifth live in Kiev, the capital city, even 
though the proportion living in Kiev decreased slightly over the analysis period.  About 
90 percent of the high wage earners are married and less than half (about 40 percent) 
have higher education.  Very few have elementary education.  About 40 percent are 
employed in industry and about half are working in the public sector.   
The proportion of top wage earners working for private firms is considerably 
higher than that of the overall sample.  The average age of high wage earners is 40 years 
old.  Only about 20 percent are female.  Although there is an increase in the proportion of 
those between 20 and 25 years old among the high wage earners, this group is not 
dominated by younger people who have adopted “new” capitalist ways of life. This 
observation is supported further by the fact that only 40 percent of the highest earning 
people have higher education.  Overall, the high wage earners in Ukraine do not seem to 
fit the expected profile of a young successful male capitalist.   
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Table 33. Characteristics of the Highest Five Percent of Wage Earners. Ukraine, 
1999-2003 
 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Type of Residence 
City 0.66 0.61 0.61 0.65 0.65 
Rural 0.06 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.05 
Kiev 0.17 0.21 0.22 0.20 0.15 
Marital Status 
Married 0.90 0.89 0.87 0.83 0.89 
Education Level 
Elementary 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 
Vocational Training 0.16 0.15 0.16 0.16 0.19 
Secondary 0.14 0.11 0.16 0.15 0.10 
Secondary Special 0.23 0.25 0.25 0.24 0.22 
Higher 0.40 0.42 0.40 0.43 0.45 
Age 
Age 39.38 39.97 40.41 40.29 39.94 
Age between 25 and 29 0.10 0.13 0.10 0.13 0.14 
Age between 30 and 34 0.14 0.13 0.12 0.13 0.13 
Age between 35 and 39 0.24 0.17 0.16 0.13 0.14 
Age between 40 and 44 0.21 0.21 0.26 0.24 0.21 
Age between 45 and 49 0.16 0.17 0.17 0.18 0.17 
Age between 50 and 54 0.08 0.12 0.11 0.12 0.13 
Age between 55 and 60 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.05 
Industry of Employment 
Industry 0.42 0.45 0.47 0.42 0.40 
Type of Ownership at the Place of Employment 
State 0.47 0.43 0.41 0.46 0.51 
Private Ownership 0.16 0.14 0.16 0.22 0.19 
Stock Company 0.22 0.34 0.33 0.25 0.25 
Monthly Wages 4578 6118 8584 9256 5478 
Sample Size 393 381 377 376 383 
 
 
 Why did the wage structure in Ukraine become narrower over the analysis period?  
At the first glance it seems counterintuitive since, with the decentralization of wages, we 
would expect to see just the opposite.  As the wage grids prevalent in socialist systems 
are removed, wages are expected to adjust in favor of the highly educated/skilled 
according marginal products. Moreover, a number of studies document a widening wage 
distribution for a number of transitional economies (Brainerd 1998; Reilly and Newell 
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2000).  The Ukrainian case is likely to be different for several reasons. First, institutional 
policies in Ukraine differ from those in Central and Eastern Europe.  As discussed in 
Chapter II, the minimum wage policy adopted is such that all the wages in the economy 
are artificially tied to the minimum wage, thus preventing high wage dispersion.  At the 
same time, loss of bargaining power by trade unions is expected to further contribute to 
this phenomenon.  Finally, high payroll taxes take away the incentive of enterprises to 
pay high wages.  In addition, as discussed earlier, a low degree of integration into the 
world economy as well as a relatively slow pace of transition, are expected to contribute 
to the narrowing of the wage distribution.  
 The observed decrease in the position of a mean/median Ukrainian female in the 
male wage distribution, as well as the demonstrated compression of the wage structure, 
suggests that over the analysis period the worsening of the relative female wage position 
in the labor market is unlikely to be explained by the changes in the overall wage 
structure.  Moreover, this fact suggests that the worsening of the relative wage outcomes 
for females in the Ukrainian labor market, at least in part, can be attributed to increasing 
discrimination or changes in gender differences in labor market productive characteristics 
or to gender-specific policies. To empirically examine the factors that contributed to the 
worsening of the gender wage gap in Ukraine, we use the Juhn, Murphy, and Pierce 
Decomposition. Below is a brief description of the methodology and the results of this 
analysis. 
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Juhn, Murphy, and Pierce Decomposition: Empirical Methodology 
 
 This method decomposes changes in gender wage differentials into change in 
gender specific factors such as discrimination and labor market characteristics, as well as 
changes in gender neutral factors such as changes in differences in the overall wage 
structure, including returns to observed and unobserved skill.  The male wage structure is 
used as a wage structure that would apply to both genders in the absence of 
discrimination.  While the Juhn, Murphy, and Pierce (1993) decomposition is an 
extension to the Oaxaca (1973) decomposition, the unexplained component is 
decomposed further by the former method.  
Suppose that a male wage equation for year t is: 
m
t
m
t
m
t
m
t
m
t XW Θ+= σβ  (22) 
Where 
m
tW - is the log of male monthly wages in time period t 
m
tX - is a vector of explanatory variables 
m
tβ - vector of male coefficients 
m
tσ - standard deviation of the residuals of the male wage equation 
m
tΘ -standardized residual of the male wage regression with mean=0 and variance=1 or 
m
t
m
t
m
t e σ/=Θ .   
     Writing the wage equation in this way illustrates the two components that comprise 
the residual, the percentile that an individual occupies in the residual distribution, mtΘ , 
and the spread of the residual distribution itself, mtσ .  In this case, it represents residual 
wage inequality for males.  Assuming females are paid in accordance to the male wage 
structure, the constructed female wage equation becomes: 
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f
t
m
t
m
t
f
t
f
t XW Θ+= σβ  (23) 
Where 
f
tW -is the log of female monthly wages in time period t 
f
tX -is a vector of explanatory variables 
m
tβ - vector of male coefficients 
m
tσ - standard deviation of the residuals of the male wage equation 
f
tΘ -standardized residual of the female wage regression, i.e.  mtftft e σ/=Θ  
Consequently, the wage gap at time t can be rewritten as 
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t
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t
f
t
m
tt XXWWD σβ )()( Θ−Θ+−=−=  (24) 
The gender wage gap in equation (24) contains the effects of differences in observed 
characteristics based on the male reward structure, and effects of differences in the 
standardized residual, weighted by residual male inequality or money value per unit 
difference. 
Following Blau and Kahn (1996), the change in the wage gap over the period 
from t1 to t2 can be decomposed as follows. 
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 (25) 
The first term reflects differences in the gender wage resulting from differences in the 
observed characteristics over time. Blau and Khan (1996) labeled this term “observed- 
X’s effect”.  The second term reflects the differences in rewards to the observed skills of 
men. This term has been labeled “Observed- prices effect.”  It describes the effect of 
changes in rewards to labor market skills on the Ukrainian gender wage gap.  As Brainerd 
(1998) notes, in socialist countries, returns to skill were compressed artificially, making it 
reasonable to expect that as wage setting is decentralized, rewards to observed skills 
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should increase.  The third term reflects the effect of difference in the relative position of 
women in the male wage distribution.  The position of women in the male wage 
distribution will improve if their unobserved skills improve or if discrimination against 
them decreases.  Consequently, the wage gap will decrease.  The fourth term labeled 
“unobserved prices” reflects the widening of the male residual distribution while holding 
mean female ranking in the male residual distribution constant.  An increase in male 
residual inequality would imply a widening of the gender wage gap.  The “Observed 
prices effect,” together with the “unobserved prices effect,” reflects changes in the 
relative wage structure over time.  This argument is based on the idea that in the absence 
of labor market discrimination, the wage structure faced by men also applies to women 
(Rueckert 2002).  The next subsection focuses on the empirical results of the Juhn, 
Murphy, and Pierce decomposition for Ukraine.  
 
Juhn, Murphy, and Pierce Decomposition: Estimation Results 
 
Table 34 presents the results of the Juhn, Murphy, and Pierce decomposition in 
order to uncover what contributed to changes in the gender wage gap between 1999 and 
2003 in Ukraine.  Our results show that the gender wage gap in Ukraine increased by 
0.175 log points.  Contrary to some previous research including Brainerd (1998) and 
Reilly and Newell (2000), these results suggest that the “unobserved prices effect” 
reduces the Ukrainian gender wage gap overtime.  The change in “observed prices,” is 
positive, but relatively small, and does not contribute substantially to the widening of the 
gender wage gap over time.  Among the gender specific components of the wage gap, the 
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change in observed labor market characteristics is also relatively small, while it is the 
large change in relative wage positions of men and women that is solely responsible for 
the increase in the gender wage gap in the Ukraine. These results are consistent with the 
results of the Oaxaca decomposition.  It is really the “unexplained” portion of the gender 
wage gap which contributes the most to the magnitude of the gap and to its increase over 
the analysis period. Moreover, the downward movement of women in the wage 
distribution implies a decline of valuation of women’s characteristics by employers.   
 
Table 34.  Ukraine: Juhn, Murphy, and Pierce Decomposition in gender Wage 
Differential, 1999-2003 
 
Human 
Capital 
Specification 
Augmented 
Specification 
Observed change in gender gap (log wages)* 0.175 0.175 
Differences in Observed Labor Market Qualifications 0.033 0.058 
Differences in Observed Prices 0.020 0.085 
Differences in Relative Wage Positions of Men and Women 0.184 0.116 
Differences in Residual Inequality -0.061 -0.084 
* Change in gender wage gap is calculated as : (LnWm-LnWf)2003-(LnWm-LnWf)1999 
 
 
What is striking is how different this result is from what other research focusing 
on Ukraine has found.  Overall, Ukraine did not get as much attention as other Eastern 
European and FSU countries in the transitional literature.  To the best of our knowledge 
there are only two analyses focusing on gender wage differentials in transition where 
Ukraine is included in the sample of countries being studied.  Reilly and Newell (2000) 
use the Oaxaca decomposition methodology only.  On the other hand, Brainerd (1998) 
uses the Juhn, Murphy, and Pierce decomposition and finds that the widening of the wage 
structure is solely responsible for the worsening of the relative position of Ukrainian 
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females between 1991 and 1994.  However, in her work, 1994 is supposed to represent 
the post-reform period.  The period of 1991-1994 represents the very early stage of the 
Ukrainian transition, as the macroeconomic stabilization was achieved only in 1996.  
During that time, the main focus of the government was on macroeconomic issues and 
not on social or labor market reforms.  This period was also characterized by the initial 
decentralization of the wage structure following the emergence of the private sector 
where wage controls did not apply.  Our analysis focuses on a later period of transition 
after macroeconomic stabilization and enactment of social and labor market policies.  
The ratio of minimum wage to average wage, frequently used a proxy for measuring the 
overall distribution of wages, declined dramatically between 1990 and 1996 inline with 
what Brainerd (1998) shows but increases afterwards to the levels of EU countries. This 
reflects the initial widening and subsequent contraction of the wage structure in the late 
transition (see Figure 1).  Moreover, while Brainerd (1998) reports an increase in 90/10 
log wage differentials, as well as in variance of log wages, my results for the subsequent 
period of 1999-2003 demonstrate a decline in the overall wage dispersion no matter 
which measure is used (see Table 33).  The difference in our results can be attributed to 
the fact that the periods of analysis are different and are characterized by different labor 
market environments and therefore different overall wage distribution.   
 
Chapter Conclusion 
 
During the analysis period, wage setting and minimum wage policies resulted in 
narrowing of the overall wage structure in Ukraine. While compression of the overall 
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wage structure contributed to improvement of the relative average gender wage ratio, it 
was more than offset by the deterioration of the female position in the male wage 
distribution.  What explains this deterioration in the valuation of females by Ukrainian 
employers over time?   Observed relative labor market characteristics of women do not 
explain this change since they actually improved over the analysis period (Table 10).  
Our results also demonstrate that relative female characteristics play no part in explaining 
the gender wage gap.  On the contrary, the different treatment by employers is a more 
plausible explanation.  Both, males and females are subject to extensive benefits and 
labor protective policies.  However, women are entitled to more generous benefits 
including maternity benefits.  Consequently, they are viewed as more expensive 
employees than males.  Thus, employers have an incentive to pay lower wages to females 
to “compensate” for the higher costs associated with female workers.  Moreover, as 
demonstrated in several research studies, and as my data shows, women in transitional 
economies are likely to withdraw from the labor market during childbearing for much 
longer periods of time than their Western counterparts.  As such, the employers might 
choose not to invest in their female employees in anticipation of shorter female tenure.  
The data used in this analysis does not contain information on hours worked.  The 
wages used are monthly wages unadjusted for hours worked.  It was shown than even 
during the Soviet Union females worked shorter hours than males and were perceived by 
employers as less devoted to the enterprise.  There is sociological research mentioned in 
Chapter V which demonstrates a revival of societal attitudes towards women devoting 
more time to families and household activities rather than to market work. On the 
contrary, the primary responsibility of men is perceived to be providing for the family.  
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There is also anecdotal evidence that with transition men devote disproportionate number 
of hours to market work compare to women.  These trends would undoubtedly contribute 
to lower wages received by women. 
In addition, not only labor market policies but also the enforcement of these 
policies contributes to the observed labor market outcomes.  While Ukraine does have 
“Equal Pay for Equal Work” legislation on the books, the question remains on how this 
legislation is actually enforced.   Ukraine is ranked poorly on enforcing the rule of law, 
which may be contributing to the lower relative wages that women receive. 
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CHAPTER VII 
CONCLUSION 
 
     The purpose of this dissertation was to investigate how different labor market policies 
in Lithuania and Ukraine affected labor market outcomes in these two countries.  The 
specific focus of this analysis was on returns to education and gender wage differentials. 
 Nationally representative data from both countries was used to conduct the analysis.  
We found that returns to education in Ukraine have decreased.  Especially 
pronounced and counterintuitive is the decrease in returns to higher education.  As 
described in the conclusion of Chapter V, there are multiple factors that might have 
contributed to this outcome.  Ukraine is characterized by the low demand for and high 
increasing supply of highly educated people.  At the same time, high minimum wage 
policy together with minimum wage acting as a base wage for the whole economy 
resulted in a very compressed wage structure and thus little variation of wages by 
education.  Lithuanian females faired better than their Ukrainian counterparts.   
Gender wage differential has increased in Ukraine between 1999 and 2003.  Relative 
average female wage is higher in Lithuania in 2000.  Oaxaca decomposition and Juhn, 
Murphy, and Pierce decomposition were used.   While observed labor market 
characteristics do not explain the observed gender wage gap, Oaxaca decomposition 
technique reveals that it is the treatment or the unexplained part which is the single most 
important component in explaining the difference in relative female wages in both 
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countries. However, this component has larger magnitude in Ukraine.  The likely 
explanation of this difference is the presence of more extensive social benefits and 
employment protection programs in Ukraine.  Positive selection bias is observed in 
Lithuania while there is no clear pattern of selection bias in Ukraine.  At the same time, 
there is observed gender segregation in allocation workers into low and high paying 
industries in Lithuania while there is no clear patter of that in Ukraine.  These results 
point out to the fact that Lithuania is a more successful reformer further along in 
transition process.   
As a result of minimum wage and wage setting policies where all wages are set as 
multiples of the minimum wage, the overall distribution of wages narrowed in Ukraine 
over the course of analysis period.  To investigate the decrease in Ukrainian gender wage 
differential, Juhn, Murphy, and Pierce decomposition is used.  This technique 
decomposes average gender wage differential into gender specific factors such as 
discrimination and labor market characteristics, as well s into changes in gender neutral 
factors such as changes in differences in the overall wage structure.  The results of this 
decomposition reveal that the compression of the overall wages contributed to the 
improvement of the relative average gender wage ratio.  However, this result was more 
than offset by the downward movement of females in the wage distribution.  There are 
several explanations as to why this downward movement is observed.  Generous social 
benefits including maternity benefits result in females being more “expensive” employees 
for the enterprise leading to lower relative female wages.  At the same time, the data used 
does not contain information on hours. There is evidence that females devote less hours 
to the market work which may also explain the deterioration of relative wages unadjusted 
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for hours.  Finally, with the weaker law enforcement in Ukraine, the employers who have 
tastes for gender find it easier to exercise their tastes than previously.
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APPENDIX A 
 
Comparison of Demographic and Institutional Characteristics as well as Labor 
Market Policies in USSR, Lithuania, and Ukraine. 
 
Composition of the Labor Force and Labor Market Characteristics 
Institutional or 
Demographic 
Characteristic 
Soviet Union Lithuania Ukraine 
Labor Force 
Participation 
- very high for both 
men and women 
- females working 
age is 5 years shorts 
than males 
- women comprise slightly more 
than half of the labor force 
- LFP is lower for females in 
childbearing ages 
-relatively high for both men and 
women 
- women constitute about 50 percent 
of the labor force 
Educational 
Attainment 
-high for males and 
females 
- segregation by 
field of study 
- high for males and females 
- women on the average have 
more years of schooling 
-high for males and females with 
disproportionate demand for higher 
education 
Occupational 
attainment 
- Duncan Index 
~30% 
-Duncan Index ~35% 
- Men are overrepresented 
among manual workers 
-Women are over represented as 
service workers and skilled 
professionals 
- relatively large number of persons 
are employed in agriculture and 
industry 
-occupational segregation and vertical 
segmentation are present 
- Duncan Index ~ 40% 
Public Sector - Everything is in 
public sector 
- Industry is 
characterized by 
large enterprises. 
- Almost no small 
and medium size 
enterprises 
- Majority of employees are 
female 
- Larger share of employees are 
female 
Private Sector Non-Existent - Growing rapidly 
- Most of the employees are 
men due to privatization of 
those industries that were 
predominantly male 
- Rapid development of small 
and medium size enterprises 
- Official wages are lower in the 
private sector 
- grows at a relatively slow rate 
- slow growth of small business 
Shadow Economy Almost none Moderate in size (~30 of the 
official GDP in 1994 and ~20% 
in 1998) 
- estimated between 50 and 100 
percent of the official GDP 
Unemployment Everybody was 
guaranteed a job 
-relatively high 
- higher unemployment rates 
among men 
- workers with lower education 
are over represented among the 
unemployed 
- relatively low (~10 %) 
- hard to estimate the exact Figure due 
to hidden unemployment 
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Comparison of Labor Market Policies 
Policy Soviet Union Lithuania Ukraine 
Wage Setting - set by central 
planners as a 
multiple of a base 
wage 
- very narrow wage 
differentials 
between different 
types of employees 
- low returns to 
education 
- Extensive non-
wage benefits 
including free 
vacations, child 
care services and 
health services 
- in public sector wages are still 
calculated according to the 
formula 
- in private sector wages are set 
by collective bargaining process 
-employers have to abide by the 
minimum wage regulation and 
pay overtime 
- Wages are multiple of a minimum 
wage using specific industry and 
regional coefficients 
- minimum wage is set low 
 
Minimum Wage Set relatively low - set relatively high (higher than 
in USSR) 
- all wages are tied to minimum wage, 
therefore minimum wage influences 
not only those in the bottom of the 
wage distribution but the whole 
system of wages 
- was allowed to erode completely but 
started to recover in 1998 
 
Social Benefits - extensive.  
Especially for 
women including 
state assistance with 
child birth and child 
care, labor benefits, 
support of women 
with children, 
restrictions on 
usage of female 
labor in potentially 
harmful production 
- Less than in USSR.  On par 
with Western Europe 
- 28 days of vacation per year 
- Maternity leave is 70 days before
and 56 days after child birth 
- extensive social benefits to some 
groups of the population 
- still generous maternity leaves and 
protective legislation for females 
Employment Policy - Jobs are provided 
by the state.  
Certain population 
groups are given 
priority 
- recently, active employment 
policies were introduced 
focusing on job creation, worker 
training, and legal enforcement 
- a lot of resemblance to the Soviet 
system 
- passive employment policies 
including early retirement and 
employment benefits 
- job training and professional 
orientation are available only for 
certain population groups 
Employment 
Protection 
Regulation 
- almost nobody 
ever gets fired 
- Employer has to give a valid 
reason for dismissal 
- Employer has to give two 
months notice and pay one to 
three months of severance pay 
- Employer has to give a valid reason 
for dismissal and pay severance for 6 
months 
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APPENDIX B 
 
Construction of Geographic Regions: Ukraine 
 
Region: Administrative arrears that are part of the region 
South Hersonska, Mikolaevska, Odeska, Zaporizhska 
West Volinska, Lvivska, Zakarpatska, Ivano-Frankivska, Ternopolska, Rivenska, 
Chernivetska 
East Luhanska, Donetska, Kharkivska, Dnipropetrovska, Chmelnitska 
North Sumska, Chernigovska, Kyievska, Poltavska 
Central Cherkaska, Kirovogradska, Vinitska, Zhitomirska 
Crimea Crimean peninsula and Sevastopol 
Kiev Kiev 
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APPENDIX C 
 
Standardization of Industry Classification for Different Years: Ukraine 
 
Classification of 1999-2000 Classification of 2001-2003 
Mining, quarrying 
Manufacturing 
Industry 
Electricity, gas, water, supply 
Agriculture Agriculture, hunting, Forestry 
Forestry Fishing 
Construction Construction 
Transportation 
Communication 
Information and Computing 
Transportation and Communication 
Education 
Culture 
Art 
Science and Scientific Services 
Education 
Health, Physical Culture 
Sport 
Social Services 
Health and Social Work 
Finance, Credit, Insurance Finance 
Government Administration Public Administration 
Housing Services 
Utilities 
Domestic Sphere 
Community, Social, and Personal Service 
Activities 
Trade 
Restaurant Services 
Input Supply 
Output Marketing 
Hotels and Restaurants 
Wholesale and Retail Trade 
Business Activities Real Estate, Rental, Business Activities 
Law Enforcement and Armed 
Forces 
Domestic Servants, Butlers 
City Organizations Extra-territorial organizations and bodies 
Other  
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APPENDIX D 
 
Types of Ownership of Business: Ukraine 1999-2003 
 
Form of Business Ownership 
1999-2003 
Definition of Business Ownership 
State Company owned by the state 
Working Collective Company owned by the working members in 
equal shares 
Cooperative Company owned by a group of individuals not 
necessarily in equal shares 
Private Person (Citizen of 
Ukraine) 
Company owned by a private individual who is a 
citizen of Ukraine 
Private Person (Foreign Citizen) Company is owned by a foreign individual who is 
not a citizen of Ukraine 
Stock Company o Company is financed by issuing of stock 
Rented Company Means of production are rented from the state 
Other Other type of ownership 
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APPENDIX E 
 
Detailed Empirical Results 
 
Table E 1. OLS Estimates of Wage Equation for Ukraine 1999 – 2003: Human 
Capital Specification for Males and Females 
 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Variable Estimate  (Standard Error) 
INTERCEPT 
4.923*  
(0.213) 
5.403* 
(0.170) 
6.357*  
(0.148) 
6.753*  
(0.137) 
6.472*  
(0.127) 
CITY 
0.329* 
(0.034) 
0.183*  
(0.028) 
0.152*  
(0.024) 
0.145*  
(0.022) 
0.177*  
(0.020) 
RURAL 
-0.709*  
(0.036) 
-0.634* 
(0.028) 
-0.490*  
(0.025) 
-0.529*  
(0.023) 
-0.483*  
(0.022) 
KIEV 
0.725* 
(0.082) 
0.646*  
(0.059) 
0.684*  
(0.049) 
0.588*  
(0.045) 
0.418*  
(0.042) 
SOUTH 
0.285*  
(0.051) 
0.231*  
(0.041) 
0.290* 
(0.035) 
0.295*  
(0.033) 
0.249*  
(0.031) 
WEST 
0.252*  
(0.046) 
0.173*  
(0.036) 
0.218*  
(0.031) 
0.212*  
(0.029) 
0.171*  
(0.028) 
EAST 
0.349* 
(0.045) 
0.333*  
(0.036)   
0.364*  
(0.031) 
0.353*   
(0.029) 
0.295*  
(0.027) 
NORTH 
0.188*   
(0.052) 
0.190*  
(0.041) 
0.262*  
(0.035) 
0.261* 
(0.033) 
0.241*  
(0.032) 
CRIMEA 
0.436* 
(0.074) 
0.278*  
(0.059) 
0.324*  
(0.052) 
0.408*  
(0.046) 
0.357*  
(0.043) 
MARRIED 
0.062  
(0.050) 
0.079** 
(0.039) 
0.170*  
(0.034) 
0.107*  
(0.031) 
0.108*  
(0.029) 
DIVORCED/WIDOWED 
-0.055  
(0.065) 
0.054  
(0.050) 
0.097**  
(0.043) 
0.110*  
(0.039) 
0.068*  
(0.036) 
FEMALE 
-0.175*  
(0.029) 
-0.236*  
(0.023) 
-0.267*  
(0.020) 
-0.287*  
(0.018) 
-0.295*  
(0.017) 
AGE 
0.071*  
(0.012) 
0.065*  
(0.009) 
0.035* 
(0.008) 
0.032*  
(0.008) 
0.024*  
(0.007) 
AGESQ 
-0.001*  
(0.000) 
-0.001* 
(0.000) 
-0.001*  
(0.000) 
-0.000*  
(0.000) 
-0.000*  
(0.000) 
ELEMENTARY EDUCATION 
-0.260*  
(0.058) 
-0.142*  
(0.052) 
-0.221*  
(0.046) 
-0.104**  
(0.045) 
-0.239*  
(0.045) 
VOCATIONAL TRAINING 
0.090*  
(0.044) 
0.126*  
(0.033) 
0.113*  
(0.029) 
0.115* 
(0.026) 
-0.001   
(0.024) 
SECONDARY SPECIAL 
0.262**  
(0.038) 
0.324*  
(0.031) 
0.253*  
(0.027) 
0.245*  
(0.024) 
0.154*  
(0.024) 
INCOMPLETE HIGHER 
0.269**  
(0.082) 
0.308*  
(0.055) 
0.215*  
(0.053) 
0.349*  
(0.091) 
0.235*  
(0.063) 
HIGHER EDUCATION 
0.656**  
(0.043) 
0.635*  
(0.033) 
0.505*  
(0.029) 
0.468*  
(0.027) 
0.422*  
(0.025) 
# Obs. 7852 7611 7522 7516 7650 
R-SQ 20% 24% 24% 25% 25% 
Note: * means significant at 99%  level, ** means significant at 95% level 
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Table E 2.  OLS Estimates of Wage Equation.  Ukraine 1999-2003. Human Capital 
Specification.  Males Only 
 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Variable 
Estimate  (Standard Error) 
 
INTERCEPT 
5.246*  
(0.304) 
5.713*  
(0.247) 
6.485*  
(0.224) 
6.845*  
(0.199) 
6.486*  
(0.186) 
CITY 
0.383*  
(0.053) 
0.206*  
(0.042) 
0.174*  
(0.038) 
0.156*  
(0.034) 
0.219*  
(0.031) 
RURAL 
-0.881*  
(0.054) 
-0.735*  
(0.042) 
-0.617*  
(0.039) 
-0.668*  
(0.035) 
-0.622*  
(0.034) 
KIEV 
0.844*  
(0.124) 
0.810*  
(0.090) 
0.789*  
(0.079) 
0.702*  
(0.070) 
0.458*  
(0.056) 
SOUTH 
0.399*  
(0.077) 
0.365*  
(0.062) 
0.393*  
(0.056) 
0.426*  
(0.049) 
0.376*  
(0.047) 
WEST 
0.385*  
(0.070) 
0.277*  
(0.054) 
0.263*  
(0.049) 
0.234*  
(0.044) 
0.245*  
(0.044) 
EAST 
0.473*  
(0.069) 
0.510*  
(0.054) 
0.535*  
(0.049) 
0.471*  
(0.044) 
0.435*  
(0.043) 
NORTH 
0.265*  
(0.079) 
0.270*  
(0.062) 
0.344*  
(0.056) 
0.337*  
(0.050) 
0.348*  
(0.049) 
CRIMEA 
0.603*  
(0.117) 
0.480*  
(0.089) 
0.471*  
(0.082) 
0.477*  
(0.071) 
0.452*  
(0.068) 
MARRIED 
0.214*  
(0.076) 
0.234*  
(0.061) 
0.385*  
(0.053) 
0.263*  
(0.047) 
0.224*  
(0.043) 
DIVORCED/WIDOWED 
-0.149  
(0.129) 
-0.050  
(0.095) 
-0.061  
(0.089) 
0.061 
(0.074) 
-0.008  
(0.069) 
AGE  
0.053*  
(0.017) 
0.049*  
(0.014) 
0.022***  
(0.012) 
0.023**  
(0.011) 
0.017  
(0.010) 
AGESQ 
-0.001*  
(0.000) 
-0.001*  
(0.000) 
-0.000**  
(0.000) 
-0.000*  
(0.000) 
-0.000**  
(0.000) 
ELEMENTARY 
EDUCATION 
-0.334*  
(0.081) 
-0.042  
(0.075) 
-0.208*  
(0.067) 
-0.112***  
(0.061) 
-0.237*  
(0.067) 
VOCATIONAL 
TRAINING 
0.030  
(0.062) 
0.109**  
(0.048) 
0.111*  
(0.042) 
0.189*  
(0.037) 
0.020*  
(0.035) 
SECONDARY SPECIAL 
0.189*  
(0.059) 
0.343*  
(0.048) 
0.260*  
(0.043) 
0.287*  
(0.038) 
0.218*  
(0.039) 
INCOMPLETE HIGHER 
0.105  
(0.130) 
0.394*  
(0.084) 
0.205**  
(0.091) 
0.416**  
(0.170) 
0.208**  
(0.105) 
HIGHER EDUCATION 
0.608*  
(0.066) 
0.605*  
(0.051) 
0.483*  
(0.047) 
0.443*  
(0.041) 
0.433*  
(0.039) 
# Obs. 3904 3699 3604 3662 3725 
R-SQ 24% 27% 28% 29% 28% 
Note: * means significant at 99%  level, ** means significant at 95% level,     *** means 
significant at 90% level 
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Table E 3.  OLS Estimates of Wage Equation.  Ukraine 1999 – 2003. Human Capital 
Specification.  Females Only 
 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Variable 
Estimate  (Standard Error) 
 
INTERCEPT 
4.663* 
(0.0312) 
5.927*  
(0.234) 
6.129*  
(0.197) 
6.601*  
(0.191) 
6.161*  
(0.172) 
CITY 
0.278*  
(0.044) 
0.172*  
(0.033) 
0.140*  
(0.029) 
0.132*  
(0.028) 
0.138*  
(0.025) 
RURAL 
-0.521*  
(0.046) 
-0.470*  
(0.035) 
-0.346*  
(0.030) 
-0.384*  
(0.030) 
-0.332*  
(0.028) 
KIEV 
0.603*  
(0.106) 
0.502*  
(0.069) 
0.581*  
(0.060) 
0.468*  
(0.057) 
0.372*  
(0.051) 
SOUTH 
0.168**  
(0.067) 
0.148*  
(0.050) 
0.189*  
(0.043) 
0.165*  
(0.042) 
0.121*  
(0.038) 
WEST 
0.122**  
(0.060) 
0.157*  
(0.045) 
0.170* 
(0.039)   
0.181*  
(0.037) 
0.102*  
(0.035) 
EAST 
0.217*  
(0.058) 
0.225*  
(0.044) 
0.196*  
(0.038) 
0.231*  
(0.037) 
0.161*  
(0.034) 
NORTH 
0.108  
(0.067) 
0.130*  
(0.050) 
0.187*  
(0.044) 
0.186*  
(0.041) 
0.142*  
(0.039) 
CRIMEA 
0.272*  
(0.093) 
0.172**  
(0.071) 
0.185*  
(0.065) 
0.336*  
(0.057) 
0.271*  
(0.053) 
MARRIED 
-0.066  
(0.066) 
-0.047  
(0.049) 
-0.056  
(0.044) 
-0.051  
(0.042) 
-0.032  
(0.037) 
DIVORCED/WIDOWED 
-0.104  
(0.076) 
-0.019  
(0.055) 
-0.016  
(0.049) 
0.026  
(0.047) 
0.009  
(0.042) 
AGE 
0.074*  
(0.017) 
0.032**  
(0.013) 
0.040*  
(0.011) 
0.029*  
(0.011) 
0.031*  
(0.010) 
AGE SQUARED 
-0.001*  
(0.000) 
-0.000*  
(0.000) 
-0.000*  
(0.000) 
-0.000*  
(0.000) 
-0.000*  
(0.000) 
ELEMENTARY 
EDUCATION 
-0.127 
(0.082) 
-0.234*  
(0.071) 
-0.214*  
(0.064) 
0.015  
(0.066) 
-0.234*  
(0.058) 
VOCATIONAL 
TRAINING 
0.163*  
(0.062) 
0.120*  
(0.043) 
0.107*  
(0.038) 
0.013*  
(0.036) 
-0.014  
(0.032) 
SECONDARY SPECIAL 
0.332*  
(0.049) 
0.232*  
(0.037) 
0.233*  
(0.033) 
0.209*  
(0.030) 
0.097*  
(0.029) 
INCOMPLETE HIGHER 
0.426*  
(103) 
0.182*  
(0.065) 
0.185*  
(0.061) 
0.328*  
(0.101) 
0.249*  
(0.074) 
HIGHER EDUCATION 
0.712*  
(0.055) 
0.568*  
(0.040) 
0.501*  
(0.036) 
0.485*  
(0.034) 
0.400*  
(0.031) 
# Obs. 3948 3912 3918 3854 3925 
R-SQ 17% 21% 20% 20% 20% 
Note: * means significant at 99% level, ** means significant at 95% level, *** means 
significant at 90% level 
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Table E 4.  OLS Estimates of Wage Equation.  Lithuania 2000.  Human Capital 
Specification 
 
Males 
and 
Females 
Males 
Only 
Females 
Only 
INTERCEPT 
5.564*  
(0.19582) 
5.839*  
(0.274) 
4.988*  
(0.279) 
MARRIED 
0.164*  
(0.031) 
0.359*  
(0.046) 
-0.063*  
(0.041) 
DIVORCED/WIDOWED 
0.100**  
(0.0400) 
-0.113*  
(0.082) 
-0.020  
(0.047) 
FEMALE 
-0.186*  
(0.0175) N/A N/A 
AGE 
-0.001  
(0.007) 
0.021**  
(0.010) 
0.029*  
(0.011) 
AGE SQUARED 
-0.000   
(0.000) 
0.000   
(0.000) 
-0.000    
(0.000) 
ELEMENTARY 
-0.184*  
(0.032) 
-0.195*  
(0.042) 
0.116**  
(0.050) 
SECONDARY SPECIAL 
0.178*  
(0.020) 
0.154*  
(0.031) 
0.182*  
(0.026) 
HIGHER EDUCATION 
0.632*  
(0.024) 
0.606*  
(0.038) 
0.628*  
(0.029) 
# Obs. 4324 2168 2156 
R-SQ 30% 29% 34% 
Note: * means significant at 99% level, ** means 
significant at 95% level, *** means significant at 90% level 
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Table E 5.  Heckman Two Stage Wage Estimation.  Ukraine 1999-2003. Human 
Capital Specification.  Males and Females 
 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Variable Estimate  (Standard Error) 
 
INTERCEPT 
6.104*  
(0.168) 
6.619*  
(0.150) 
6.950*  
(0.136) 
7.372*  
(0.126) 
6.998*  
(0.118) 
CITY 
0.217*  
(0.027) 
0.127*  
(0.023) 
0.113*  
(0.021) 
0.105*  
(0.020) 
0.137*  
(0.019) 
RURAL 
-0.410*  
(0.027) 
-0.445*  
(0.024) 
-0.386*  
(0.022) 
-0.406*  
(0.020)   
-0.377*  
(0.020) 
KIEV 
0.550*  
(0.097) 
0.519*  
(0.068) 
0.523*  
(0.059) 
0.470*  
(0.054) 
0.254*  
(0.050) 
SOUTH 
0.156*  
(0.059) 
0.246*  
(0.047) 
0.278*  
(0.041) 
0.260*  
(0.039) 
0.167*  
(0.036) 
WEST 
0.216*  
(0.053) 
0.255*  
(0.042) 
0.288*  
(0.036) 
0.256*  
(0.034) 
0.119*  
(0.032) 
EAST 
0.172*  
(0.052) 
0.314*  
(0.041) 
0.301*  
(0.036) 
0.330*  
(0.034) 
0.162*  
(0.031) 
NORTH 
0.045  
(0.060) 
0.144*  
(0.047) 
0.204*  
(0.042) 
0.222*  
(0.039) 
0.143*  
(0.037) 
CRIMEA 
0.358*  
(0.086) 
0.329*  
(0.067) 
0.399*  
(0.060) 
0.4336*  
(0.053) 
0.314*  
(0.050) 
MARRIED 
0.101**  
(0.039) 
0.104*  
(0.034) 
0.162*  
(0.031) 
0.108*  
(0.028) 
0.153*  
(0.026) 
DIVORCED/WIDOWED 
0.012 
(0.051) 
0.048 
(0.043) 
0.073 
(0.040) 
0.106*  
(0.036) 
0.118*  
(0.032) 
FEMALE 
-0.267*  
(0.022) 
-0.325*  
(0.020) 
-0.336*  
(0.018) 
-0.343*  
(0.017) 
-0.356*  
(0.016) 
AGE 
0.057*  
(0.009) 
0.041*  
(0.008) 
0.035*  
(0.007) 
0.028*  
(0.007) 
0.026*  
(0.006) 
AGE SQUARED 
-0.001*  
(0.000) 
-0.001*  
(0.000) 
-0.000*  
(0.000) 
-0.000*  
(0.000) 
-0.000*  
(0.000) 
ELEMENTARY EDUCATION 
-0.122*  
(0.043) 
-0.132*  
(0.044) 
-0.204*  
(0.041) 
-0.096** 
(0.039) 
-0.170*  
(0.040) 
VOCATIONAL TRAINING 
0.095*  
(0.032) 
0.097*  
(0.028) 
0.091*  
(0.025) 
0.094*  
(0.023) 
0.020  
(0.021) 
SECONDARY SPECIAL 
0.185*  
(0.029) 
0.230*  
(0.026) 
0.196*  
(0.024) 
0.186*  
(0.021) 
0.144*  
(0.022) 
INCOMPLETE HIGHER 
0.237*  
(0.062) 
0.230*  
(0.046) 
0.186*  
(0.047) 
0.246*  
(0.081) 
0.243*  
(0.057) 
HIGHER EDUCATION 
0.466*  
(0.034) 
0.479*  
(0.028) 
0.449*  
(0.026) 
0.412*  
(0.024) 
0.404*  
(0.022) 
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Table E 5.  Heckman Two Stage Wage Estimation.  Ukraine 1999-2003. Human 
Capital Specification.  Males and Females- continued 
Selection Equation 
INTERCEPT 
0.499*  
(0.034) 
0.475*  
(0.036) 
0.500*  
(0.037) 
0.451*  
(0.036) 
0.328*  
(0.036) 
NUMBER OF CHILDREN UNDER 7 
-0.064*  
(0.014) 
-0.091*  
(0.017) 
-0.088*  
(0.018) 
-0.080*  
(0.019) 
-0.101*  
(0.019) 
HEAD OF HOUSEHOLD 
0.118*  
(0.016) 
0.162*  
(0.018) 
0.190*  
(0.020) 
0.161*  
(0.019) 
0.147*  
(0.019) 
NON-LABOR INCOME 
0.000*  
(0.000) 
0.000*  
(0.000) 
0.000*  
(0.000) 
0.000*  
(0.000) 
0.000*  
(0.000) 
NUMBER OF PENSIONERS 
-0.101*  
(0.013) 
-0.097*  
(0.021) 
-0.043***  
(0.023) 
-0.087*  
(0.021) 
-0.130*  
(0.021) 
KIEV 
-0.079  
(0.071) 
0.031  
(0.070) 
0.117*  
(0.070) 
0.098  
(0.067) 
0.118***  
(0.063) 
SOUTH 
-0.120*  
(0.043) 
-0.106**  
(0.046) 
-0.127*  
(0.047) 
-0.070  
(0.047) 
-0.000   
(0.044) 
WEST 
-0.215*  
(0.038) 
-0.192*  
(0.040) 
-0.245*  
(0.042) 
-0.190*  
(0.041) 
-0.083 ***  
(0.040) 
EAST 
-0.113*  
(0.038) 
-0.105*  
(0.040) 
-0.077  
(0.041) 
-0.113*  
(0.041) 
0.014   
(0.040) 
CENTRAL 
-0.190*  
(0.042) 
-0.088*  
(0.044) 
-0.083  
(0.045) 
-0.051  
(0.044) 
-0.147*  
(0.043) 
CRIMEA 
-0.276*  
(0.060) 
-0.189*  
(0.063) 
-0.314*  
(0.065) 
-0.251*  
(0.062) 
-0.177*  
(0.060) 
Lambda -1.563 -1.143 -0.979 -0.930 -0.858 
Note: * means significant at 99% level, ** means significant at 95% level, *** means significant at 
90% level 
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Table E 6.  Wage Estimation with Heckman Correction.  Ukraine 1999-2003. 
Human Capital Specification.  Males Only 
 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Variable Estimate  (Standard Error) 
INTERCEPT 
6.005*  
(0.243) 
6.376*  
(0.221) 
6.805*  
(0.210) 
7.178*  
(0.186) 
6.868*  
(0.173) 
CITY 
0.228*  
(0.043) 
0.102*  
(0.037) 
0.125*  
(0.035) 
0.101*  
(0.032) 
0.158*  
(0.029) 
RURAL 
-0.528*  
(0.042) 
-0.560*  
(0.037) 
-0.490*  
(0.035) 
-0.525*  
(0.031 
-0.479*  
(0.031) 
KIEV 
0.586*  
(0.146) 
0.560*  
(0.110) 
0.595*  
(0.093) 
0.521*  
(0.084) 
0.270*  
(0.078) 
SOUTH 
0.202**  
(0.089) 
0.289*  
(0.074) 
0.365*  
(0.065) 
0.346*  
(0.058) 
0.229*  
(0.056) 
WEST 
0.310*  
(0.079) 
0.285*  
(0.064) 
0.328*  
(0.057) 
0.267*  
(0.051) 
0.156*  
(0.050) 
EAST 
0.243*  
(0.078) 
0.442*  
(0.063) 
0.437*  
(0.056) 
0.431*  
(0.051) 
0.256*  
(0.050) 
NORTH 
0.085  
(0.091) 
0.170**  
(0.073) 
0.310*  
(0.065) 
0.315*  
(0.058) 
0.240*  
(0.057) 
CRIMEA 
0.540*  
(0.133) 
0.468*  
(0.105) 
0.507*  
(0.094) 
0.518*  
(0.082) 
0.345*  
(0.079) 
MARRIED 
0.136**  
(0.061) 
0.160*  
(0.054) 
0.281*  
(0.050) 
0.187*  
(0.044) 
0.213*  
(0.039) 
DIVORCED/WIDOWED 
-0.091  
(0.097) 
-0.101*  
(0.083) 
-0.040 
(0.081) 
0.042  
(0.067) 
0.095  
(0.060) 
AGE 
0.060*  
(0.013) 
0.052*  
(0.012) 
0.035*  
(0.011) 
0.034*  
(0.010) 
0.026*  
(0.009) 
AGE SQUARED 
-0.001*  
(0.000) 
-0.001*  
(0.000) 
-0.000*  
(0.000) 
-0.000*  
(0.000) 
-0.000*  
(0.000) 
ELEMENTARY 
EDUCATION 
-0.225*  
(0.061) 
-0.088  
(0.064) 
-0.209*  
(0.059) 
-0.118**  
(0.054) 
-0.213*  
(0.059) 
VOCATIONAL 
TRAINING 
0.024  
(0.047) 
0.103**  
(0.041) 
0.090**  
(0.038) 
0.145*  
(0.033) 
0.053***  
(0.031) 
SECONDARY SPECIAL 
0.104*  
(0.046) 
0.282*  
(0.042) 
0.232*  
(0.039) 
0.227*  
(0.034) 
0.223*  
(0.035) 
INCOMPLETE HIGHER 
0.114  
(0.101) 
0.334*  
(0.073) 
0.184**  
(0.083) 
0.266***  
(0.154) 
0.238* *  
(0.093) 
HIGHER EDUCATION 
0.429*  
(0.053) 
0.488*  
(0.045) 
0.447*  
(0.043) 
0.398*  
(0.037) 
0.431*  
(0.035) 
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Table E 6.  Wage Estimation with Heckman Correction.  Ukraine 1999-2003. 
Human Capital Specification.  Males Only-continued 
 
Selection Equation 
INTERCEPT 
0.541*  
(0.050) 
0.515*  
(0.053) 
0.483*  
(0.055) 
0.458*  
(0.054) 
0.337*  
(0.052) 
NUMBER OF CHILDREN 
UNDER 7 
0.044**  
(0.025) 
0.077*  
(0.027) 
0.110*  
(0.032) 
0.114*  
(0.034) 
0.112*  
(0.030) 
HEAD OF HOUSEHOLD 
0.078*  
(0.024) 
0.093*  
(0.027) 
0.164*  
(0.030) 
0.105*  
(0.029) 
0.102*  
(0.028) 
NON-LABOR INCOME 
0.000*  
(0.000) 
0.000*   
(0.000) 
0.000*  
(000) 
0.000*  
(0.000) 
0.000*  
(0.000) 
NUMBER OF 
PENSIONERS 
-0.163*  
(0.019) 
-0.139*  
(0.029) 
-0.136*  
(0.033) 
-0.134*  
(0.031) 
-0.214*  
(0.029) 
KIEV 
-0.019  
(0.109) 
0.103  
(0.108) 
0.161  
(0.109) 
0.165  
(0.106) 
0.072  
(0.091) 
SOUTH 
-0.086  
(0.062) 
-0.105  
(0.067) 
-0.108  
(0.069) 
-0.019  
(0.068) 
0.072  
(0.065) 
WEST 
-0.195*  
(0.056) 
-0.190*  
(0.059) 
-0.231*  
(0.061) 
-0.157*  
(0.060) 
-0.032  
(0.058) 
EAST 
-0.033  
(0.056) 
-0.125**  
(0.058) 
-0.011  
(0.061) 
-0.042  
(0.060) 
0.071  
(0.058) 
CENTRAL 
-0.189*  
(0.060) 
-0.1437** 
(0.063) 
-0.062  
(0.066) 
-0.039  
(0.064) 
-0.125**  
(0.062) 
CRIMEA 
-0.312*  
(0.089) 
-0.228*  
(0.013) 
-0.252*  
(0.095) 
-0.293*  
(0.090) 
-0.168**  
(0.089) 
Lambda -1.637 -1.246 -1.042 -0.965 -0.938 
Note: * means significant at 99% level, ** means significant at 95% level, *** 
means significant at 90% level 
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Table E 7.  Wage Estimation with Heckman Correction.  Ukraine 1999-2003. 
Human Capital Specification.  Females Only 
 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Variable Estimate  (Standard Error) 
INTERCEPT 
6.198*  
(0.244) 
6.730*  
(0.207) 
6.797*  
(0.178) 
7.433*  
(0.172) 
6.742*  
(0.160) 
CITY 
0.202*  
(0.034) 
0.138*  
(0.029) 
0.121*  
(0.026) 
0.114*  
(0.025) 
0.109*  
(0.023) 
RURAL 
-0.270*  
(0.035) 
-0.3410*  
(0.030) 
-0.270*  
(0.027) 
-0.283*  
(0.026) 
-0.261*  
(0.025) 
KIEV 
0.509*  
(0.1244) 
0.441*  
(0.080) 
0.457*  
(0.070) 
0.405*  
(0.067) 
0.251*  
(0.060) 
SOUTH 
0.109  
(0.077) 
0.182*  
(0.058) 
0.189*  
(0.050) 
0.171*  
(0.049) 
0.096**  
(0.044) 
WEST 
0.132*** 
(0.069) 
0.225*  
(0.052) 
0.236*  
(0.044 
0.227*  
(0.043) 
0.087**  
(0.040) 
EAST 
0.095   
(0.067) 
0.188*  
(0.050) 
0.159*  
(0.043) 
0.224*  
(0.042) 
0.073***  
(0.039) 
NORTH 
-0.008  
(0.078) 
0.107**  
(0.059) 
0.112**  
(0.051) 
0.139*  
(0.049) 
0.059  
(0.045) 
CRIMEA 
0.186*** 
(0.108) 
0.196**  
(0.083) 
0.288*  
(0.074) 
0.348*  
(0.067) 
0.279*  
(0.061) 
MARRIED 
0.044  
(0.05) 
0.007  
(0.043) 
0.010  
(0.039) 
0.014  
(0.037) 
0.034  
(0.034) 
DIVORCED/WIDOWED 
0.002   
(0.059) 
0.018 
(0.049) 
0.000  
(0.044) 
0.058  
(0.041) 
0.066***  
(0.038) 
AGE 
0.037*  
(0.013) 
0.018  
(0.011) 
0.030*  
(0.009) 
0.009*  
(0.010) 
0.025*  
(0.009) 
AGE SQUARED 
-0.000*  
(0.000) 
-0.000  
(0.000) 
-0.000*  
(0.000) 
-0.000*  
().000) 
-0.000*  
(0.000) 
ELEMENTARY 
EDUCATION 
0.019   
(0.060) 
-0.141**  
(0.059) 
-0.173*  
(0.055) 
0.020  
(0.057) 
-0.149*  
(0.052) 
VOCATIONAL 
TRAINING 
0.154*  
(0.046) 
0.115*  
(0.037) 
0.101*  
(0.034) 
0.009*  
(0.032) 
-0.003  
(0.029) 
SECONDARY SPECIAL 
0.250*  
(0.0337) 
0.193*  
(0.032) 
0.151*  
(0.029) 
0.158*  
(0.026) 
0.080*  
(0.026) 
INCOMPLETE HIGHER 
0.368*  
(0.076) 
0.118**  
(0.056) 
0.161*  
(0.053) 
0.252*  
(0.090) 
0.238*  
(0.068) 
HIGHER EDUCATION 
0.500*  
(0.042) 
0.471*  
(0.035) 
0.426*  
(0.032) 
0.422*  
(0.030) 
0.371*  
(0.028) 
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Table E 7. Wage Estimation with Heckman Correction.  Ukraine 1999-2003. Human 
Capital Specification.  Females Only-continued 
 
Selection Equation 
INTERCEPT 
0.426*  
(0.046) 
0.425*  
(0.049) 
0.497*  
(0.052) 
0.421*  
(0.051) 
0.306*  
(0.050) 
NUMBER OF 
CHILDREN UNDER 7 
-0.147*  
(0.018) 
-0.254*  
(0.024) 
-0.242*  
(0.024) 
-0.241*  
(0.026) 
-0.306*  
(0.027) 
HEAD OF 
HOUSEHOLD 
0.157*  
(0.024) 
0.235*  
(0.028) 
0.198*  
(0.029) 
0.209*  
(0.028) 
0.176*  
(0.028) 
NON-LABOR INCOME 
0.000*    
(0.000) 
0.000*  
(0.000) 
0.000*  
(0.000) 
0.000*  
(0.000) 
0.000*  
(0.000) 
NUMBER OF 
PENSIONERS 
-0.039**  
(0.019) 
-0.075**  
(0.030) 
0.023  
(0.033) 
-0.065**  
(0.029) 
-0.059**  
(0.030) 
KIEV 
-0.169*** 
(0.096) 
-0.081*  
(0.089) 
0.103  
(0.094) 
0.040*  
(0.089) 
0.140*  
(0.088) 
SOUTH 
-0.155*  
(0.059) 
-0.090  
(0.062) 
-0.133**  
(0.065) 
-0.123*** 
(0.064) 
-0.073  
(0.062) 
WEST 
-0.214*  
(0.053) 
-0.200*  
(0.056) 
-0.250*  
(0.059) 
-0.230*  
(0.057) 
-0.120**  
(0.056) 
EAST 
-0.182*  
(0.052) 
-0.033 
(0.056) 
-0.125**  
(0.058) 
-0.189*  
(0.056) 
-0.049  
(0.554) 
CENTRAL 
-0.186*  
(0.059) 
-0.042  
(0.061) 
-0.093    
(.063) 
-0.065*  
(0.062) 
-0.167*  
(0.061) 
CRIMEA 
-0.229*  
(0.081) 
-0.168*** 
(0.087) 
-0.351  
(0.089) 
-0.210*  
(0.085) 
-0.188**  
(0.083) 
Lambda -1.440 -1.004 -0.860 -0.841 -0.730 
Note: * means significant at 99% level, ** means significant at 95% level, *** 
means significant at 90% level 
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Table E 8.  Heckman Two Stage Wage Estimation.  Lithuania 2000. Human Capital 
Specification 
 
Males 
and 
Females
Males 
Only 
Females 
Only 
INTERCEPT 
5.731*  
(0.185)
6.021*  
(0.259)
5.254*  
(0.257)
MARRIED 
0.126*  
(0.030)
0.264*  
(0.044)
-0.042  
(0.039) 
DIVORCED/WIDOWED 
0.048    
(0.038)
-
0.130***  
-0.018  
(0.045) 
FEMALE 
-0.166*  
(0.017) N/A N/A 
AGE 
0.001   
(0.007)
-0.019**   
(0.009)
0.027*  
(0.010) 
AGE SQUARED 
-0.000*  
(0.000)
-0.000*  
(0.000)
-0.000*  
(0.000) 
ELEMENTARY 
-0.161*  
(0.030)
-0.171*  
(0.039)
-
0.098**  
SECONDARY SPECIAL 
0.176*  
(0.020)
0.158*  
(0.029)
0.173*  
(0.024) 
HIGHER EDUCATION 
0.620*  
(0.023)
0.587*  
(0.037)
0.629*  
(0.028) 
Selection Equation 
INTERCEPT 
0.361*  
(0.037)
0.034  
(0.063)
0.580*  
(0.049) 
NUMBER OF CHILDREN UNDER 7 
0.028    
(0.036)
0.173*  
(0.059)
-
0.117**  
HEAD OF HOUSEHOLD 
0.769*  
(0.040)
0.978*  
(0.061)
0.579*  
(0.055) 
NON-LABOR INCOME 
0.000*  
(0.000)
0.001*  
(0.000)
-0.000*  
(0.000) 
NUMBER OF PENSIONERS 
-
0.104**  
-0.111  
(0.069)
-0.134*  
(0.059) 
Lambda -0.524 -0.515 -0.493 
Note: * means significant at 99% level, ** means significant at 95% level, *** 
means significant at 90% level 
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Table E 9.  OLS Estimates of Wage Equation.  Ukraine 1999-2003. Augmented 
Specification.  Males and Females 
 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Variable Estimate  (Standard Error) 
Intercept 
5.096*  
(0.200) 
5.806*  
(0.158) 
6.602*  
(0.139) 
6.849*  
(0.128) 
6.664*  
(0.119) 
CITY 
0.220*  
(0.032) 
0.100*  
(0.025) 
0.100*  
(0.023) 
0.097*  
(0.021) 
0.146*  
(0.019) 
RURAL 
-0.222*  
(0.036) 
-0.236*  
(0.028) 
-0.162*  
(0.025) 
-0.223*  
(0.023) 
-0.197*  
(0.022) 
KIEV 
0.650*  
(0.076) 
0.611*  
(0.052) 
0.641*  
(0.046) 
0.540*  
(0.042) 
0.390*  
(0.039) 
SOUTH 
0.295*  
(0.047) 
0.232*  
(0.037) 
0.260*  
(0.033) 
0.264*  
(0.030) 
0.217*  
(0.028) 
WEST 
0.154*  
(0.043) 
0.127*  
(0.033) 
0.154*  
(0.029) 
0.121*  
(0.027) 
0.085*  
(0.026) 
EAST 
0.299*  
(0.042) 
0.319*  
(0.033) 
0.312*  
(0.029) 
0.273*  
(0.027) 
0.226*  
(0.025) 
NORTH 
0.158*  
(0.048) 
0.142*  
(0.037) 
0.208*  
(0.033) 
0.218*  
(0.030) 
0.202*  
(0.029) 
CRIMEA 
0.426*  
(0.069) 
0.304*  
(0.053) 
0.337*  
(0.049) 
0.376*  
(0.042) 
0.320*  
(0.040) 
MARRIED 
0.086***  
(0.046) 
0.089**  
(0.036) 
0.149*  
(0.032) 
0.099*  
(0.029) 
0.091*  
(0.026) 
DIVORCED/WIDOWED 
-0.0367  
(0.060) 
0.043  
(0.045) 
0.091*  
(0.040) 
0.100*  
(0.036)  
0.065**  
(0.033) 
AGE 
-0.259*  
(0.028) 
-0.242*  
(0.022) 
-0.255*  
(0.020) 
-0.265*  
(0.018) 
-0.279*  
(0.017) 
AGE SQUARED 
0.074  
(0.011) 
0.055*  
(0.009) 
0.036*  
(0.008) 
0.039*  
(0.007) 
0.028*  
(0.006) 
ELEMENTARY EDUC 
-0.001*  
(0.000) 
-0.001*  
(0.000) 
-0.000* 
(0.000) 
-0.000*  
(0.000) 
-0.000*  
(0.000) 
VOCATIONAL TRAINING 
-0.152*  
(0.053) 
-0.028  
(0.048) 
-0.098**  
(0.043) 
-0.023  
(0.041) 
-0.136*  
(0.041) 
SECONDARY SPECIAL 
0.055  
(0.041) 
0.106*  
(0.030) 
0.097*  
(0.027) 
0.093*  
(0.024) 
-0.017  
(0.022) 
INCOMPLETE HIGHER 
0.199*  
(0.036) 
0.230*  
(0.028) 
0.214*  
(0.025) 
0.213*  
(0.022) 
0.131*  
(0.022) 
HIGHER EDUCATION 
0.156**  
(0.076) 
0.244*  
(0.049) 
0.173*  
(0.049) 
0.320*  
(0.084) 
0.199*  
(0.058) 
AGRICULTURE, FORESTRY 
0.543*  
(0.041) 
0.564*  
(0.031) 
0.477  
(0.028) 
0.465*  
(0.026) 
0.394*  
(0.024) 
CONSTRUCTION 
-1.073*  
(0.052) 
-0.790*  
(0.042) 
-0.842*  
(0.037) 
-0.762*  
(0.033) 
-0.804*  
(0.032) 
TRANSPORTATION AND 
COMMUNICATIONS 
-0.082  
(0.064) 
-0.020  
(0.051) 
-0.140*  
(0.045) 
-0.042  
(0.041) 
-0.062  
(0.038) 
EDUCATION, CULTURE 
0.121  
(0.050) 
0.158*  
(0.038) 
0.044*  
(0.035) 
0.091*  
(0.032) 
0.028  
(0.030) 
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Table E 9. OLS Estimates of Wage Equation.  Ukraine 1999-2003. Augmented 
Specification.  Males and Females-continued 
HEALTH CARE, PHYSICAL 
CULTURE, SOCIAL SECURITY 
-0.160  
(0.052) 
-0.286*  
(0.040) 
-0.347*  
(0.037) 
-0.340*  
(0.034) 
-0.344*  
(0.032) 
FINANCE, INSURANCE, 
CREDIT, PENSION SECURITY 
-0.008  
(0.055) 
-
0.077***  
(0.042) 
-0.278*  
(0.037) 
-0.288*  
(0.035) 
-0.358*  
(0.033) 
STATE 
0.293**  
(0.0127) 
0.324*  
(0.098) 
0.105  
(0.092)  
0.017  
(0.070) 
0.022*  
(0.063) 
MUNICIPAL UTILITIES, 
SERVICE SPHERE 
0.213*  
(0.077) 
0.289*  
(0.060) 
-0.004  
(0.056) 
0.045  
(0.039) 
-0.027  
(0.033) 
TRADE, PUBLIC CATERING, 
INPUT SUPPLY 
-0.191*  
(0.062) 
-0.214*  
(0.046) 
-0.307*  
(0.042) 
-0.341*  
(0.047) 
-0.330*  
(0.042) 
OTHER 
-0.003  
(0.053) 
-0.094**  
(0.041) 
-0.166*  
(0.036) 
-0.151*  
(0.033) 
-0.176*  
(0.030) 
WORKING COLLECTIVE OR 
COOPERATIVE 
0.204*  
(0.068) 
0.268*  
(0.052) 
0.040*  
(0.049) 
-0.159**  
(0.071) 
-0.182*  
(0.066) 
STOCK COMPANY 
-0.491*  
(0.044) 
-0.368*  
(0.037) 
-0.330*  
(0.035) 
-0.422*  
(0.034) 
-0.372*  
(0.034) 
RENTAL COMPANY 
-0.086**  
(0.041) 
0.109*  
(0.030) 
-0.004*  
(0.027) 
-0.020  
(0.025) 
-0.087*  
(0.024) 
FOREIGN OWNERSIP 
0.332**  
(0.140) 
-0.029  
(0.093) 
-0.091  
(0.076) 
0.151  
(0.072) 
-0.163  
(0.073) 
PRIVATE OWNERSHIP 
0.468*  
(0.155) 
0.579*  
(0.120) 
0.224*  
(0.104) 
0.393*  
(0.090) 
0.250  
(0.101) 
OTHER 
0.054  
(0.055) 
0.017  
(0.038) 
-0.119*  
(0.032) 
-0.074*  
(0.029) 
-0.143*  
(0.026) 
BOOTHER 
-1.126**  
(0.458) 
-0.624*  
(0.165) 
-1.085*  
(0.163) 
-0.095  
(0.351) 
-0.263  
(0.233) 
# Obs. 7852 7611 7522 7516 7650 
R-SQ 32% 36% 35% 36% 36% 
Note: * means significant at 99%  level, ** means significant at 95% level, *** means significant 
at 90% level 
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Table E 10.  OLS Estimates of Wage Equation.  Ukraine 1999-2003. Augmented 
Specification.  Males Only 
 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Variable Estimate (Standard Error) 
Intercept 
5.648*  
(0.284) 
5.822*  
(0.230) 
6.812*  
(0.209) 
6.943*  
(0.183) 
6.755*  
(0.172) 
CITY 
0.234*  
(0.049) 
0.077*  
(0.039) 
0.103*  
(0.036) 
0.101*  
(0.032) 
0.182*  
(0.029) 
RURAL 
-0.273*  
(0.055) 
-0.266*  
(0.043) 
-0.184*  
(0.040) 
-0.272*  
(0.035) 
-0.221*  
(0.035) 
KIEV 
0.735*  
(0.114) 
0.731*  
(0.083) 
0.715*  
(0.073) 
0.629*  
(0.064) 
0.430*  
(0.060) 
SOUTH 
0.353*  
(0.071) 
0.339*  
(0.057) 
0.338*  
(0.051) 
0.393*  
(0.045) 
0.323*  
(0.043) 
WEST 
0.225*  
(0.064) 
0.166*  
(0.050) 
0.175*  
(0.045) 
0.124*  
(0.040) 
0.123*  
(0.040) 
EAST 
0.344*  
(0.064) 
0.431*  
(0.050) 
0.440*  
(0.045) 
0.368*  
(0.040) 
0.340*  
(0.039) 
NORTH 
0.181**  
(0.072) 
0.162*  
(0.057) 
0.255*  
(0.052) 
0.274*  
(0.045) 
0.298*  
(0.045) 
CRIMEA 
0.569*  
(0.108) 
0.434*  
(0.082) 
0.444*  
(0.075) 
0.413*  
(0.064) 
0.363*  
(0.062) 
MARRIED 
0.252*  
(0.070) 
0.204*  
(0.056) 
0.339*  
(0.049) 
0.217*  
(0.042) 
0.197*  
(0.039) 
DIVORCED/WIDOWED 
-0.1023  
(0.118) 
-0.038    
(0.087) 
-0.078    
(0.082) 
0.001     
(0.067) 
0.015  
(0.063) 
AGE 
0.051*  
(0.015) 
0.052*  
(0.012) 
0.023**  
(0.011) 
0.032*  
(0.010) 
0.020**  
(0.009) 
AGE SQUARED 
-0.001*  
(0.000) 
-0.001*  
(0.000) 
-0.000**  
(0.000) 
-0.000*  
(0.000) 
-0.000**  
(0.000) 
ELEMENTARY EDUC 
-0.217*  
(0.074) 
0.076     
(0.069) 
-0.086     
(0.061) 
-0.044    
(0.055) 
-0.119*** 
(0.061) 
VOCATIONAL TRAINING 
0.001    
(0.057) 
0.117*  
(0.043) 
0.085**  
(0.038) 
0.157*  
(0.033) 
-0.002  
(0.032) 
SECONDARY SPECIAL 
0.136    
(0.054) 
0.281*  
(0.044) 
0.198*  
(0.040) 
0.239*  
(0.034) 
0.177*  
(0.035) 
INCOMPLETE HIGHER 
0.024    
(0.119) 
0.316*  
(0.077) 
0.121     
(0.084) 
0.401*  
(0.154) 
0.175***  
(0.096) 
HIGHER EDUCATION 
0.509*  
(0.063) 
0.600*  
(0.048) 
0.454*  
(0.045) 
0.446*  
(0.038) 
0.409*  
(0.037) 
AGRICULTURE, FORESTRY 
-1.157*  
(0.074) 
-0.893*  
(0.060) 
-0.958*  
(0.052) 
-0.762*  
(0.045) 
-0.841*  
(0.045) 
CONSTRUCTION 
-0.184**  
(0.081) 
-0.071     
(0.066) 
-0.219* 
(0.057) 
-0.085**  
(0.058) 
-0.069  
(0.047) 
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Table E 10.  OLS Estimates of Wage Equation.  Ukraine 1999-2003. Augmented 
Specification.  Males Only-continued 
 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Variable Estimate (Standard Error) 
TRANSPORTATION AND 
COMMUNICATIONS 
-0.006  
(0.065) 
0.105**  
(0.052) 
-0.044     
(0.046) 
0.062     
(0.042) 
0.015  
(0.040) 
EDUCATION, CULTURE 
-0.367*  
(0.094) 
-0.498*  
(0.075) 
-0.503*  
(0.067) 
-0.465*  
(0.061) 
-0.518*  
(0.061) 
HEALTH CARE, PHYSICAL 
CULTURE, SOCIAL 
SECURITY 
-0.217**  
(0.121) 
-0.180***  
(0.093) 
-0.399*  
(0.077) 
-0.415*  
(0.071) 
-0.511*  
(0.070) 
FINANCE, INSURANCE, 
CREDIT, PENSION 
SECURITY 
0.111    
(0.310) 
0.311     
(0.191) 
-0.104    
(0.237) 
0.130     
(0.158) 
-0.046  
(0.119) 
STATE 
0.089    
(0.148) 
0.192     
(0.120) 
0.034     
(0.102) 
0.080     
(0.055) 
-0.017  
(0.049) 
MUNICIPAL UTILITIES, 
SERVICE SPHERE 
-0.308  
(0.089) 
-0.306*  
(0.068) 
-0.366*  
(0.065) 
-0.348*  
(0.076) 
-0.378*  
(0.063) 
TRADE, PUBLIC CATERING, 
INPUT SUPPLY 
-0.215**  
(0.089) 
-0.126***  
(0.067) 
-0.226*  
(0.060) 
-0.169*  
(0.052) 
-0.144*  
(0.049) 
OTHER 
0.047     
(0.087) 
0.244*  
(0.068) 
0.047     
(0.064) 
-0.250**  
(0.121) 
-0.257**  
(0.103) 
WORKING COLLECTIVE OR 
COOPERATIVE 
-0.607*  
(0.061) 
-0.363*  
(0.052) 
-0.320*  
(0.050) 
-0.557*  
(0.049) 
-0.468*  
(0.048) 
STOCK COMPANY 
-0.168*  
(0.057) 
0.099**  
(0.043) 
-0.010     
(0.039) 
-0.058*** 
(0.035) 
-0.146*  
(0.033) 
RENTAL COMPANY 
0.481**  
(0.210) 
0.014     
(0.134) 
-0.102     
(0.106) 
0.130     
(0.100) 
-0.223**  
(0.094) 
FOREIGN OWNERSIP 
0.271     
(0.217) 
0.608*  
(0.150) 
0.483*  
(0.147) 
0.289**  
(0.126) 
0.281***  
(0.0627) 
PRIVATE OWNERSHIP 
0.078    
(0.080) 
0.022     
(0.055) 
-0.095**  
(0.046) 
-0.081**  
(0.040) 
-0.221*   
(0.037) 
OTHER 
-1.245*  
(0.534) 
-0.616*  
(0.212) 
-0.734*  
(0.214) 
0.099     
(0.425) 
-0.238  
(0.288) 
# Obs. 3904 3699 3604 3662 3725 
R-SQ 36% 40% 40% 43% 41% 
Note: * means significant at 99%  level, ** means significant at 95% level, *** means 
significant at 90% level 
 
  
 
143  
Table E 11.  OLS Estimates of Wage Equation.  Ukraine 1999-2003. Augmented 
Specification.  Females Only 
 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Variable Estimate  (Standard Error) 
Intercept 
4.430*  
(0.297) 
5.742*  
(0.226) 
6.266*  
(0.188) 
6.616*  
(0.184) 
6.276*  
(0.167) 
CITY 
0.290*  
(0.041) 
0.120*  
(0.031) 
0.098*  
(0.028) 
0.095*  
(0.027) 
0.112*  
(0.024) 
RURAL 
-0.175*  
(0.047) 
-0.217*  
(0.036) 
-0.147*  
(0.031) 
-0.179*  
(0.031) 
-0.170*  
(0.028) 
KIEV 
0.563*  
(0.100) 
0.484*  
(0.065) 
0.573*  
(0.056) 
0.434*  
(0.055) 
0.349*  
(0.049) 
SOUTH 
0.222*  
(0.062) 
0.122**  
(0.047) 
0.186*  
(0.041) 
0.139*  
(0.040) 
0.107*  
(0.036) 
WEST 
0.079     
(0.056) 
0.010**  
(0.043) 
0.140*  
(0.036) 
0.118*  
(0.035) 
0.055**  
(0.033) 
EAST 
0.231*  
(0.055) 
0.206*  
(0.042) 
0.186*  
(0.036) 
0.180*  
(0.035) 
0.122*  
(0.032) 
NORTH 
0.123** 
(0.063) 
0.110**  
(0.047) 
0.167*  
(0.041) 
0.167*  
(0.039) 
0.117*  
(0.037) 
CRIMEA 
0.277*  
(0.087) 
0.178*  
(0.067) 
0.235*  
(0.061) 
0.323*  
(0.055) 
0.269*  
(0.051) 
MARRIED 
-0.034  
(0.062) 
-0.024  
(0.046) 
-0.047  
(0.041) 
-0.028  
(0.040) 
-0.031  
(0.035) 
DIVORCED/WIDOWED 
-0.091  
(0.071) 
-0.008  
(0.052) 
0.002   
(0.046) 
0.047   
(0.045) 
0.008   
(0.039) 
AGE 
0.082*  
(0.016) 
0.042*  
(0.012) 
0.041*  
(0.010) 
0.037*  
(0.010) 
0.035*  
(0.009) 
AGE SQUARED 
-0.001*  
(0.000) 
-0.000*  
(0.000) 
-0.000*  
(0.000) 
-0.000*  
(0.0016) 
-0.000*  
(0.000) 
ELEMENTARY EDUC 
-0.045  
(0.076) 
-0.138*  
(0.067) 
-0.118**  
(0.060) 
0.084   
(0.063) 
-0.155*  
(0.055) 
VOCATIONAL TRAINING 
0.109***  
(0.058) 
0.108*  
(0.041) 
0.100*  
(0.036) 
0.008   
(0.034) 
-0.027  
(0.030) 
SECONDARY SPECIAL 
0.249*  
(0,047) 
0.185*  
(0.035) 
0.205*  
(0.031) 
0.190*  
(0.028) 
0.084*  
(0.028) 
INCOMPLETE HIGHER 
0.299*  
(0.097) 
0.169*  
(0.062) 
0.162*  
(0.057) 
0.287*  
(0.096) 
0.212*  
(0.071) 
HIGHER EDUCATION 
0.587*  
(0.054) 
0.544*  
(0.039) 
0.474*  
(0.035) 
0.483*  
(0.034) 
0.371*  
(0.031) 
AGRICULTURE, FORESTRY 
-0.926*  
(0.077) 
-0.592*  
(0.061) 
-0.634*  
(0.052) 
-0.692*  
(0.049) 
-0.677*  
(0.046) 
CONSTRUCTION 
0.061   
(0.114) 
0.023*  
(0.089) 
0.043   
(0.086) 
0.091   
(0.077) 
-0.022  
(0.072) 
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Table E 11.  OLS Estimates of Wage Equation.  Ukraine 1999-2003. Augmented 
Specification.  Females Only-continued 
 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Variable Estimate  (Standard Error) 
TRANSPORTATION AND 
COMMUNICATIONS 
0.337*  
(0.080) 
0.247*  
(0.058) 
0.183*  
(0.0007) 
0.137*  
(0.050) 
0.071   
(0.048) 
EDUCATION, CULTURE 
0.082   
(0.065) 
-0.134*  
(0.048) 
-0.209*  
(0.045) 
-0.234*  
(0.043) 
-0.205*  
(0.039) 
HEALTH CARE, PHYSICAL 
CULTURE, SOCIAL SECURITY 
0.223*  
(0.065) 
0.037   
(0.049) 
-0.157*  
(0.044) 
-0.179*  
(0.042) 
-0.231*  
(0.039) 
FINANCE, INSURANCE, CREDIT, 
PENSION SECURITY 
0.493*  
(0.134) 
0.391*  
(0.109) 
0.245*  
(0.093) 
0.071   
(0.076) 
0.109   
(0.071) 
STATE 
0.421*  
(0.090) 
0.398*  
(0.067) 
0.056   
(0.065) 
0.029   
(0.054) 
0.012   
(0.046) 
MUNICIPAL UTILITIES, SERVICE 
SPHERE 
0.007   
(0.086) 
-0.070  
(0.062) 
-0.197*  
(0.054) 
-0.285*  
(0.058) 
-0.241*  
(0.055) 
TRADE, PUBLIC CATERING, INPUT 
SUPPLY 
0.219*  
(0.067) 
-0.002  
(0.051) 
-0.054  
(0.045) 
-0.083*** 
(0.042) 
-0.173*  
(0.039) 
OTHER 
0.394*  
(0.118) 
0.253*  
(0.086) 
-0.053  
(0.078) 
-0.065  
(0.085) 
-0.077  
(0.083) 
WORKING COLLECTIVE OR 
COOPERATIVE 
-0.293*  
(0.065) 
-0.359*  
(0.052) 
-0.315*  
(0.048) 
-0.259*  
(0.047) 
-0.240*  
(0.047) 
STOCK COMPANY 
0.065   
(0.059) 
0.136*  
(0.043) 
0.028   
(0.038) 
0.028   
(0.036) 
-0.001  
(0.034) 
RENTAL COMPANY 
0.126   
(0.186) 
-0.069*  
(0.129) 
-0.057  
(0.109) 
0.166   
(0.104) 
-0.053  
(0.120) 
FOREIGN OWNERSIP 
0.750*  
(0.220) 
0.441**  
(0.216) 
-0.149  
(0.147)   
0.494*  
(0.127) 
0.224**  
(1.33) 
PRIVATE OWNERSHIP 
0.046   
(0.076) 
0.020   
(0.052) 
-0.123*  
(0.045) 
-0.065  
(0.041) 
-0.031  
(0.037) 
OTHER 
-0.613  
(1.042) 
-0.561**  
(0.276) 
-1.736*  
(0.259) 
-0.804  
(0.656) 
-0.164  
(0.424) 
# Obs. 3948 3912 3918 3854 3925 
R-SQ 28% 31% 30% 29% 28% 
Note: * means significant at 99%  level, ** means significant at 95% level, *** means significant 
at 90% level 
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Table E 12.  OLS Estimates of Wage Equation.  Lithuania 2000. Augmented 
Specification 
 
Males 
and 
Females 
Males 
Only 
Females 
Only 
INTERCEPT 
5.386*  
(0.186) 
5.626*  
(0.261) 
4.863*  
(0.265) 
MARRIED 
0.130*  
(0.029) 
0.286*  
(0.044) 
-0.064***  
(0.039) 
DIVORCED/WIDOWED 
0.124*  
(0.038) 
-0.053  
(0.077) 
0.019  
(0.045) 
FEMALE 
-0.203*  
(0.018) N/A N/A 
AGE 
0.006   
(0.006) 
-0.011   
(0.009) 
0.033*  
(0.010) 
AGE SQUARED 
-0.000*   
(0.000) 
0.000*   
(0.000) 
-0.000*   
(0.000) 
ELEMENTARY EDUC 
-0.108*   
(0.030) 
-0.109*  
(0.040) 
-0.054  
(0.050) 
SECONDARY SPECIAL 
0.073*  
(0.020) 
0.082*  
(0.030) 
0.052**  
(0.026) 
HIGHER 
0.346*  
(0.029) 
0.344*  
(0.046) 
0.322*  
(0.036) 
LEGISLATORS AND SENIOR OFFICIALS 
0.702*  
(0.040) 
0.749*  
(0.059) 
0.596*  
(0.055) 
SCIENTIFIC AND INTELLECTUAL 
PROFESSIONALS 
0.566*  
(0.035) 
0.557*  
(0.060) 
0.536*  
(0.041) 
MEDIUM LEVEL TECHNICIALS AND 
PROFESSIONALS 
0.503*  
(0.034) 
0.591*  
(0.056) 
0.434*  
(0.042) 
OFFICE WORKERS 
0.432*  
(0.038) 
0.389*  
(0.075) 
0.407*  
(0.043) 
SERVICE WORKERS, FARMERS, AND FISHERMEN 
0.263*  
(0.031) 
0.372*  
(0.057) 
0.171*  
(0.037) 
AGRICULTURAL WORKERS, FARMERS, AND 
FISHERMEN 
0.259*  
(0.074) 
0.325*  
(0.095) 
0.237***  
(0.125) 
OPERATORS AND CRAFTSMEN OF MECHANIC 
ARTS AND OTHER TRADES 
0.342*  
(0.027) 
0.339*  
(0.039) 
0.313*  
(0.041) 
OPERATORS OF INSTALLATIONS AND 
MACHINERY AND ASSEMBLERS 
0.417*  
(0.031) 
0.441*  
(0.040) 
0.357*  
(0.066) 
PRIVATE SECTOR 
-0.149*  
(0.018) 
-0.166*  
(0.027) 
-0.123*  
(0.024) 
# Obs. 4324 2168 2156 
R-SQ 40% 38% 42% 
Note: * means significant at 99% level, ** means significant at 95% level, *** means 
significant at 90% level 
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Table E 13.  Heckman Two Stage Wage Estimation.  Ukraine 1999-2003.  
Augmented Specification.  Males and Females 
 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Variable Estimate  (Standard Error) 
INTERCEPT 
6.384*  
(0.163) 
6.605*  
(0.143) 
7.245*  
(0.129) 
7.415*  
(0.118) 
7.181*   
(0.111) 
CITY 
0.143*  
(0.026) 
0.056**  
(0.022) 
0.070*  
(0.021) 
0.075*  
(0.019) 
0.116*   
(0.017) 
RURAL 
-0.144*  
(0.028) 
-0.205*  
(0.024) 
-0.142*  
(0.022) 
-0.177*  
(0.021) 
-0.164* 
(0.020) 
KIEV 
0.479*  
(0.090) 
0.470*  
(0.062) 
0.482*  
(0.054) 
0.431*  
(0.050) 
0.233*   
(0.046) 
SOUTH 
0.147*  
(0.055) 
0.202*  
(0.044) 
0.246*  
(0.038) 
0.243*  
(0.036) 
0.136*   
(0.033) 
WEST 
0.153*  
(0.050) 
0.177*  
(0.038) 
0.223*  
(0.034) 
0.177*  
(0.031) 
0.045     
(0.030) 
EAST 
0.123** 
(0.049) 
0.248*  
(0.038) 
0.239*  
(0.033) 
0.254*  
(0.031) 
0.099*   
(0.030) 
NORTH 
0.011*  
(0.056) 
0.083**  
(0.044) 
0.155*  
(0.039) 
0.190*  
(0.036) 
0.111*   
(0.034) 
CRIMEA 
0.351*  
(0.080) 
0.304*  
(0.062) 
0.400*  
(0.056) 
0.417*  
(0.049) 
0.286*   
(0.047) 
MARRIED 
0.120*  
(0.037) 
0.082**  
(0.032) 
0.133*  
(0.029) 
0.106*  
(0.026) 
0.137*   
(0.024) 
DIVORCED/WIDOWED 
0.029   
(0.049) 
0.015**  
(0.041) 
0.051  
(0.037) 
0.089*  
(0.033) 
0.105*   
(0.030) 
FEMALE 
-0.253*  
(0.023) 
-0.262*  
(0.020) 
-0.269*  
(0.018) 
-0.268*  
(0.017) 
-0.29*    
(0.016) 
ELEMENTARY EDUC 
-0.099**  
(0.041) 
-0.041**  
(0.042) 
-0.111*  
(0.038) 
-0.021  
(0.036) 
-0.084** 
(0.037) 
VOCATIONAL TRAINING 
0.071**  
(0.032) 
0.111*  
(0.026) 
0.081*  
(0.024) 
0.072*  
(0.022) 
0.010     
(0.020) 
SECONDARY SPECIAL 
0.153*  
(0.028) 
0.211*  
(0.024) 
0.182*  
(0.022) 
0.172*  
(0.020) 
0.140*   
(0.020) 
INCOMPLETE HIGHER 
0.173*  
(0.059) 
0.234*  
(0.043) 
0.170*  
(0.044) 
0.221*  
(0.077) 
0.216*    
(0.053) 
HIGHER EDUCATION 
0.465*  
(0.034) 
0.519*  
(0.028) 
0.470*  
(0.026) 
0.437*  
(0.023) 
0.411*   
(0.022) 
AGE 
0.050*  
(0.009) 
0.046*  
(0.008) 
0.031*  
(0.007) 
0.034*  
(0.006) 
0.027*   
(0.006) 
AGE SQUARED 
-0.001*  
(0.000) 
-0.001*  
(0.000) 
0.000*  
(0.000) 
0.000*  
(0.000) 
0.000*   
(0.000) 
AGRICULTURE, FORESTRY 
-0.851*  
(0.039) 
-0.681*  
(0.036) 
-0.746*  
(0.032) 
-0.675*  
(0.028) 
-0.700* 
(0.028) 
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Table E 13. Heckman Two Stage Wage Estimation.  Ukraine 1999-2003.  
Augmented Specification.  Males and Females-continued 
 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Variable Estimate  (Standard Error) 
CONSTRUCTION 
-0.104**  
(0.051) 
-0.029**  
(0.045) 
-0.140*  
(0.041) 
-0.036  
(0.037) 
-0.054    
(0.034) 
TRANSPORTATION AND 
COMMUNICATIONS 
0.022   
(0.040) 
0.083**  
(0.034) 
-0.001*  
(0.032) 
0.086*  
(0.029) 
0.024     
(0.028) 
EDUCATION, CULTURE 
-0.305*  
(0.043) 
-0.407*  
(0.036) 
-0.445*  
(0.034) 
-0.395*  
(0.032) 
-0.406* 
(0.030) 
HEALTH CARE, PHYSICAL 
CULTURE, SOCIAL SECURITY 
-0.211*  
(0.045) 
-0.231*  
(0.038) 
-0.395*  
(0.034) 
-0.362*  
(0.032) 
-0.427* 
(0.030) 
FINANCE, INSURANCE, CREDIT, 
PENSION SECURITY 
0.100   
(0.102) 
0.215**  
(0.088) 
-0.025  
(0.086) 
-0.010  
(0.065) 
-0.022    
(0.058) 
STATE 
0.001   
(0.064) 
0.149*  
(0.054) 
-0.091*** 
(0.051) 
-0.005  
(0.035) 
-0.051*** 
(0.031) 
MUNICIPAL UTILITIES, 
SERVICE SPHERE 
-0.256*  
(0.050) 
-0.225*  
(0.040) 
-0.318*  
(0.038) 
-0.374*  
(0.043) 
-0.318* 
(0.039) 
TRADE, PUBLIC CATERING, 
INPUT SUPPLY 
-0.085**  
(0.043) 
-0.152*  
(0.036) 
-0.236*  
(0.033) 
-0.185*  
(0.030) 
-0.205* 
(0.028) 
OTHER 
0.048   
(0.055) 
0.185*  
(0.047) 
-0.027  
(0.045) 
-0.130**  
(0.065) 
-0.125** 
(0.062) 
WORKING COLLECTIVE OR 
COOPERATIVE 
-0.296*  
(0.032) 
-0.269*  
(0.031) 
-0.282*  
(0.031) 
-0.301*  
(0.029) 
-0.291* 
(0.030) 
PRIVATE OWNERSHIP 
0.125*  
(0.045) 
0.059***  
(0.034) 
-0.063**  
(0.030) 
-0.037  
(0.026) 
-0.109* 
(0.024) 
FOREIGN OWNERSIP 
0.532*  
(0.131) 
0.535*  
(0.108) 
0.388*  
(0.104) 
0.479*  
(0.081) 
0.252** 
(0.092) 
STOCK COMPANY 
0.019   
(0.033) 
0.123*  
(0.027) 
0.019  
(0.025) 
0.003  
(0.023) 
-0.051** 
(0.021) 
RENTAL COMPANY 
0.396*  
(0.115) 
0.057  
(0.080) 
-0.094  
(0.068) 
0.080  
(0.065) 
-0.163** 
(0.065) 
OTHER 
-0.846**  
(0.338) 
-0.523*  
(0.145) 
-0.852*  
(0.145) 
-0.089  
(0.289) 
-0.321    
(0.209) 
Selection Equation 
INTERCEPT 
-0.264*  
(0.034) 
0.464*  
(0.036) 
-0.322*  
(0.065) 
0.479*  
(0.037) 
0.337*   
(0.036) 
NUMBER OF CHILDREN UNDER 
7 
0.000*  
(0.015) 
-0.098*  
(0.017) 
0.000*  
(0.000) 
-0.094*  
(0.020) 
-0.105* 
(0.019) 
HEAD OF HOUSEHOLD 
-0.079*  
(0.017) 
0.175*  
(0.019) 
-0.083*  
(0.018) 
0.153*  
(0.020) 
0.148*    
(0.019) 
NON-LABOR INCOME 
0.13*   
(0.000) 
0.000*  
(0.000) 
0.190*  
(0.020) 
0.000*  
(0.000) 
0.000*   
(0.000) 
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Table E 13.  Heckman Two Stage Wage Estimation.  Ukraine 1999-2003.  
Augmented Specification.  Males and Females-continued 
 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Variable Estimate  (Standard Error) 
NUMBER OF PENSIONERS 
0.000*  
(0.013) 
-0.085*  
(0.021) 
0.000*  
(0.000) 
-0.097*  
(0.021) 
-0.119* 
(0.021) 
KIEV 
-0.107   
(0.072) 
0.055  
(0.068) 
-0.049**  
(0.023) 
0.115***  
(0.068) 
0.168*   
(0.064) 
SOUTH 
-0.039**  
(0.043) 
-0.104**  
(0.046) 
0.160**  
(0.071) 
-0.065  
(0.047) 
-0.010* 
(0.045) 
WEST 
-0.121*  
(0.039) 
-0.183*  
(0.041) 
-0.120**  
(0.047) 
-0.210*  
(0.041) 
-0.100** 
(0.040) 
EAST 
-0.192**  
(0.038) 
-0.077*** 
(0.040) 
-0.258*  
(0.042) 
-0.119**  
(0.041) 
0.024     
(0.040) 
CENTRAL 
-0.080*  
(0.042) 
-0.070  
(0.044) 
-0.055  
(0.042) 
-0.067  
(0.045) 
-0.146** 
(0.044) 
CRIMEA 
-0.173*  
(0.060) 
-0.182*  
(0.063) 
-0.076*** 
(0.045) 
-0.258*  
(0.062) 
-0.172** 
(0.060) 
Lambda -1.441 -1.040 -0.902 -0.848 -0.785 
Note: * means significant at 99% level, ** means significant at 95% level, *** means 
significant at 90% level 
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Table E 14.  Heckman Two Stage Wage Estimation.  Ukraine 1999-2003.  
Augmented Specification.  Males Only 
 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Variable Estimate  (Standard Error) 
INTERCEPT 
6.476* 
(0.235) 
6.446* 
(0.207) 
7.172* 
(0.195) 
7.279* 
(0.170) 
7.099* 
(0.16) 
CITY 
0.141* 
(0.041) 
0.015 
(0.035) 
0.069 
(0.033) 
0.067** 
(0.030) 
0.141* 
(0.027) 
RURAL 
-0.180* 
(0.044) 
-0.256* 
(0.037) 
-0.159* 
(0.035) 
-0.225* 
(0.031) 
-0.185* 
(0.031) 
KIEV 
0.492* 
(0.135) 
0.468* 
(0.100) 
0.516* 
(0.086) 
0.453* 
(0.076) 
0.253* 
(0.070) 
SOUTH 
0.156** 
(0.082) 
0.242* 
(0.068) 
0.304* 
(0.059) 
0.330* 
(0.052) 
0.189* 
(0.050) 
WEST 
0.195* 
(0.073) 
0.184* 
(0.058) 
0.238* 
(0.052) 
0.156* 
(0.046) 
0.054 
(0.046) 
EAST 
0.139*** 
(0.073) 
0.343* 
(0.058) 
0.334* 
(0.052) 
0.324* 
(0.046) 
0.178* 
(0.045) 
NORTH 
0.025 
(0.083) 
0.062 
(0.068) 
0.225* 
(0.060) 
0.257* 
(0.053) 
0.199* 
(0.052) 
CRIMEA 
0.525* 
(0.122) 
0.417* 
(0.096) 
0.472* 
(0.086) 
0.461* 
(0.074) 
0.280* 
(0.072) 
MARRIED 
0.169* 
(0.057) 
0.111** 
(0.051) 
0.219* 
(0.046) 
0.157* 
(0.040) 
0.185* 
(0.036) 
DIVORCED/WIDOWED 
-0.005 
(0.093) 
-0.133*** 
(0.077) 
-0.078 
(0.074) 
-0.012 
(0.061) 
0.093*** 
(0.056) 
ELEMENTARY EDUC 
-0.186* 
(0.058) 
0.004 
(0.060) 
-0.100*** 
(0.054) 
-0.037 
(0.049) 
-0.105** 
(0.054) 
VOCATIONAL TRAINING 
-0.008 
(0.045) 
0.117** 
(0.038) 
0.072** 
(0.035) 
0.121* 
(0.030) 
0.027 
(0.028) 
SECONDARY SPECIAL 
0.065 
(0.044) 
0.250* 
(0.039) 
0.183* 
(0.036) 
0.187* 
(0.031) 
0.187* 
(0.032) 
INCOMPLETE HIGHER 
0.082 
(0.094) 
0.276* 
(0.068) 
0.119 
(0.076) 
0.265*** 
(0.138) 
0.193** 
(0.086) 
HIGHER EDUCATION 
0.441* 
(0.052) 
0.543* 
(0.044) 
0.461* 
(0.041) 
0.419* 
(0.036) 
0.427* 
(0.033) 
AGE 
0.048* 
(0.012) 
0.055* 
(0.011) 
0.033* 
(0.010) 
0.039* 
(0.009) 
0.027* 
(0.008) 
AGE SQUARED 
-0.001* 
(0.000) 
-0.001* 
(0.000) 
0.000* 
(0.000) 
-0.001* 
(0.000) 
0.000* 
(0.000) 
AGRICULTURE, FORESTRY 
-0.937* 
(0.057) 
-0.753* 
(0.051) 
-0.856* 
(0.046) 
-0.711* 
(0.039) 
-0.746* 
(0.039) 
CONSTRUCTION 
-0.149** 
(0.068) 
-0.074 
(0.059) 
-0.176* 
(0.052) 
-0.065 
(0.046) 
-0.062 
(0.043) 
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Table E 14.  Heckman Two Stage Wage Estimation.  Ukraine 1999-2003.  
Augmented Specification.  Males Only-continued 
 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Variable Estimate  (Standard Error) 
TRANSPORTATION AND 
COMMUNICATIONS 
-0.045 
(0.054) 
0.039 
(0.047) 
-0.066 
(0.043) 
0.065*** 
(0.039) 
0.016 
(0.037) 
EDUCATION, CULTURE 
-0.458* 
(0.079) 
-0.581* 
(0.067) 
-0.578* 
(0.062) 
-0.503* 
(0.057) 
-0.532* 
(0.056) 
HEALTH CARE, PHYSICAL 
CULTURE, SOCIAL SECURITY 
-0.342* 
(0.102) 
-0.307* 
(0.085) 
-0.489* 
(0.071) 
-0.461* 
(0.065) 
-0.534* 
(0.063) 
FINANCE, INSURANCE, CREDIT, 
PENSION SECURITY 
-0.122 
(0.277) 
0.216 
(0.173) 
-0.289 
(0.220) 
-0.019 
(0.151) 
-0.078 
(0.110) 
STATE 
-0.046 
(0.125) 
0.053 
(0.109) 
-0.109 
(0.095) 
0.011 
(0.051) 
-0.022 
(0.045) 
MUNICIPAL UTILITIES, SERVICE 
SPHERE 
-0.340* 
(0.072) 
-0.291* 
(0.059) 
-0.338* 
(0.059) 
-0.360* 
(0.072) 
-0.341* 
(0.058) 
TRADE, PUBLIC CATERING, 
INPUT SUPPLY 
-0.191* 
(0.074) 
-0.176* 
(0.059) 
-0.266* 
(0.055) 
-0.166* 
(0.048) 
-0.175* 
(0.045) 
OTHER 
-0.063 
(0.073) 
0.149** 
(0.063) 
-0.041 
(0.060) 
-0.135 
(0.112) 
-0.254* 
(0.095) 
WORKING COLLECTIVE OR 
COOPERATIVE 
-0.369* 
(0.046) 
-0.288* 
(0.044) 
-0.307* 
(0.043) 
-0.461* 
(0.043) 
-0.365* 
(0.042) 
PRIVATE OWNERSHIP 
0.108 
(0.066) 
0.112** 
(0.049) 
-0.054 
(0.042) 
-0.068*** 
(0.037) 
-0.166* 
(0.034) 
FOREIGN OWNERSIP 
0.463* 
(0.18) 
0.569* 
(0.136) 
0.749* 
(0.156) 
0.326* 
(0.115) 
0.237*** 
(0.141) 
STOCK COMPANY 
-0.049 
(0.047) 
0.119* 
(0.038) 
-0.001 
(0.035) 
-0.061*** 
(0.032) 
-0.102* 
(0.03) 
RENTAL COMPANY 
0.477* 
(0.186) 
0.114 
(0.115) 
-0.09 
(0.094) 
0.065 
(0.091) 
-0.206** 
(0.082) 
OTHER 
-0.866** 
(0.388) 
-0.511* 
(0.175) 
-0.666* 
(0.197) 
-0.034 
(0.386) 
-0.266 
(0.25) 
Selection Equation 
INTERCEPT 
0.508* 
(0.051) 
0.488* 
(0.054) 
0.467* 
(0.055) 
0.471* 
(0.054) 
0.322* 
(0.052) 
NUMBER OF CHILDREN UNDER 7
0.025 
(0.025) 
0.074* 
(0.027) 
0.117* 
(0.032) 
0.098* 
(0.034) 
0.101* 
(0.031) 
HEAD OF HOUSEHOLD 
0.121* 
(0.025) 
0.112* 
(0.027) 
0.178* 
(0.030) 
0.105* 
(0.030) 
0.104* 
(0.028) 
NON-LABOR INCOME 
0.000* 
(0.000) 
0.000* 
(0.000) 
0.000* 
(0.000) 
0.000* 
(0.000) 
0.000* 
(0.000) 
NUMBER OF PENSIONERS 
-0.162* 
(0.020) 
-0.112* 
(0.029) 
-0.139* 
(0.032) 
-0.141* 
(0.031) 
-0.183* 
(0.030) 
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Table E 14. Heckman Two Stage Wage Estimation.  Ukraine 1999-2003.  
Augmented Specification.  Males Only-continued 
 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Variable Estimate  (Standard Error) 
KIEV 
0.072 
(0.111) 
0.168 
(0.109) 
0.206*** 
(0.110)
0.223** 
(0.108) 
0.145 
(0.092) 
SOUTH 
-0.094 
(0.063) 
-0.113*** 
(0.068) 
-0.101 
(0.069)
0.010 
(0.068) 
0.085 
(0.065) 
WEST 
-0.186* 
(0.056) 
-0.172* 
(0.059) 
-0.246* 
(0.061)
-0.183* 
(0.060) 
-0.037 
(0.058) 
EAST 
0.015 
(0.057) 
-0.084 
(0.058) 
0.020 
(0.062)
-0.029 
(0.060) 
0.097*** 
(0.058) 
CENTRAL 
-0.166* 
(0.061) 
-0.107*** 
(0.064) 
-0.048 
(0.066)
-0.048 
(0.064) 
-0.105*** 
(0.063) 
CRIMEA 
-0.279* 
(0.090) 
-0.203** 
(0.092) 
-0.262* 
(0.095)
-0.286* 
(0.090) 
-0.123 
(0.089) 
Lambda -1.486 -1.126 -0.960 -0.864 -0.836 
Note: * means significant at 99% level, ** means significant at 95% level, *** means 
significant at 90% level 
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Table E 15.  Heckman Two Stage Wage Estimation.  Ukraine 1999-2003.  
Augmented Specification.  Females Only 
 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Variable Estimate  (Standard) 
INTERCEPT 
6.203* 
(0.243) 
6.667* 
(0.201) 
7.055* 
(0.172) 
7.403* 
(0.165) 
6.897*  
(0.155) 
CITY 
0.149* 
(0.033) 
0.082* 
(0.028) 
0.082* 
(0.025) 
0.083* 
(0.024) 
0.089*  
(0.022) 
RURAL 
-0.103* 
(0.036) 
-0.175* 
(0.031) 
-0.123* 
(0.027) 
-0.132* 
(0.027) 
-0.136* 
(0.025) 
KIEV 
0.457* 
(0.118) 
0.433* 
(0.076) 
0.443* 
(0.066) 
0.381* 
(0.064) 
0.223*  
(0.057) 
SOUTH 
0.129*** 
(0.073) 
0.150* 
(0.055) 
0.184* 
(0.047) 
0.157* 
(0.047) 
0.075*** 
(0.042) 
WEST 
0.112*** 
(0.065) 
0.179* 
(0.049) 
0.206* 
(0.042) 
0.188* 
(0.041) 
0.044    
(0.038) 
EAST 
0.092   
(0.064) 
0.158* 
(0.048) 
0.137* 
(0.041) 
0.179* 
(0.041) 
0.031    
(0.037) 
NORTH 
-0.010 
(0.074) 
0.084  
(0.055) 
0.095** 
(0.048) 
0.129* 
(0.047) 
0.037    
(0.043) 
CRIMEA 
0.182*** 
(0.103) 
0.201** 
(0.078) 
0.319* 
(0.069) 
0.367* 
(0.064) 
0.275*  
(0.058) 
MARRIED 
0.059   
(0.049) 
0.021  
(0.041) 
0.017   
(0.037) 
0.029  
(0.035) 
0.036    
(0.032) 
DIVORCED/WIDOWED 
0.011** 
(0.058) 
0.010  
(0.046) 
0.011   
(0.042) 
0.067*** 
(0.039) 
0.057    
(0.036) 
ELEMENTARY EDUC 
0.032   
(0.058) 
-0.076 
(0.057) 
-0.111** 
(0.052) 
0.068  
(0.055) 
-0.086*** 
(0.05) 
VOCATIONAL TRAINING 
0.149* 
(0.045) 
0.120* 
(0.036) 
0.096* 
(0.032) 
-0.004   
(0.03) 
-0.005  
(0.028) 
SECONDARY SPECIAL 
0.223* 
(0.036) 
0.185* 
(0.030) 
0.163* 
(0.027) 
0.159* 
(0.025) 
0.095*  
(0.025) 
INCOMPLETE HIGHER 
0.305* 
(0.075) 
0.171* 
(0.053) 
0.171* 
(0.050) 
0.207** 
(0.086) 
0.224*  
(0.065) 
HIGHER EDUCATION 
0.497* 
(0.043) 
0.508* 
(0.034) 
0.450* 
(0.031) 
0.450*  
(0.03) 
0.385*  
(0.028) 
AGE 
0.036* 
(0.013) 
0.024** 
(0.011) 
0.025* 
(0.009) 
0.017*** 
(0.009) 
0.027*  
(0.008) 
AGE SQUARED 
0.000   
(0.000) 
0.000*** 
(0.000) 
0.000** 
(0.000) 
0.000  
(0.000) 
0.000*  
(0.000) 
AGRICULTURE, FORESTRY 
-0.669* 
(0.055) 
-0.513* 
(0.050) 
-0.543* 
(0.045) 
-0.529* 
(0.041) 
-0.545* 
(0.041) 
CONSTRUCTION 
-0.047 
(0.090) 
0.015  
(0.078) 
-0.014 
(0.078) 
0.084  
(0.067) 
-0.016  
(0.066) 
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Table E 15.  Heckman Two Stage Wage Estimation.  Ukraine 1999-2003.  
Augmented Specification.  Females Only-continued 
 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Variable Estimate  (Standard) 
TRANSPORTATION AND 
COMMUNICATIONS 
0.169* 
(0.063) 
0.155* 
(0.052) 
0.127** 
(0.049) 
0.152* 
(0.044) 
0.066    
(0.044) 
EDUCATION, CULTURE 
-0.121** 
(0.052) 
-0.270* 
(0.043) 
-0.317* 
(0.041) 
-0.281* 
(0.038) 
-0.284* 
(0.036) 
HEALTH CARE, PHYSICAL 
CULTURE, SOCIAL SECURITY 
-0.055 
(0.052) 
-0.124* 
(0.044) 
-0.284* 
(0.040) 
-0.258* 
(0.037) 
-0.311* 
(0.036) 
FINANCE, INSURANCE, CREDIT, 
PENSION SECURITY 
0.256** 
(0.105) 
0.260* 
(0.096) 
0.134   
(0.085) 
0.094  
(0.067) 
0.069    
(0.065) 
STATE 
0.134** 
(0.072) 
0.245* 
(0.061) 
-0.003 
(0.059) 
0.002  
(0.048) 
-0.042  
(0.042) 
MUNICIPAL UTILITIES, SERVICE 
SPHERE 
-0.085 
(0.068) 
-0.098*** 
(0.054) 
-0.229* 
(0.048) 
-0.332* 
(0.052) 
-0.236* 
(0.051) 
TRADE, PUBLIC CATERING, 
INPUT SUPPLY 
0.032   
(0.053) 
-0.060 
(0.045) 
-0.142* 
(0.041) 
-0.126* 
(0.038) 
-0.192* 
(0.035) 
OTHER 
0.190** 
(0.095) 
0.207  
(0.076) 
-0.062 
(0.069) 
-0.064 
(0.075) 
0.014    
(0.079) 
WORKING COLLECTIVE OR 
COOPERATIVE 
-0.191* 
(0.047) 
-0.213* 
(0.043) 
-0.239* 
(0.043) 
-0.129* 
(0.039) 
-0.193* 
(0.041) 
PRIVATE OWNERSHIP 
0.169* 
(0.062) 
0.023  
(0.046) 
-0.058 
(0.041) 
0.001  
(0.037) 
-0.028  
(0.034) 
FOREIGN OWNERSIP 
0.594* 
(0.189) 
0.357** 
(0.188) 
-0.100 
(0.126) 
0.636* 
(0.112) 
0.302** 
(0.119) 
STOCK COMPANY 
0.115** 
(0.045) 
0.163* 
(0.038) 
0.054   
(0.034) 
0.080* 
(0.032) 
0.018    
(0.031) 
RENTAL COMPANY 
0.222   
(0.140) 
0.006  
(0.108) 
-0.124 
(0.096) 
0.074  
(0.091) 
-0.045    
(0.11) 
OTHER 
-0.783 
(0.884) 
-0.409   
(0.26) 
-1.492* 
(0.212) 
-0.953*** 
(0.564) 
-0.421  
(0.429) 
Selection Equation 
INTERCEPT 
0.430* 
(0.047) 
0.428* 
(0.049) 
0.512* 
(0.052) 
0.457* 
(0.051) 
0.330*  
(0.050) 
NUMBER OF CHILDREN UNDER 7
-0.150* 
(0.019) 
-0.266* 
(0.024) 
-0.237* 
(0.025) 
-0.239* 
(0.026) 
-0.294* 
(0.027) 
HEAD OF HOUSEHOLD 
0.146* 
(0.025) 
0.236* 
(0.029) 
0.182* 
(0.029) 
0.189* 
(0.028) 
0.174*  
(0.028) 
NON-LABOR INCOME 
0.000* 
(0.000) 
0.000* 
(0.000) 
0.000** 
(0.000) 
0.000* 
(0.000) 
0.000*  
(0.000) 
NUMBER OF PENSIONERS 
-0.051* 
(0.019) 
-0.074** 
(0.030) 
0.025   
(0.033) 
-0.068** 
(0.029) 
-0.059** 
(0.030) 
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Table E 15.  Heckman Two Stage Wage Estimation.  Ukraine 1999-2003.  
Augmented Specification.  Females Only-continued 
 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Variable Estimate  (Standard) 
KIEV 
-0.160*** 
(0.097) 
-0.075 
(0.090) 
0.118   
(0.095) 
0.015  
(0.089) 
0.161*** 
(0.088) 
SOUTH 
-0.148** 
(0.059) 
-0.083 
(0.063) 
-0.130** 
(0.065) 
-0.131** 
(0.064) 
-0.094  
(0.062) 
WEST 
-0.197* 
(0.053) 
-0.195* 
(0.056) 
-0.268* 
(0.059) 
-0.248* 
(0.057) 
-0.151* 
(0.056) 
EAST 
-0.162* 
(0.053) 
-0.089 
(0.055) 
-0.111 
(0.058) 
-0.213* 
(0.057) 
-0.055  
(0.055) 
CENTRAL 
-0.176* 
(0.058) 
-0.035 
(0.062) 
-0.098 
(0.063) 
-0.080 
(0.062) 
-0.180* 
(0.061) 
CRIMEA 
-0.236* 
(0.082) 
-0.169*** 
(0.088) 
-0.359* 
(0.089) 
-0.226* 
(0.085) 
-0.205** 
(0.083) 
Lambda -1.354 -0.936 -0.811 -0.806 -0.698 
Note: * means significant at 99% level, ** means significant at 95% level, *** means 
significant at 90% level 
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Table E 16. Heckman Two Stage Wage Estimation.  Lithuania 2000. Augmented 
Specification. 
 
Males 
and 
Females
Males 
Only 
Females 
Only 
INTERCEPT 
5.563*  
(0.177) 
5.825*  
(0.249) 
5.106*  
(0.244) 
MARRIED 
0.099*  
(0.028) 
0.216*  
(0.042) 
-0.048  
(0.037) 
DIVORCED/WIDOWED 
0.074**  
(0.036) 
-0.079   
(0.073) 
0.012  
(0.042) 
FEMALE 
-0.185*  
(0.017) N/A N/A 
AGE 
0.006   
(0.006) 
-0.010   
(0.009) 
0.029*  
(0.010) 
AGE SQUARED 
-0.000   
(0.000) 
-0.000   
(0.000) 
-0.000   
(0.000) 
ELEMENTARY EDUC 
-0.094*  
(0.029) 
-0.100*  
(0.038) 
-0.039  
(0.044) 
SECONDARY SPECIAL 
0.075*  
(0.019) 
0.086*  
(0.029) 
0.051**  
(0.025) 
HIGHER EDUCATION 
0.349*  
(0.028) 
0.345*  
(0.044) 
0.343*  
(0.034) 
LEGISLATORS AND SENIOR OFFICIALS 
0.668*  
(0.039) 
0.687*  
(0.057) 
0.611*  
(0.051) 
SCIENTIFIC AND INTELLECTUAL 
PROFESSIONALS 
0.523*  
(0.033) 
0.490*  
(0.058) 
0.515*  
(0.039) 
MEDIUM LEVEL TECHNICIALS AND 
PROFESSIONALS 
0.475*  
(0.033) 
0.552*  
(0.055) 
0.420*  
(0.039) 
OFFICE WORKERS 
0.394*  
(0.037) 
0.341*  
(0.072) 
0.388*  
(0.040) 
SERVICE WORKERS, FARMERS, AND 
FISHERMEN 
0.223*  
(0.030) 
0.320*  
(0.055) 
0.149*  
(0.035) 
AGRICULTURAL WORKERS, FARMERS, AND 
FISHERMEN 
0.210  
(0.071) 
0.261*  
(0.092) 
0.235**  
(0.116) 
OPERATORS AND CRAFTSMEN OF MECHANIC 
ARTS AND OTHER TRADES 
0.304*  
(0.026) 
0.298*  
(0.037) 
0.287*  
(0.038) 
OPERATORS OF INSTALLATIONS AND 
MACHINERY AND ASSEMBLERS 
0.370*  
(0.030) 
0.392*  
(0.038) 
0.361*  
(0.061) 
PRIVATE SECTOR 
-0.120*  
(0.017) 
-0.146*  
(0.026) 
-0.089*  
(0.023) 
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Table E 16.  Heckman Two Stage Wage Estimation.  Lithuania 2000. Augmented 
Specification-continued 
Selection Equation 
INTERCEPT 
0.388*  
(0.038) 
0.066   
(0.064) 
0.595*  
(0.048) 
NUMBER OF CHILDREN UNDER 7 
0.043 
(0.036) 
0.184*  
(0.060) 
0.090**  
(0.047) 
HEAD OF HOUSEHOLD 
0.746*  
(0.040) 
0.954*  
(0.063) 
0.562*  
(0.055) 
NON-LABOR INCOME 
0.000*   
(0.000) 
0.000*   
(0.000) 
0.000*  
(0.000) 
NUMBER OF PENSIONERS 
-0.127*  
(0.045) 
-
0.137***  
(0.072) 
-
0.154**  
(0.060) 
Lambda -0.478 -0.445 -0.461 
Note: * means significant at 99% level, ** means significant at 95% level, *** means 
significant at 90% level 
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